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CONSTITUTIONAL GRAVITY: A UNITARY THEORY
OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
AND PUBLIC CIVIL JUSTICE

Richard C. Reuben
Under the traditionalbipolar model, civil dispute resolution is generally divided
into two spheres: trial, which is public in nature and therefore subject to constitutional due process, and alternative dispute resolution (ADR), which is private
in nature and therefore not subject to such constraints. In this Article, Professor
Richard Reuben proposes a unitary understandingof public civil dispute resolution, one that recognizes that ADR is often energized by state action and thus
is constitutionally required to comply with minimal but meaningful due process
standards. Dependingupon the process, such standardsmight include the right to
an impartial forum, the right to present evidence and confront adverse evidence,
and a qualified right to counsel. Reuben concludes that the effect of the ADR
movement should be the expansion of our concept of public civil justice, rather
than its contractionthrough privatization.
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INTRODUCTION

The arrival of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) onto the modem
legal landscape brings with it a challenge for the twenty-first century that is
worthy of an era of millennial change: defining and ensuring the vitality of
public systems of justice that are essential to the continuing consolidation
of constitutional democracies. Naturally, the United States provides a most
useful vehicle for analyzing the issue, but the lessons learned here certainly
may be extrapolated to the developing constitutional democracies in many
other countries. 1
1. Inspired in part by the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the former Soviet Union,
the late twentieth century saw a dramatic expansion in the use of constitutional democracies across
the globe, as nations from the Ukraine to South Africa moved away from totalitarian regimes and
toward participatory democracies patterned after the United States and frequently guided by American
constitutional scholars.
See generally SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE:
DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE 20TH CENTURY (1991); JUAN J. LINZ, THE BREAKDOWN OF
DEMOCRATIC REGIMES: CRISIS, BREAKDOWN, AND REEQUILIBRATION (1978); GUILLERMO
O'DONNELL & PHILIPPE C. SCHMITTER, TRANSITIONS FROM AUTHORITARIAN RULE: TENTATIVE
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Many have come to view ADR as "privatized justice," the devolution
of public power to private authority that is a byproduct of the downsizing of
government at the close of the twentieth century. This bipolar approach is
2
the dominant view of courts, practitioners, and legal scholars. Under this
view, disputants choose between public and private systems of dispute resolution, prompting some legal scholars to suggest that the advent of modern
ADR has led to a "process pluralism" of dispute resolution choices for disputants.3 This is, of course, a positive development in light of the continuing popular dissatisfaction with the public justice system that has provided
4
the basis for the ADR movement itself.

D GD

Contemporary Understanding: A Bipolar System

ADR

CTrial

Public System

Private System

But it also raises serious questions, such as whether any constitutional
procedural safeguards follow the dispute to the alternative hearing. Under
the bipolar approach, the answer is "no"; the hearings are strictly private.
But does that mean that the parties have no enforceable due process rights
whatsoever in that hearing, such as the right to an impartial adjudicator, the
right to present their side of the story, or the right to counsel?
CONCLUSIONS ABOUT UNCERTAIN DEMOCRACIES (1986). It should be noted that some democ-

racies are more participatory than others. For an argument that the mode of transition affects the
type of democracy that will emerge, see Terry Lynn Karl, Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America, 23 COMP. POL. 1, 1-8 (1990).

2. See, e.g., Bryant G. Garth, Privatizationand the New Market for Disputes: A Frameworkfor
Analysis and a Preliminary Assessment, 12 STUD. L. POL. & Soc'Y 367, 374 (1992); Martin H. Malin
& Robert F. Ladenson, Privatizing Justice: A Jurisprudential Perspective on Labor and Employment
Arbitration from the Steelworkers Trilogy to Gilmer, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1187, 1190 (1993); Lauren
K. Robel, Private Justice and the Federal Bench, 68 IND. L.J. 891, 892 (1993); Kim Karelis, Note,
Private Justice: How Civil Litigation Is Becoming a Private Institution-The Rise of Private Dispute
Centers, 23 SW. U. L. REV. 621, 622-23 (1994); see also KATHERINE V.W. STONE, PRIVATE
JUSTICE: THE LAW OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 1-32 (2000).

3. See generally Marc Galanter & John Lande, Private Courts and Public Authority, 12
STUD. L. POL. & Soc'y 393 (1992); John Lande, The Diffusion of a Process Pluralist Ideology of
Disputing: Factors Affecting Opinions of Business Lawyers and Executives (1995) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin (Madison)) (on file with author).
See infra Parts I.A.2, I.B.2.b.
4.
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The mere asking of such questions suggests a dark side to ADR,5 and
one with all-too-human faces: a group of waitresses who were told that their
sexual harassment claims had to be arbitrated before a panel selected by their
employer, in a private rather than a public proceeding, and without compensatory or punitive damages available as remedies;6 a businessman who
lost his business and his life's savings when a retired judge, brought in to
mediate a minor partnership dispute, instead ordered the distribution of all
partnership assets;' a Utah housewife who, just moments before being wheeled
into serious knee surgery, was told that she must sign a mandatory arbitration agreement in order to proceed with the operation.'
In a recent article, I began to suggest a different understanding that may
be far more consistent with the nuanced sophistication of modem ADR
than the current bipolar model allows-a unitary theory of public justice
that is predicated upon the recognition that a significant portion of the
modem ADR movement is built upon the foundation of state action.9 That
is, after analyzing the history of ADR, the state and federal statutory systems
under which it primarily operates, and the U.S. Supreme Court's state action
doctrine, I suggested that much of modem ADR may not be private at all,
but rather may be public in nature and therefore subject to constitutional
constraints, particularly due process, at least at some level.'" ADR programs
that are operated by federal and state courts or administrative agencies
provide the best example of seemingly private ADR that is more properly
characterized as public dispute resolution-a particularly important realization considering Congress's massive 1998 expansion of ADR to every federal
district court," the Clinton administration's equally extensive expansion of

5. See Richard C. Reuben, The Dark Side of ADR, CAL. LAW., Feb. 1994, at 53, 53-58 (citing
examples of abuses in alternative dispute resolution (ADR)).
6. See Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 935 (4th Cit. 1999); see also infra
notes 595-596 and accompanying text.
7. See Reuben, supra note 5, at 53.
8. See Barry Meier, In Fine Print, Customers Lose Ability to Sue, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1997,
at Al. Remarkably, the agreement Doncene Sosa signed with Salt Lake City, Utah, surgeon Dr.
Lonnie Paulos, included a provision requiring patients who won less than half the amount they
sought against Dr. Paulos in a medical malpractice claim to pay the doctor both his legal fees and
$150 for every hour he spent on the case, even if he was found liable. See Sosa v. Paulos, 924 P.2d
357, 360 (Utah 1996).
9. See Richard C. Reuben, Public Justice: Toward a State Action Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 85 CAL. L. REV. 577, 609-41 (1997). While the notion of a unitary theory could
include criminal, administrative, and public policy dispute resolution processes, my focus in this Article
is simply on civil dispute resolution between private parties.
10.
See id.
11.
See Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-315, 112, Stat. 2993)
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-658 (1998)).
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ADR in federal administrative agencies, 2 and the significant push to expand
the use of ADR in state administrative agencies. 3 A strong, but more controversial, argument4 can also be made that contractual arbitration is also driven
by state action.'

The reasoning of that article is relatively straightforward and may be
easily summarized.' The many state and federal statutes, executive orders, and
court rules that by necessity have provided the basic architecture for the modem movement have done so by establishing a structure in which public and
private actors participate jointly in furthering the goal of binding dispute
resolution. Public courts are actively involved in the administration, oversight, and execution of such processes in governmental ADR programs,
often compelling or strongly encouraging parties into those programs, often
using private neutrals to implement the programs,16 and often adopting the
results of those ADR processes as their own legally binding judgments. 7
The involvement of public courts is similarly woven into the fabric of the
many federal and state contractual arbitration statutes that overturned the
courts' historic refusal to enforce agreements to arbitrate. s In such situations,
state action would appear to be present under current doctrine, obliging
compliance with constitutional safeguards for personal and property rights, at
least at some level. Given the pivotal role that public courts and constitutional
values play in the exercise of constitutional democracy, such an understanding may be essential to the facilitation of public confidence in the rule of law
as a public institution that political scientists increasingly are recognizing as
critical to the deepening and consolidation of constitutional democracies. 9

12.

See Executive Order 12988 (Feb. 5, 1996); Martha W. McClellan, Coming of Age: Arbitra-

tion, Other Forms of ADR, See Massive Expansion in U.S. Agencies, DIsP. RESOL MAG., Spring 1999,

at 17. See generally Jeffrey M. Senger, Turning the Ship of State, 2000 J. DIsP. RESOL. (forthcoming
May 2000).
13.
See Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Focus Expands: ADR Spotlight Turns to State Administrative
Agencies, DiSP. RESOL. MAG., Spring 1999, at 16.

14.

See infra Parts II.B.l.b, lI.B.2.b.2.a.

15.

For a fuller exposition, see infra Part II.

16. See, e.g., Wayne D. Brazil, Comparing Structures for the Delivery of ADR Services by
Courts: Critical Values and Concerns, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 715, 748-50 (1999). Most
federal court programs involve court-selected attorney panels. See CENTER FOR DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMIN., NATIONAL STANDARDS FOR COURT-CONNECTED

MEDIATION Rule 6 (1992) (proposing certain rules for mediators on court rosters); ELIZABETH
PLAPINGER & DONNA STIENSTRA, ADR AND SETTLEMENT IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS:
A SOURCEBOOK FOR JUDGES AND LAWYERS 8 (1996); Charles Pou, Jr., 'Wheel of Fortune' or
'Singled Out?': How Rosters 'Matchmake' Mediators, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Spring 1997, at 10.
See infra Part I.B.1.
17.
See infra Part I.B.2.b.
18.
See infra Part II.B.2.d.2.
19.

HeinOnline -- 47 UCLA L. Rev. 955 1999-2000

956

47 UCLA LAW REVIEW 949 (2000)

In sharp contrast with the bipolar approach to binding dispute resolution, then, recognizing state action in seemingly private ADR processes lays
the foundation for an expanded notion of public civil justice-that is, dispute
resolution that is administered and enforced by and through the public
courts-rather than for its contraction through privatization.0 This foundation gives rise to a unitary theory of ADR and public civil justice, which
recognizes that the rise of the ADR movement at the end of the twentieth
century has created, perhaps inadvertently, a unified system of public civil
justice in which trial, arbitration, mediation, evaluative techniques, and
other forms of ADR all operate toward the single end of binding public civil
dispute resolution.' In this view, trial is but one end of a spectrum of public
civil dispute resolution, rather than the exclusive method.22 The Constitution, after all, certainly permits other forms of binding dispute resolution;
as long as constitutional values are respected, the type of dispute resolution
process can be flexible.23 However, the fact that procedures must comply
with due process when energized by state action establishes the unitary character of binding public civil dispute resolution.
In laying out a more comprehensive theory of public civil justice, this
Article addresses the challenging question of just how to integrate constitutional norms into seemingly private ADR processes without destroying the
very virtues that compel their use. The task seems quite daunting at first blush.
ADR processes and constitutional expectations at times seem wholly antithetical. ADR results can and should sometimes be based upon standards far
removed from law; constitutional processes require a more traditional and
20.
Professor Richard Abel insightfully observed at the outset of the modern era of ADR
that the rise of informal dispute resolution processes would actually expand the power of the state
much deeper into private affairs by bringing the coercive power of the state into the domain of purely
private dispute resolution. See Richard L. Abel, The Contradictions of Informal Justice, in 1 THE
POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE 267, 270-79 (Richard L. Abel ed., 1982). For an insightful commentary rejecting the public-private distinction in the administrative law context for purposes of systemic
evaluation, see Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2000).
21.
To the extent that it is used, a better formulation of the acronym is "appropriate dispute resolution." Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Introduction: What Will We Do When Adjudication Ends?
A Brief Intellectual History of ADR, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1613, 1625 (1997).
22.
See infra Part IV.A-B; see also Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S.
123, 170-72 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (noting that the judicial model of an evidentiary
hearing is neither a required nor even the most effective method of decision making in all circumstances, and that the essence of due process is the requirement that "a person in jeopardy of serious loss [be given] notice of the case against him and an opportunity to meet it").
23.
See id.; see also Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895
(1961) ("'Due process', unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content
unrelated to time, place and circumstances." (citing Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm., 341 U.S. at
162-63 (Frankfurter, J., concurring))); Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV.
1267, 1277-79, 1316 (1975).
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formal grounding. ADR processes are intended to be informal; constitutional
processes rely on formality to facilitate fundamental fairness. ADR procedures generally operate outside of public view; constitutional procedures
generally assure public witness.
I contend that despite such vastly disparate values, the incorporation
of constitutional values into seemingly private ADR is achievable, necessary, and desirable. Thanks in part to the abundance of scholarly and judicial
work this century on administrative and labor law, many of these questions
have already been considered, yielding a wealth of resources upon which
the constitutional integration may draw. The analogy between the legitimate needs of ADR and of those administrative agencies-particularly in
their adjudicative capacities-is especially useful in this regard. Both are
highlighted by the lower, more flexible level of constitutional compliance
than that found in full-blown adjudication; this is to accommodate the tension between the need for specialized bureaucratic discretion and constitutional protection of private property and personal rights.
In the end, I argue that constitutional norms could and should be incorporated into our current ADR structure with relative ease, beginning by simply
recognizing the constitutional dimension to ADR when it is present, and as
something that augments and enhances our understanding of process pluralism and its still-powerful ancestor, the multidoor courthouse. Public policy
strongly favors the use of binding ADR methods for resolving disputes; proper
constitutional integration would compel the accommodation of the unique
features of individual ADR processes that make them particularly suitable in
appropriate cases. While ADR empirical research is still nascent in its scope
and conclusions, researchers generally agree that parties who participate in
such processes tend to approve of them.24 Therefore, constitutional integration would need to be minimal but meaningful, taking care to avoid the mere
recreation of the litigation system by properly respecting the unique characteristics of ADR processes. Similarly, it would need to be sensitive to the federalism issues that inevitably arise when constitutional standards are imposed
on the states, and take care to ensure that the constitutional shadow cast
on ADR processes reaches no further than is necessary to vindicate constitutional concerns. Finally, integration would also contribute to a more substantial foundation for public funding of governmental ADR programs than
the current bipolar understanding permits.

24.

See generally Chris Guthrie & James Levin, A "Party Satisfaction" Perspective on a

Comprehensive Mediation Statute, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 885 (1998); Lynn A.
Kerbeshian, ADR: To Be Or ... ?, 70 N.D. L. REV. 381, 400 (1994); David Luban, The Quality
of Justice, 66 DENY. U. L. REV. 381, 404 (1989).
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As a result, the task of constitutional integration must focus on constitutional values, take into account the differing nature and goals of the
various ADR processes, and then synthesize these considerations by squaring constitutional values with ADR goals to guide the appropriate constitutional integration for each ADR process. Such an approach leads easily
f

Trial

Arbitration
(govemmental & contractual)

Coercive
Governmental
Power

Consensual Processes
Mediation, Facilitation
(governmental only)

Advisory Processes
Early Neutral Evaluation,
Summary Jury Trial,
Fact Finding
(governmental only)

Unitary System of Public Justice

to a unitary theory of ADR and public justice that recognizes constitutional
force as something of a receding gravitational concept: The farther the
dispute resolution process is removed from the purview of coercive governmental power, the lower the level of constitutional force, or gravity, exerted
on that process. For this reason, constitutional gravity and constitutional
requirements are greater in adjudicatory systems (such as litigation and arbitration) than in consensual systems (such as mediation and facilitation), or
advisory systems (such as early neutral evaluation (ENE), fact finding, and
SJT). So understood, public civil justice under a unitary theory might be
viewed as having a solar appearance, with litigation, arbitration, mediation,
and other forms of dispute resolution orbiting with receding constitutional
gravitational force around the locus of coercive governmental power.
Part I provides an overview of civil dispute resolution, including the history of ADR (especially judicial treatment of agreements to arbitrate) and the
rise and legal structure of modem ADR. It also identifies the gap between
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high support for ADR and low actual voluntary usage and suggests that one
reason may be the lack of constitutional safeguards in ADR under the current bipolar understanding of ADR as simply private justice.
Part II then explores the foundational question of whether ADR is in
fact private by applying the state action doctrine, the principle mechanism
by which the U.S. Supreme Court has drawn the line between public and
private conduct for purposes of constitutional due process. Applying traditional state action analysis to ADR, it concludes that court-related and contractual ADR can give rise to state action when the government compels
parties into procedures that either result in binding dispute resolutiontraditionally an exclusive function of government-or so entangle private
ADR with government action that the private ADR hearing may be fairly
attributable to the state under contemporary doctrinal standards. This
includes arbitration, mediation, and advisory processes that operate through
courts or administrative agencies, as well as contractual arbitrations conducted under the authority of the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 (FAA)
or related state laws.
Part III focuses on contractual arbitration and addresses the relationship between contractual rights and constitutional rights. Departing from
the current bipolar approach, which views a contractual agreement to
arbitrate as an absolute waiver of all legal rights, it offers alternative
theories of the waiver of legal rights that an agreement to arbitrate under
the FAA or related state laws represents. Under one theory, the waiver is
of one's right to have one's legal claims heard in a governmental decisional
forum. Under the alternative theory, the waiver is of one's substantive legal
rights and most, but not all, of the full panoply of procedural rights
available at trial. Under either theory, the constitutional due process right
to a fundamentally fair hearing is preserved in contractual arbitrations
energized by state action. The standards for assessing the validity of such a
waiver are unclear under current law but at a minimum require that the
waiver clearly be knowing and voluntary. To give content to those terms,
Part III tracks and synthesizes current doctrine in light of the particular
characteristics and concerns of ADR and proposes that the knowledge and
voluntariness requirements for waiver may be assessed by reference to the text
of the agreement, the environment of the waiver negotiation, and a factual
analysis of the actual negotiation of the waiver.
Part IV completes the portrait of the unitary theory by demonstrating
how a constitutional dimension may be incorporated into seemingly private
ADR in a minimal but meaningful way that both preserves and enhances
those processes, while remaining faithful to the core values of the Constitution.
It accomplishes this integration by squaring the unique characteristics and

HeinOnline -- 47 UCLA L. Rev. 959 1999-2000

960

47 UCLA LAW REVIEW 949 (2000)

concerns of the various ADR processes with those values paying particular
attention to the role being played by the neutral or the government actor in
light of the state action doctrine. For arbitration, these minimal but meaningful standards include the right to a neutral forum, the right to present
and confront evidence, and a qualified right to counsel. For mediation, they
include the right to a neutral forum and a qualified right to counsel. For advisory evaluative and fact-finding processes, they are limited to a qualified right
to counsel.
Under such an approach, the incorporation of such constitutional minimums would not disturb the settled law that governs these processes or interfere with their operation. To the contrary, these constitutional minimums
are, for the most part, consistent with the best practices of ADR processes
and enhance the value of these ADR programs by recognizing fundamental
constitutional standards, beyond mere contractual norms, that may be vindicated in the context of specific and exceptional cases. The recognition of
such a modest constitutional dimension can mitigate the need for greater
governmental regulation of ADR that is currently being felt at the state and
national levels2" and instead bring new and creative energy to our concept
of public justice for this new millennium.
I.

THE CURRENT BIPOLAR UNDERSTANDING: AN OVERVIEW
OF MODERN CIVIL DISPUTE RESOLUTION

A unitary theory of public justice must be placed within its proper historical and contemporary contexts. Therefore, Part I lays the foundation
for the discussion in Parts II, 1II, and IV by sketching the current legal understanding of modem ADR, first in terms of its processes (arbitration, mediation, and advisory processes), then in terms of the central routes into those
processes (court order, legislative mandate, and contractual agreement), and
finally in terms of the law that has arisen around those processes. I then
discuss problems with the current understanding and factors that suggest a
continuing discomfort with ADR.

25. See, e.g., Symposium on Drafting a Uniform/Model Mediation Act, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON
DISP. RESOL. 787 (1998); Model MediationLaw Effort Begins, DiSP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 1997, at 20.
For a call for states to enact comprehensive mediation legislation, see Note, Mandatory Mediation
and Summary Jury Trial: Guidelines for Ensuring Fair and Effective Processes, 103 HARV. L. REV.
1086 (1990).
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A. The Landscape of Civil Dispute Resolution
The Public System: Traditional Litigation

1.

In the traditional litigation system, the resolution of legal disputes is
an adversarial adjudicatory process that generally focuses on the law and the
courthouse. That is to say, disputes are legalized by the establishment of rights
in constitutions, statutes, court rules, or other sources of law. Persons or entities seeking to vindicate those rights do so in a court of law according to procedures that are generally predictable, well defined, and designed to further
the goals of truth seeking, fairness, and accuracy in the pursuit of justice. 26
In an adversarial trial process, the parties to the dispute present their
versions of the facts and the law to triers of fact and law, who in turn issue a
decision resolving the dispute that generally may be appealed to a higher
authority. 7 The proceedings are conducted according to strict and intricate
rules of evidence and procedure that are normally prescribed by courts or
legislative bodies." As such, litigation is highly formalized, both in its structural institutions and in the agents who engage in the process. Judges decide
questions of law. 9 Juries (or sometimes judges) decide questions of fact to
which the law will be applied." Attorneys generally represent parties in litibecause of the technical sophistication of the process and the applicable
gation
31
law.

Considerable dispute resolution activity can and usually does take place
informally before and after the dispute is legalized by the filing of a complaint.
Attorneys for both parties spend considerable time analyzing and evaluating
the legal and factual merits of their cases, interviewing potential witnesses,

26. See GRAHAM C. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 92-93 (3d ed.
1996). Definitions of courts and of adjudication can, of course, vary. See generally THE ROLE OF
COURTS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY: THE FINAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON THE ROLE OF COURTS

(Jethro K. Lieberman ed., 1984).
27.

See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 7 (1985).

See id. at 462-69.
28.
See id. at 457. This of course represents the most fundamental role of judges at trial.
29.
The judicial role in the overall process of dispute resolution is far more expansive, in part because
of the rise of ADR. See generally Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976); Owen M. Fiss, The Bureaucratizationof the Judiciary, 92 YALE L.J.
1442 (1983); Judith Resnik, ManagerialJudges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982).
See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 27, at 475-78, 536-39.
30.
See Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation and
31.
Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509, 510 (1994) (observing that "the legal
system's central institutional characteristic-litigation [by principals-] is carried out by agents").
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and marshaling arguments that may ultimately be used to persuade a trier
of fact or law to rule in their favor.

During this period, the two parties

generally begin negotiating possible settlements in a process that is heavily
influenced by the parties' analysis of their respective cases and general negotiation strategies. This process is often called "bargaining in the shadow of
the law. 3 2 While litigation is often thought of in terms of trial, most cases end

at this stage in a negotiated settlement; indeed, most researchers estimate
that approximately 90 to 95 percent of all disputes are resolved through negotiation and without the need for trial 3
2.

The Private System: Alternative Dispute Resolution

The public litigation process may be effective as a truth- and justiceseeking vehicle, but it certainly carries efficiency costs. While empirical
research tends to repudiate popular beliefs in a litigation "crisis,"" the civil
justice system nonetheless remains heavily burdened and can be expected
to become even more so as law and society expand. An already sluggish
civil trial process is further slowed by the gamesmanship of litigation, increasing direct costs to parties, and indirect costs to the system itself, which are
reflected, for example, in higher insurance premiums and lower public confidence.3" Moreover, the complexity of the process, the trauma often associated with trial, and a general dissatisfaction with the traditional legal system
36
have led to a search for new approaches to resolving disputes.
32.
See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
33.
See STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION,
AND OTHER PROCESSES 149, 152 (2d ed. 1992). For the seminal argument that traditional litigation and its formal alternatives are the exception rather than the rule for dispute resolution, see
Marc S. Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and Think
We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L.REV. 4 (1983).
34.
For arguments that there is a crisis, see, for example, RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 59-94 (1985) and the sources cited therein, and Robert H.
Bork, Dealing with the Overload in Article III Courts, in THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES
ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 150 (A. Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1979) [hereinafter THE
POUND CONFERENCE]. For contrary perspectives, see Marc Galanter, The Day After the Litigation
Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3, 6-7 (1986); Marc Galanter, The Life and Times of the Big Six; Or, the
Federal Courts Since the Good Old Days, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 921; and Robel, supra note 2.
35.
See Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 31, at 510.
36.
The modern ADR movement is generally acknowledged to have been born with the
Pound Conference in 1976, which was cosponsored by the American Bar Association (ABA),
the Conference of Chief Justices, and the Judicial Conference of the United States. The conference invoked a speech presented to the ABA by Harvard Law School Dean Roscoe Pound
on August 29, 1906, entitled "The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration
of Justice." See William T. Gosset et al., Foreward to THE POUND CONFERENCE, supra note 34, at 7,
7-8; see also Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reflections on Judicial ADR and the Multi-Door Courthouse at Twenty:
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The 1980s and 1990s have seen the unprecedented rise of ADR in both
governmental and contractual spheres, and at both the state and the federal
levels.37 This movement toward more informal methods of dispute resolution
may be one of the most significant developments in our system of civil justice
since the advent of modem discovery in 1938, and it includes dispute resolution methods that have their source of authority in court rules and legislative,
executive, and administrative mandates, as well as private contracts."
The claimed advantages of ADR are generally cast in terms of efficiency and process. The efficiency argument supporting ADR is that it is a
faster and therefore less expensive process than traditional litigation-although
this claim has proven difficult to document. 39 Process rationales suggest that
ADR methods are more satisfying and more private, produce better outcomes,
and contribute to a more civil society through less contentious methods of
dispute resolution."

Perhaps not surprisingly, the perceived disadvantages of ADR are a mirror image of its strengths, at least as currently understood. To the extent
that court formalities in part strive to equalize the power imbalances between

the parties, the informal structures of ADR can serve to reinforce those
imbalances.42 Similarly, the privatization of dispute resolution through ADR,
Fait Accompli, Failed Overture, or Fledgling Adulthood?, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 297, 30912(1996).
37.
The growth of ADR in the late twentieth century has not been formally charted. However, it may be reckoned by reference to several measures, including the expansion of court-related
programs, delivery systems for contractual ADR, memberships in professional associations, academic course offerings, ADR publications and web sites, and a grudging embrace by the legal
profession. For a fuller discussion, see Reuben, supra note 9, at 582 n.9. See also JULIANA BIRKHOFF,
CONFLICT RESOLUTION SYLLABI (National Inst. for Dispute Resolution 1998); Anthony
M. Aarons, Firm Resolution: Irell & Manella's Stand-Alone ADR Center Aims to Rival AAA and
JAMS, L.A. DAILY J., Apr. 6, 1998, at A5; James B. Boskey, The Electronic Age Comes to ADR:
The Best Web Sites and Listservs, DiSP. RESOL. MAO., Winter 1997, at 25.
38.
See Abel, supra note 20; Reuben, supra note 9, at 594.
See, e.g., JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., AN EVALUATION OF MEDIATION AND EARLY
39.
NEUTRAL EVALUATION UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT 48-53 (RAND 1996) (arguing
that arbitration, mediation, and early neutral evaluation produced no "statistically significant" reductions in time to disposition, the costs of litigation, perceptions of fairness, or client satisfaction).
See generally Warren E. Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274 (1982);
40.
Robert D. Raven, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Expanding Opportunities, ARB. J., June 1988, at 44;
William H. Simon, Legal Informality and Redistributive Politics, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 384
(1985); Francis E. McGovern, Beyond Efficiency: A Bevy of ADR Justifications (An Unfootnoted
Summary), DISP. RESOL. MAG., Summer 1997, at 12-13.
41.
For an overview of critical scholarship on ADR, see generally Eric K. Yamamoto, ADR:
Where Have All the Critics Gone?, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1055 (1996).
42.
See, e.g., JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAw? 136 (1983); Richard Delgado
et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985
WIS. L. REV. 1359, 1387-88. See generally Abel, supra note 20; Paul D. Carrington & Paul H.
Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction,1996 SuP. CT. REV. 331, 333-39; Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement,
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and the establishment of a new and important class of entrepreneurial ADR
providers,43 creates a profit motive for the neutral that does not exist in the
public dispute resolution system. As such, repeat players, such as employers,
have been found to enjoy a significant advantage in at least some ADR
processes." Under the bipolar model, ADR also results in the sacrifice of constitutional and other public law rights through ADR processes, such as the
rights to an attorney and to due process, the appellate process's assurance of
the accurate application of public laws, and the educational value of public
decision making. 45 Finally, critics would contend that all of this takes place in
an environment of secrecy, in which closed doors can mask a world of mischief. For all of these reasons, whether parties can be compelled into ADR
processes has been among the most pervasive and controversial issues of the
ADR movement.46
3.

Forms of Alternative Dispute Resolution

There are many different forms of ADR. However, for purposes of this
Article, it is helpful to divide them into three groups: adjudicatory processes
(most notably arbitration), consensual processes (most notably mediation),
47
and advisory processes (most notably early neutral evaluation).

93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984); Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangersfor Women, 100
YALE L.J. 1545 (1991); Lisa G. Lerman, Mediation of Wife Abuse Cases: The Adverse Impact of
Informal Dispute Resolution on Women, 7 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 57 (1984).
43. See YvES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER

33-62 (1996); Anthony M. Aarons, Packaging ADR: The Industry Is Still Searching for a Way to
Make Money, CAL. LAW., Feb. 1998, at 26.
44.
See, e.g., Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: Differences Between Repeat and NonRepeat Player Outcomes, PROC. 49TH ANN. MEETING INDUS. LAB. REL. RES. ASS'N (1997) (arguing
that empirical research reveals a substantial bias among employment arbitrators in favor of repeat
players); Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change,
9 L. & SOC'Y REV. 95 (1974) (discussing advantages of repeat players). For a more detailed discussion of repeat player issues, see infra notes 556-572 and accompanying text.
45.
See generally Fiss, supra note 42, at 1085; David Luban, Settlements and the Erosionof the Public
Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619 (1995) (arguing that settlement most often reduces the public's participation in dispute resolution, reduces the production of rules and precedents, and leads to an erosion
of the public realm). But cf. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophical
and Democratic Defense of Settlement (in Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663, 2693 (1995) (arguing that
settlement can be participatory, democratic, empowering, educative, and transformative for the parties). For an argument that ADR isa more democratic process than litigation because of its potential
to include more parties in the resolution of a dispute, see LAWRENCE SUSSKIND & PATRICK FIELD,
DEALING WITH AN ANGRY PUBLIC: THE MUTUAL GAINS APPROACH TO RESOLVING DISPUTES

(1996).
46.
47.

See sources cited supra note 42.
See generally STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION 7-13 (1985).
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Adjudicatory Processes: Arbitration

Arbitration is the central adjudicatory process in ADR. Like trial, it is
process in which a third-party neutral simply decides the dispute
adversarial
an
between the parties. Unlike trial judges, however, arbitrators are generally
not bound by the constraints of substantive law in either the procedures by
which they conduct their hearings4 s or in the standards they use to resolve
the dispute,4 9 other than any specific instructions that may be delineated in
court-related programs or contractual provisions. In fact, arbitrators need
not-and often do not-have legal training." To the contrary, they are typically selected by the parties for their subject matter expertise or personal
gravitas rather than their legal acumen.
While arbitrations are far less formal than trials, they still have a very
clear adjudicative structure. Each side typically has an opportunity to present witnesses and evidence and to engage in cross-examination-subject to
the arbitrator's discretion or, significantly in contractual arbitration, the
rules agreed upon by the parties themselves prior to the arbitration. Discovery may be available, but to a much lesser extent than in traditional litigation.5" As a result, the arbitrator's award generally may be rendered quickly
on the basis of the arbitrator's professional judgment under the circumstances rather than on the basis of traditional legal norms.52 In contractual
arbitration, the arbitrator's decision, or "award," is generally final, binding,
and subject to substantive review only for errors of law or fact. 3 Courts may
modify awards for scrivener's errors and other technical imperfections but
may only vacate them upon proof of bias, fraud, misconduct, or abuse of

48. See 1 GABRIEL M. WILNER, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: THE LAW OF
PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 1.01 (rev. ed. 1999) (noting that traditional rules of
evidence and procedure do not apply in arbitration).
49.

See FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA ASPER ELKOURI, HOW ARBITRATION WORKS 366-413

(4th ed. 1985).
See id. at 138-45; see also Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 743
50.
(1981); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 57 n.18 (1974).
Discovery is not expressly provided for under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) or the
51.
Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA). However, the UAA is currently being revised by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, and the proposed final draft includes provisions for an expedited discovery process. See also UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 17 (Proposed Revisions Mar. 2000). For a discussion of a draft of the proposal, see Timothy J. Heinsz, Revised Uniform
ArbitrationAct: Discovery, Punitive Damages, Review, Attorney Fees All Get Tentative OK by NCCUSL
DraftingCommittee, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 1998, at 15.
It should, however, also be emphasized that the enormous capacity for satellite litiga52.
tion can seriously diminish the cost- and time-efficiency potential of arbitration. See, e.g., Intel
Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 12 F.3d 908 (9th Cir. 1993).
See 1 WILNER, supra note 48, at §§ 33.00-.11, 34.00-.02.
53.
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discretion by the arbitrator.5 4 By contrast, court-related arbitrations are
typically nonbinding because of constitutional concerns over jury trial
rights.5 Regardless of whether the arbitration is court-related or contractual,
an arbitration award may be adopted by a public court and enforced as its
own judgment.
The history of arbitration may be traced from antiquity 6 to the traveling crafters' guilds and merchants in medieval England, 7 the religious communities of colonial America, 8 and to some degree the maritime and
commercial shipping industries. Arbitration became a more important feature of American dispute resolution with the rise of the labor movement in
the late nineteenth century. Arbitration emerged as an alternative to strikes
in addressing labor grievances 9 and today is included in more than 95 percent
of all collective bargaining agreements6" as the "law of the shop."61 Contractual arbitration is also common in the nonunion workplace,62 as well as in
an increasingly wide range of consumer settings, such as banking, credit
card, financial, health care, insurance, retail purchase, and communication

54. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1994); UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 12, 7 U.L.A. 280 (1997). A
recent debate has emerged over whether the parties may agree to terms of judicial review in addition to those found in the FAA and the UAA. See infra Part IV.C.2.d.
55.
See Dwight Golann, Making Alternative Dispute Resolution Mandatory: The Constitutional
Issues, 68 OR. L. REV. 487, 502-05 (1989) (arguing that because constitutional rights can be
waived, the issue is not whether binding, consensual arbitration infringes on constitutional rights,
but whether there was a voluntary and informed waiver).
56.
See EDITH HAMILTON, GREEK MYTHOLOGY 179 (recounting the scene in which Venus,
Juno, and Pallas Athene agreed to let Paris decide who was most beautiful); I Corinthians 6:1-:7
(encouraging dispute arbitration).
57.
See FRANCES KELLOR, ARBITRATION AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 3 (1952); Earl S.
Wolaver, The Historical Backgroundof Commercial Arbitration, 83 U. PA. L.REV. 132, 132-34 (1934).
See generally JULIUS HENRY COHEN, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE LAw 71-83, 136
(1918); RODOLPHE J.A. DE SEIFE, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: PRACTICE GUIDE

§§ 2:01-:03, at 7-16 (1987).

58.
See Susan L. Donegan, ADR in Colonial America: A Covenant for Survival, ARB. J., June
1993, at 14; Bruce H. Mann, The Formalization of Informal Law: Arbitration Before the American
Revolution, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 443, 454-55 (1984).
59.
See LAURA J. COOPER & DENNIS R. NOLAN, LABOR ARBITRATION: A COURSEBOOK
1 (1994).
60.
See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 33, at 189.
61.
McDonald v. City of W. Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 290 (1984); Nolde Bros., Inc. v. Local
No. 358, Bakery & Confectionery Workers Union, 430 U.S. 243, 253 (1977); United Steelworkers
v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 580 (1960).
62.
Virtually all broker-investor and employment disputes in the securities industry, for
example, are decided by arbitration rather than by trial. See SECURITIES ARBITRATION REFORM:
REPORT OF THE ARBITRATION POLICY TASK FORCE TO THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC. 6, 13 (1996). For an overview of securities arbitration, see PHILIP J. HOBLIN, JR., SECURITIES ARBITRATION: PROCEDURES, STRATEGIES, CASES
(2d ed. 1992); WILNER, supra note 48, §§ 19.10-.14.
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service agreements.63 Arbitration is particularly well suited for cases involving technical and related matters, cases calling simply for a distribution of
resources, and cases involving small disputes that do not justify the transaction
costs of more formal litigation for either party.
b.

Consensual Processes: Negotiation and Mediation

Unlike adjudicatory judicial and arbitration proceedings, consensual processes call for the parties to decide the dispute themselves. This can be in
the form of direct negotiation or through mediation, which is often called
"facilitated negotiation."
Direct negotiation, in which two or more parties try to work out their
differences without intervention, is probably the most common method of
dispute resolution. While it is easy to overlook negotiation as a means of
dispute resolution, recent scholarship has more fully developed its principles
and applications and has emphasized its usefulness for fundamental problem
solving that can avoid many of the frailties of other dispute resolution techniques, just as it is an ongoing part of ADR processesi 4 Negotiation is often
thought of as part of the litigation process, as indeed it is. However, the
recognition of its character, function, goals, and process dynamics as a separate dispute resolution mechanism helps illuminate the61 details of the broader
isa part.
system of civil dispute resolution of which it
In mediation, a third-party neutral typically facilitates the resolution of
by guiding the parties through a series of stages that may be
dispute
the

63.

See Thomas J.Stipanowich, Punitive Damages and the Consumerizationof Arbitration, 92

Nw. U. L. REv. 1, 1-11 (1997).
64. See, e.g., ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN (Bruce Patton ed., 1981). For commentary and criticism of Fisher and
Ury's work, see GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 33, at 20; RICHARD N. LEBOW, THE ART OF
BARGAINING at x (1996) (commenting that the book really represents "an awkward composite of the
accommodative and competitive strategies"); Herbert M. Kritzer, Fee Arrangements and Negotiation, 21 L. & SOC'Y REV. 341 (1987) (arguing that the legal fee structure creates disincentive
to gain-sharing solutions); and James J. White, Essay Review: The Pros and Cons of "Getting To
YES," 34 J.LEGAL EDUC. 115, 115 (1984) (book review) (describing the book as offering "a forceful
and persuasive criticism of much traditional negotiating behavior," as well as suggesting "a variety of
negotiating techniques that are both clever and likely to facilitate collective negotiation"). For more
on negotiation, see generally DONALD G. GIFFORD, LEGAL NEGOTIATION: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS (1989); GERARD I. NIERENBERG, THE ART OF NEGOTIATING (1989); and HOWARD
RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION (1982).

In recognizing these differences, Professor Marc Galanter once suggested a "single proc65.
ess of disputing in the vicinity of official tribunals," which involves "the strategic pursuit of a settlement through mobilizing the court process." Marc Galanter, Worlds of Deals: Using Negotiation
to Teach About Legal Process, 34 J.LEGAL EDUC. 268, 268 (1984); see also infra Part IV.A.
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summarized as contracting (agreeing upon ground rules), issue development
(identifying facts, positions, etc.), working the conflict (promoting mutual
understanding and developing
mutually acceptable options), and closure
66
(agreeing upon options).
As a method of dispute resolution, mediation's central strength lies in
its communicative and transformative powers-that is, the ability of the
parties, with the help of a third-party mediator, to get beyond the initial
positions that defined the conflict and down to the underlying interests of
the parties-as well as its powerful potential to unleash creative, integrative
solutions not possible in adjudicatory decision making.67 As such, it can be
particularly effective in disputes in which the preservation of relationships
is important and that allow for the consideration of options for resolution that
exceed those that would be traditionally available in a court of law. While a
mediation agreement can generally be enforced like any other contract,68
and can sometimes be confirmed by a court for purposes of enforcement,69 the
process's most fundamental enforcement power comes from the fact that the
parties themselves have structured and approved the agreement.
Mediation plainly is not appropriate for all disputes. A critical problem in mediation is its capacity to exacerbate power imbalances. In particular,
some criticize mediation as tending to favor the economically or emotionally
stronger party, or as working against the one who can least tolerate conflict
or most values a harmonious resolution. 70 This may inspire some parties to
settle for far less than they might obtain before a judge in a traditional adversarial setting. As one writer puts it, "compromise only is an equitable solution
between equals; between unequals, it 'inevitably reproduces inequality."'1 For
this reason, for example, while mediation can be extremely effective in
addressing the interest-based issues of child custody and property division in
66.
See KIMBERLEE K. KOVACH, MEDIATION: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 30-35 (2d ed.
2000); CHRISTOPHER MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR
RESOLVING CONFLICT 32-33 (1986); NANCY H. ROGERS & CRAIG A. MCEWEN, MEDIATION:
LAW, POLICY, PRACTICE §§ 3:01-:05 (2d ed. 1994 & Supp. 1998).
67.
See generally ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF
MEDIATION: RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION (1994)

(describing a view that the practice of mediation should be focused on transforming the parties
and their relationship).
68.
See ROGERS & MCEwEN, supra note 66, § 4:13; see also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 572.35
(West 1988 & Supp. 2000); Haghighi v. Russian-Am. Broad. Co., 577 N.W.2d 927 (Minn. 1998),
rev'd, 173 F.3d 1086 (8th Cir. 1999) (construing the Minnesota statute).
69.
See ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note 66, § 8:02.
70.
See, e.g., Laura Nader, Controlling Processes in thePracticeof Law: Hierarchy and Pacification in the Movement to Re-Form Dispute Ideology, 9 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 3 (1993)
(arguing that "harmony ideology" was a response to the law reform discourse of the 1960s).
71.
AUERBACH, supra note 42, at 136.
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divorce proceedings,72 some women's rights organizations have taken positions
urging women not to mediate such disputes-and certainly not in situations
73
in which domestic violence is or has been present.
c.

Advisory Processes: An Array of Settlement Aids

Beyond arbitration and mediation, ADR also includes a broad range of
techniques designed to foster settlement. That is, their primary purpose is
to provide the parties and their representatives with more information that
will either help narrow the negotiation gap between the parties or provide

other incentives to settle the dispute without resort to adjudication. There
7
are several variations, including principally: "
(1) Early Neutral Evaluation. In ENE, an expert evaluator meets with
the parties to analyze the case, discuss disputed issues, explore settlement
7
possibilities, and evaluate the parties' relative chances of prevailing. " The
neutral evaluator frequently provides a "reality check" for one or more of the
parties and can be brought in privately by the parties during the negotiation
process or, in certain cases, assigned by the court to provide an evaluation
in a pending case."

(2) Summary Jury Trials. Pioneered by U.S. District Judge Thomas
Lambros, the summary jury trial (SJT) is a form of court-ordered minitrial
in which the parties present brief versions of their facts and legal arguments7
to a jury drawn from the same population as would be used in a real trial.
72.

See generally GARY J.FRIEDMAN, A GUIDE TO DIVORCE MEDIATION: How TO REACH

A FAIR, LEGAL SETTLEMENT AT A FRACTION OF THE COST (1993) (presenting firsthand divorce

mediation case studies that raise issues the author addresses as a mediator); ELEANOR E. MACCOBY
& ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD: SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY
(1992) (demonstrating the importance of interest-based settlements in matters of divorce).
See Richard C. Reuben, The Lauryer Turns Peacemaker, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1996, at 54, 58.
73.
For a fuller discussion of these and other advisory processes, such as private judicial and
74.
jury trials, see LEONARD L. RISKIN & JAMES E. WESTBROOK, DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAW-

YERS 589-647 (2d ed. 1997).
See Joshua D. Rosenberg & H. Jay Folberg, Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Empirical
75.

Analysis, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1487, 1488-91 (1994) (analyzing the early neutral evaluation (ENE)
program in the northern district of California); see also PLAPINGER & STIENSTRA, supra note 16,
at 50-54 (providing a district-by-district description of ADR programs in federal courts).

76.

See Wayne D. Brazil et al., Early Neutral Evaluation: An Experimental Effort to Expedite

Dispute Resolution, 69 JUDICATURE 279 (1986); Irving R. Kaufman, Reform for a System in Crisis:
Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Federal Courts, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 12-13 (1990); Jack M.

Sabatino, ADR as "Litigation Lite": Procedural and Evidentiary Norms Embedded Within Alternative
Dispute Resolution, 47 EMORY L.J. 1289, 1317 (1998).

77. See generally Thomas D. Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Alternative Methods
of Dispute Resolution: A Report to the Judicial Conference of the United States Committee on the Opera-

tion of the Jury System, 103 F.R.D. 461 (1984); Richard A. Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and
Other Methods of Alternative Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. CHI. L. REV.
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An SJT generally lasts one day and consists of the selection of six jurors to
hear approximations by counsel of the expected evidence. After receiving
an abbreviated charge, the jury retires with directions to render a consensus
verdict. After a verdict is reached, the jury is informed that its verdict is
advisory in nature and nonbinding. Again, an SJT provides the parties with
a reality check by indicating how an actual jury may view their cases and
opposing arguments.
(3) Minitrials. Although forms vary, the concept is similar to that of the
SJT in that the parties each present their cases in truncated form to a thirdparty neutral who decides the dispute, though minitrials are private. While
the process is adjudicatory in form, it differs from traditional adjudication in
that the opinion is generally advisory and nonbinding. As such, it provides
a basis for settlement discussions between the parties, which may or may not
include the neutral.
(4) Hybrids. The permutations of ADR processes are limited only by
one's imagination. 79 More than one of the foregoing ADR processes may be
used to resolve individual disputes, and often several are integrated into the
design of overall conflict resolution management schemes."
"Med/arb" is the most common hybrid form of ADR and combines
mediation and arbitration into a single process. The dispute is first mediated,
and if that proves unsuccessful, it moves into binding arbitration. This form

366 (1986). As to the validity of court-ordered summary jury trials, compare McKay v. Ashland
Oil, Inc., 120 F.R.D. 43, 46 (E.D. Ky. 1988) (upholding mandatory summary jury trial as a valid
pretrial settlement device), with Strandell v. Jackson County, 838 F.2d 884, 888 (7th Cir. 1988)
(rejecting a mandatory summary jury trial as inconsistent with the encouragement in Rule 16 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of extrajudicial procedures to facilitate settlement). As to the

confidentiality of summary jury trials, see Cincinnati Gas & ElectricCo. v. General Electric Co., 854

F.2d 900, 905 (6th Cir. 1988) (noting that because summary jury trial is an aspect of negotiation
that is traditionally private, the press has no right to attend).
78.
See generally Mini-Trials: Opportunities for Compromise, 51 TEX. B.J. 34 (1988).
79.
For discussion of an imaginative ADR structure that began with arbitration but was
followed by a negotiation that resulted in a contractual agreement to establish a private system
of law, see Robert H. Mnookin & Jonathan D. Greenberg, Lessons of the IBM-Fujitsu Arbitration:

How Disputants Can Work Together to Solve Deeper Conflicts, Disp. RESOL. MAG., Spring 1998,
at 16.

80. See Mary P. Rowe, The Ombudsman's Role ina Dispute Resolution System, 7 NEGOTIATION
J. 353, 353 (1991); see also Ellen J. Waxman & Howard Gadlin, A Breed Apart: An Ombudsman
Serves as a Buffer Between and Among Individuals and Large Institutions, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Summer
1998, at 21, 24. See generally CATHY A. COSTANTINO & CHRISTINA SICKLES MERCHANT,

DESIGNING CONFLICT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS: A GUIDE TO CREATING PRODUCTIVE AND
HEALTHY ORGANIZATIONS (1996); WILLIAM L. URY ET AL., GETTING DISPUTES RESOLVED:
DESIGNING SYSTEMS TO CUT THE COSTS OF CONFLICT (1988).
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of dispute resolution is found in labor-management agreements and, increasingly, in consumer banking."
While med/arb is an example of the blending of two ADR processes
into a single process, conflict resolution managers often take the concept
one step further, developing tiered structures in which disputes are routed
through a series of stages, with a different type of dispute resolution process used at each stage. For example, unions and large construction contractors in California and a handful of other states sometimes enter into
collective bargaining agreements that, in effect, partially privatize worker's
compensation for specific construction projects, including the delivery of
health care services and the system by which disputes arising from workplace injuries are resolved." The dispute resolution systems typically call
for a four-step process, in which the dispute is handled by an ombudsman
before going to mediation, arbitration, and finally, if it is still unresolved,
back into the public worker's compensation system for possible trial de
novo.83
B. The Current Legal Structure of Alternative Dispute Resolution
While the various ADR processes I have described are often considered to be nonlegal in nature, the fact that they operate within a legalized
structure begins to point to the inadequacy of the bipolar model. As noted
briefly above, there are essentially three routes by which one may enter an
ADR process: by court order, by legislative or administrative mandate, or by
private contract. For the sake of convenience, I refer to court-ordered and
legislatively or administratively mandated ADR processes as "court-related"
processes, as all are ultimately implemented through the courts. Together,
court-related and contractual ADR are the twin pillars supporting the
modem ADR movement-and the prevailing bipolar approach to civil
dispute resolution.

81.

See generally Barry C. Bartel, Med-Arb as a Distinct Method of Dispute Resolution: History,

Analysis, and Potential, 27 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 661 (1991); Stephen B. Goldberg, The Mediation

of Grievances Under a Collective Bargaining Contract: An Alternative to Arbitration, 77 Nw. U. L.
REV. 270 (1982).
See DAVID I. LEVINE ET AL., EVALUATING CARVE-OUTS IN THE CONSTRUCTION INDUS82.
TRY (forthcoming 2000) (manuscript at 137-49, 207-13, on file with author); Ellyn Moscowitz &
Victor J. Van Bourg, Carve-Outs and the Privatization of Workers' Compensation in Collective
BargainingAgreements, 46 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 23-33 (1995).
See id. at 3-4.
83.
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Court-Related Programs

Both federal and state judicial and administrative law systems have
broadly embraced a variety of ADR methods." Taken together, they constitute what experts generally believe to be a substantial share of the total ADR
"market" of cases and providers. However, this size, the nuanced variations
in ADR programs, and the technological balkanization of the courts have
combined to largely prohibit a systematic analysis of the many state and federal programs, even as a descriptive matter.
The most important descriptive effort to date was a 1996 study of ADR
in the federal district courts by researchers Elizabeth Plapinger and Donna
Stienstra.85 While their work is limited to the federal sphere, it is commonly
believed that the basic structure of their findings substantially mirrors the
activities in state court systems-although this is plainly an area in which
more empirical work is necessary. 16
Plapinger and Stienstra found that mediation is the dispute resolution
method of choice in the federal district courts, with more than half of the
ninety-four district courts offering-and in some instances requiring-the
mediation of at least some claims in filed cases. 7 Arbitration is the next
most frequently used ADR procedure in federal district courts, but it is a
distant second, with only twenty courts offering the procedure (although
several more authorize its use)." The use of ENE is rising but still is found

84.

See generally COURT-ANNEXED MEDIATION: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON SELECTED

STATE AND FEDERAL PROGRAMS (Edward J. Bergman & John G. Bickerman eds., 1998);
PLAPINGER & STIENSTRA, supra note 16; Patricia M. Killingsworth, "Winning" Redefined: A Positive
Approach to the Practice of Law, 12 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 653 (1996) (describing use of ADR by
Georgia State Board of Workers' Compensation); Staci J. Pratt et al., Alternative Dispute Resolution
as a Means of Addressing AgriculturalPollution, 20 HAMLINE L. REV.395 (1996); Senger, supra note 12.
85.

See PLAPINGER & STIENSTRA, supra note 16.

86.
See Lisa B. Bingham, Structure Affects Function: Context Matters in Research on
Third Party Dispute Resolution, Presentation to William and Flora Hewlett Foundation Annual
Meeting of Conflict Resolution Centers (Jan. 23, 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author). For a discussion of research needs in the ADR field, see Deborah Hensler, A Research
Agenda: What We Need to Know About Court-Connected ADR, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 1999, at 15.
87.
See PLAPINGER & STIENSTRA, supra note 16, at 4.
88.
Eighteen of the twenty federal court-related programs are statutorily authorized and
congressionally funded. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-658 (1994). Two others offer arbitration as part of
a hybrid med/arb procedure. See id. Moreover, interest in court-annexed arbitration programs
appears to be in decline rather than ascent, as at least two courts that have required mandatory
arbitration (the western district of Michigan and the western district of Missouri) have changed
their programs to include arbitration as but one of a range of ADR options. Similarly, the eastern
district of North Carolina has eliminated its mandatory arbitration program altogether. See
PLAPINGER & STIENSTRA, supra note 16, at 7.
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in only fourteen courts. While more than half the federal district courts
authorize the use of SJTs, the usage level remains minimal at one or two
cases per year." Many courts offer more than one ADR option, and at least
six offer a full array of ADR choices, including arbitration, mediation, ENE,
and SJT. 9
Plapinger and Stienstra further report that some of these ADR programs are voluntary, others are mandatory-that is, parties must attend an
ADR hearing if their case meets certain eligibility requirements, usually
based on case type or size-and still others have both mandatory and
voluntary components.9 However, both mandatory and voluntary programs
are increasingly relying on judges to identify cases that are appropriate for
ADR and to educate the parties about ADR options, although local court
rules also can impose a duty upon counsel to discuss ADR options with
their clients.92 In this regard, the settlement conference under Rule 16 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has become a central mechanism by
which cases are sorted and routed into ADR.93 The parties are generally
required to attend the ADR hearings and, in most cases, to pay for the services of the ADR neutral.94
In most programs, the courts establish rosters of private attorney-neutrals
to provide the actual ADR service, although some employ court personnel
or rely upon bar associations or other private-sector ADR providers of neutrals for these services.95 Most courts set eligibility criteria for inclusion on

See PLAPINGER & STIENSTRA, supra note 16, at 5.
89.
See id.
90.
See id. at 7; see also Kent Snapp, Five Years of Random Testing Shows Early ADR Suc91.
cessful, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Summer 1997, at 16.
See PLAPINGER & STIENSTRA, supra note 16, at 7-8. For a discussion and a criticism of
92.
the expansion of the judicial function, see Resnik, supra note 29.
See PLAPINGER & STIENSTRA, supra note 16, at 8. For a discussion of the use of Rule
93.
16 as a mechanism for expanding court usage of ADR, and the promotion of a general "settlement
culture," see James J. Alfini, Risk of Coercion Too Great: Judges Should Not Mediate Cases Assigned
to Them for Trial, DIsP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 1999, at 11, 11-12. See also Scott A. Miller, Expanding
the Federal Court's Power to Encourage Settlement Under Rule 16: G. Heileman Brewing v. Joseph
Oat, 1990 Wis. L. REV. 1399; Charles R. Richey, Rule 16 Revisited: Reflections for the Benefit of
Benchand Bar, 139 F.R.D. 525 (1991).
See PLAPINGER & STIENSTRA, supra note 16, at 8, 10-11. In calculating rates for neutrals,
94.
the majority of courts use the market rate; others, however, set their own fee schedules, require
pro bono neutral services, or require the payment of court-set fees after a certain number of pro
bono sessions. See id. at 10.
See id. at 9. State examples of this exist. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 27A, § 2-3-104(B)
95.
(1992) (environmental quality mediations); id. tit. 85, § 3.10 (worker's compensation mediations); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 115.797(4) (West 1999); see also Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Rules and
Other Policies: Pay Close Heed to Structure for Success, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 1997, at 15.
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the rosters, and many include on their rosters any person who has been
certified as an ADR neutral by a bar association or state court system. As a
result, many ADR neutrals simultaneously serve on the rosters of state court
programs, federal court and administrative programs, private ADR brokerages, and bar association programs. 96 Similarly, many court-related programs are willing to accept neutrals trained by bar associations or private
training organizations, while others insist upon conducting the training themselves or hiring and screening trainers for their programs. 97
The legal contours of these programs have not been heavily litigated,
leaving many issues "resolved" only by way of momentum. 9 Most relevant
for my purposes, a small handful of courts have rejected facial challenges to
the validity of court-related ADR programs on a variety of constitutional
grounds, including Seventh Amendment and due process challenges, 99
establishing an informal presumption of validity that few litigants even consider challenging. Similarly, a smattering of federal courts have addressed
a number of collateral issues, including the immunity of ADR neutrals,"° the
public's right to attend ADR proceedings, 1 ' and the impact on a subsequent
trial of the disclosure of privileged information during a court-ordered ADR

96.
See Pou, supra note 16, at 10 (discussing the establishment and operation of public and
private sector rosters).
97.
See PLAPINGER & STIENSTRA, supra note 16, at 9.
98.
For an overview and summary of cases, see generally Lucy V. Katz, Compulsory Alternative Dispute Resolution and Voluntarism: Two-Headed Monster or Two Sides of the Coin?, 1993 J.
DisP. RESOL. 1.
99.
See, e.g., Dillard v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 961 F.2d 1148, 1155
n.12 (5th Cir. 1992) (finding Seventh Amendment rights to be waived by the signing of a valid
arbitration agreement); Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp., 591 F.2d 1164, 1179-81 (5th Cir. 1979)
(holding that mandatory mediation of medical malpractice claims does not violate the Seventh
Amendment); Kimbrough v. Holiday Inn, 478 F. Supp. 566, 577 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (upholding a
mandatory arbitration program against a Seventh Amendment challenge).
100.
See, e.g., Wagshal v. Foster, 28 F.3d 1249, 1254 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding that a neutral case evaluator in a real estate dispute was entitled to judicial immunity); Austern v. Chicago
Bd. Options Exch., Inc., 898 F.2d 882, 886 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that securities arbitrators were
entitled to full judicial immunity); Corey v. New York Stock Exch., 691 F.2d 1205, 1209 (6th Cir.
1982) (extending arbitral immunity to boards and agencies that sponsor arbitration); see also
Olson v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers (NASD), 85 F.3d 381, 383 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that
the NASD's appointment of an arbitrator was within the scope of the arbitral process and was protected under the immunity); Wasyl, Inc. v. First Boston Corp., 813 F.2d 1579, 1582 (9th Cir. 1987)
(holding that a third party named in a private contract to provide a valuation of assets was entitled
to absolute immunity).
101.
See, e.g., Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 854 F.2d 900, 905 (6th Cir.
1988) (stating that a summary jury trial may be ordered closed to the public because it is just part
of a negotiation process).
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hearing. 2 Remarkably, however, the reported cases have not meaningfully
addressed the substantive validity of the operationof ADR programs, including matters as fundamental as due process, the right to counsel, and other
constitutional rights-a situation that may well change as both state and
federal court-related ADR programs continue to expand."°3
2.

Contractual Alternative Dispute Resolution

While court-related ADR has been the most important component of
the modem ADR movement, the rise of contractual ADR has also been
The overwhelming majority of these arbitrations
extremely significant.'
have been conducted under the authority of the FAA 05 and state versions of
the Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA),' 6 and these cases have by far generated the greatest body of case law and are the most significant for purposes
of state action in developing a unitary theory of ADR and public civil justice. Therefore, while the "sleeping giant" of mediation and tiered dispute
resolution systems continue to become more popular, 7 this part focuses on
contractual arbitration.

See, e.g., GTE Directories Serv. Corp. v. Pacific Bell Directory, 135 F.R.D. 187, 192
102.
(N.D. Cal. 1991) (stating that disclosure of privileged documents during an ENE session does not
waive the privilege if the affected party states an intent to retain the privilege).
But see Dexter v. Prudential Ins. Co., No. CIV.A.96-21 KHV, 1999 VL 156170, at *2-*3
103.
(D. Kan. Mar. 17, 1999) (acknowledging the possibility of a constitutional right of confrontation
in arbitration, but rejecting it under the facts of this specific case).
This point may be underscored by the fact that while the U.S. Supreme Court has
104.
issued many rulings on contractual arbitration under the FAA and on labor arbitration under the
Labor Management Relations Act and the Railway Labor Act, the Court has not issued a single
significant opinion on mediation or any other ADR process. But see Elgin, J. & E. Ry. Co. v.
Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 727-29 (1945) (recognizing, in the collective bargaining context, that arbitration and mediation are by necessity voluntary processes); Switchmen's Union v. National
Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297, 305 (1943) (declining to exercise jurisdiction over agreements
mediated by the National Mediation Board). Moreover, the lower federal and state courts that
have issued rulings on mediation and other ADR processes have often looked to the arbitration case
law for analogy and guidance. See, e.g., City and County of Denver v. District Court, 939 P.2d
1353, 1364 (Colo. 1997) (ruling that because an ADR provision serves the same public interests
in economy for the parties and judicial efficiency as an arbitration provision, it is enforceable in
the same manner as an arbitration agreement).
See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994) The FAA was adopted in 1925 and was patterned after
105.
similar legislation in New York. The basic structure of these acts was later incorporated into the
UAA in 1955 by the National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws and has been
adopted by the overwhelming majority of states.
See UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT prefatory note (Proposed Revisions Oct. 1999) (observ106.
ing that 35 states have adopted the UAA in full and that 14 have adopted it in substantially
similar form).
See Reuben, supra note 73, at 55.
107.
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a.

The Federal and State Statutory Arbitration Schemes

All fifty states and the District of Columbia have enacted specific arbitration statutes,10 8 most patterned after either the New York Arbitration Law
of 1920 and the FAA or the UAA.109
These statutory schemes generally provide that written agreements to
arbitrate are "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable," except upon grounds sufficient to revoke any contract."0 In so doing, they set forth an integrated
system of shared roles between public courts and private arbitrators that
provides a shadow in which all agreements to arbitrate, and subsequent arbitrations, are entered. In uncontested cases, this shadow of the law, com-

108.
See ALA. CODE § 6-6-1 (1993); ALASKA STAT. § 09.43.010 (Michie 1998); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1501 (West 1994); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-108-201 (Michie Supp.
1999); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281 (West 1999); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-22-203 (West
1999); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-408 (West 1991); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 5701
(1975); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-4301 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 682.02, 684.02 (West 1990);
GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-3 (1999); HAW. REV. STAT. § 658-1 (1999); IDAHO CODE § 7-901
(1998); 710 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1 (West 1999); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-2-1 (West 1983);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 679A.1 (West 1993); KAN. CIV. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-401 (West Supp.
1996); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 417.050 (Michie Supp. 1998); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4201
(West 1997); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 5927 (West 1980); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD.
PROC. § 3-206 (1995); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 251, § 1 (West Supp. 1996); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 600.5001 (West 1987); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 572.08 (West 1988); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 11-15-1 (1972); MO. ANN. STAT. § 435.350 (West Supp. 1997); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 27-5-114 (1995); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-2602 (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38.035 (Michie
1996); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 542:1 (1997); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:24-1 (West 1987); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 44-7-1 (Michie 1995); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7501 (McKinney 1980); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 1-567.2 (Supp. 1996); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-29.2-01 (1996); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.01
(Banks-Baldwin 1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 802 (West 1993); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 36.454(5) (1995); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7303 (West 1982); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-3-2
(1997); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-48-10 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1999); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-25A-1
(Michie 1987); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-5-302 (Supp. 1996); TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. § 171.001 (West 1997); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-31a-3 (1996); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 5652 (Supp. 1999); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.016 (Michie 1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 7.04.010 (West 1992); W. VA. CODE § 55-10-1 (1994); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 788.015 (West
Supp. 1999); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-36-103 (Michie 1988).
The formalization of mediation is more recent, but such agreements are sometimes treated as
arbitration awards under these statutes for enforcement purposes, a process called the "confirmation"
of the agreement. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1297.401 (Deering 1996); CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 3186 (Deering 1995). See generally ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note 66, at § 3.02 (discussing the
format and techniques of a typical mediation session); id. at § 8.02 (discussing the enforcement of
mediation clauses in contracts).
109.
The UAA was enacted in 1955 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and is substantially similar to the FAA and the 1920 New York statute. For a detailed
comparison of the FAA and the UAA, see Joseph Colagiovanni & Thomas W. Hartmann, Enforcing ArbitrationAwards, DISP. RESOL. J., Jan. 1995, at 14.
110.
See 9 U.S.C. § 2; UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 1, 7 U.L.A. 6 (1997).
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bined with the will of the parties, provides sufficient regulation for private
ordering. In contested cases, courts are to decide whether the initial agreement to arbitrate is valid as a contractual matter, and if so, they are to stay
any pending legal action until after the arbitration."' These statutes further
authorize the courts to appoint the arbitrator or umpire if a contract so
provides or the parties cannot agree on a neutral."'
Once a dispute is routed into arbitration, the statutes confer upon
arbitrators various powers for administering the arbitration, including the
power to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of documents, enforceable by the same contempt power for noncompliance as that
given to traditional federal judges.' Finally, if the parties' agreement to
arbitrate so designates, the statutes permit the prevailing party to have the
court enter the award as a formal judgment of the court."' They also limit

the grounds for appealing arbitration awards to situations in which the
award was procured by corruption, fraud, undue means, or upon the misconduct of the arbitrator,"5 and they limit the bases for vacating" 6 and modifying" the awards.
Such an intricate and integrated structure for the enforcement of
predispute agreements to arbitrate was a matter of historical necessity."'
While courts were willing to enforce arbitration awards, for centuries they
had refused to enforce the initial agreements to arbitrate. Under the
"ouster doctrine," English courts, and later American courts, regularly found
such agreements to be void because the statutes improperly ousted courts of9
their jurisdiction to hear matters arising under the laws of the sovereign.1
The FAA and related state statutes were the result of a coordinated effort
by the commercial community and the legal profession at the turn of the
nineteenth century to reverse the ouster doctrine legislatively and to permit
the specific enforcement of agreements to arbitrate commercial cases."'
In recent years, the U.S. Supreme Court has expanded the scope of the
FAA beyond its commercial origins to include employment and consumer

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
Rep. 532
120.

See 9 U.S.C. § 3; UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 2(b), 7 U.L.A. 109.
See 9 U.S.C. § 5; UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 3, 7 U.L.A. 167.
See 9 U.S.C. § 7; UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 7, 7 U.L.A. 199.
See 9 U.S.C. § 9; UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 11, 7 U.L.A. 264.
See 9 U.S.C. § 10; UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 12(a), 7 U.L.A. 280.
See 9 U.S.C. § 10; UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 12, 7 U.L.A. 280.
See 9 U.S.C. § 11; UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 13, 7 U.L.A. 409.
For a more complete discussion of this issue, see Reuben, supra note 9, at 598-601.
See, e.g., Insurance Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. 445, 458 (1874); Kill v. Hollister, 95 Eng.
(K.B. 1746).
See Reuben, supra note 9, at 601. See generally AUERBACH, supra note 42.
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arbitration,12' as well as other statutory rights.'22 The Court upheld the
constitutionality of the FAA as a valid exercise of Congress's admiralty
powers,'23 and state supreme courts have followed suit under state constitutional law.'24
b.

The Revolution in Judicial Attitudes Toward Arbitration
and Alternative Dispute Resolution

Despite the legislative initiatives of the early twentieth century,
judicial acceptance of arbitration agreements was generally grudging until
the late 1980s. 2 Initially reflecting Chief Justice Warren Burger's concerns
about the case load of the federal courts and the quality of the justice they
dispensed,'26 the U.S. Supreme Court issued a series of opinions over the
next decade and one-half that, in sum, took an expansive and forceful view
of the FAA as a reflection of the "national policy favoring arbitration."'2
In particular, the Court ruled that the FAA established a presumption of
consent to arbitration agreements,'26 and it extended the act beyond its
commercial roots to apply to all statutory claims in which Congress had not
"evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the
121.
See J. Clark Kelso & Thomas J. Stipanowich, ProtectingConsumers in Arbitration,DISP.
RESOL. MAG., Fall 1998, at 11.
122.
See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 62840 (1985) (permitting arbitration of civil racketeering, antitrust, and other statutory claims).
123.
See Marine Transit Corp. v. Dreyfus, 284 U.S. 263, 278-79 (1932). Remarkably perhaps, admiralty is the only context in which the Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality
of the FAA. While other challenges may lie, such as due process and separation of powers, it is implausible to imagine the Supreme Court striking down the statute at this point, given the body of law
that has developed under it and the widespread national and international reliance on its validity.
124.
See Katz, supra note 98, and cases cited therein.
125.
See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 435 (1953) (holding that mandatory arbitration agreements in securities brokerage agreements are not enforceable under the FAA because
"the right to select the judicial forum is the kind of 'provision' that cannot be waived" under the
Securities Act of 1933), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S.
477 (1984). For a more complete discussion, see Reuben, supra note 9, at 599-602.
126.
See, e.g., Warren E. Burger, Agenda for 2000 A.D.-A Need for Systematic Anticipation,
in THE POUND CONFERENCE, supra note 34, at 23, 23-25; Warren E. Burger, The State of Justice,
A.B.A. J., Apr. 1984, at 62.
127.
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984). The Court's approach to arbitration
under the FAA mirrors its approach to arbitration under federal collective bargaining law. See
United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960) (Steelworkers Trilogy); United Steelworkers
v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960). For a comprehensive criticism of this "national policy"
favoring arbitration under the FAA, see Jean R. Sternlight, Panaceaor CorporateTool?: Debunking the
Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637 (1996).
128.
See Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983).
See generally Sternlight, supra note 127, at 660.
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statutory rights at issue."' 29 In so doing, the Court used a series of cases from
the securities industry to repudiate the ouster doctrine, 30 summarily reject
generalized concerns over power imbalances, and permit the enforcement of
mandatory arbitration provisions in contracts of adhesion (at least under
certain circumstances) 131
As significant as this expansion was in the federal sphere, the Court's
extension of the FAA to the states has been even more remarkable. Within
a two-year period, the Court, over the once-vigorous dissent of Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor, 132 held that the act preempts any contrary state law
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985).
129.
Wilko was formally overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 481, which held that
130.
predispute agreements to arbitrate securities fraud claims under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
are enforceable. See also Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 228-29 (1987)
(holding that predispute agreements to arbitrate securities fraud claims under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970
are enforceable, and distinguishing Wilko as applying only to prohibit waivers of substantive rights,
not choice of forum provisions).
See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991) (upholding man131.
datory arbitration of an Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) claim). The case has
been quite controversial, spawning a vast literature, largely critical, among scholars. See, e.g.,
Reginald Alleyne, Statutory Discrimination Claims: Rights "Waived" and Lost in the Arbitration
Forum, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 381 (1996); Christine Godsil Cooper, Where Are We Going with
Gilmer?-Some Ruminations on the Arbitration of Discrimination Claims, 11 ST. Louis U. PUB. L.
REV. 203 (1992); Robert A. Gorman, The Gilmer Decision and the Private Arbitrationof Public-Law
Disputes, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 635; Sharona Hoffman, Mandatory Arbitration: Alternative Dispute
Resolution or Coercive Dispute Suppression?, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 131 (1996); Pierre
Levy, Gilmer Revisited: The Judicial Erosion of Employee Statutory Rights, 26 N.M. L. REV. 455
(1996); Lewis Maltby, Paradise Lost-How the Gilmer Court Lost the Opportunity for Alternative
Dispute Resolution to Improve Civil Rights, 12 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 1 (1994). For an argument
that the case should be interpreted narrowly, see Joseph R. Grodin, Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims: Doctrine and Policy in the Wake of Gilmer, 14 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 1 (1996); see
also Jean R. Stemlight, Compelling Arbitration of Claims Under the Civil Rights Act of 1866: What
Congress Could Not Have Intended, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 273, 320-23 (1999).
Despite such criticism, several lower federal courts have applied Gilmer broadly. See, e.g.,
Asplundh Tree Expert Co. v. Bates, 71 F.3d 592, 597, 601-02 (6th Cir. 1995) (using Gilmer to deny
an injunction and order arbitration of an employment dispute); Metz v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 39 F.3d 1482, 1487-88 (10th Cir. 1994) (extending Gilmer to bar a pregnancy
discrimination claim under Title VII); Albert v. National Cash Register Co., 874 F. Supp. 1328,
1332-33 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (extending Gilmer to bar a religious discrimination suit under Title VII);
Scott v. Farm Family Life Ins. Co., 827 F. Supp. 76, 77-79 (D. Mass. 1993) (extending Gilmer to bar
a gender discrimination suit under Title VII).
Compare Justice O'Connor's dissent in Southland (arguing that the majority's extension
132.
of the FAA to state courts "is impelled by an understandable desire to encourage the use of arbitration, but it utterly fails to recognize the clear congressional intent underlying the FAA," and
that "Congress intended to require federal, not state, courts to respect arbitration agreements"),
465 U.S. at 22-23, with her concurrence in Allied Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson:
[M]ore than 10 years have passed since Southland, several subsequent cases have built
upon its reasoning, and parties have undoubtedly made contracts in reliance on the
Court's interpretation of the Act in the interim. After reflection, I am persuaded by considerations of stare decisis, which we have said "have special force in the area of statutory
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restricting arbitrability,'33 that for diversity purposes FAA jurisprudence
creates a body of federal substantive law that "governs... in either state or
federal court,"'34 and that "as a matter of federal law, any doubts ...should
be resolved in favor of arbitration."'3 5 Similarly, the Court has given the act
potentially wide reaching application to state tort and contract law claims
by giving the statutory term "commerce" its broadest possible construction.'36 While there is some significant evidence that judicial enthusiasm
for ADR may be becoming more restrained,'37 and while some judges remain
skeptical of ADR,"' judicial support for ADR can be expected to continue.

interpretation," to acquiesce in today's judgment. Though wrong, Southland has not
proved unworkable, and, as always, "Congress remains free to alter what we have done."
513 U.S. 265, 283-84 (1995) (citations omitted).
133.
See Southland, 465 U.S. at 10-16. For an example of the breadth of the Court's view of
what constitutes a state law that is hostile to arbitration and therefore preempted by the FAA, see
Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996), which ruled that the FAA preempted
Montana from requiring plainer disclosure of arbitration clauses in boilerplate consumer contracts.
See also Richard C. Reuben, Western Showdown: Two Montana Judges Buck the U.S. Supreme
Court, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1996, at 16, 16 (noting that two Montana Supreme Court justices "Irlefused
to sign a routine remand order" returning the case to the trial courts for further proceedings, and
quoting the two justices as saying that they could not "in good conscience be an instrument of a
policy which is as legally unfounded, socially detrimental and philosophically misguided as the
United States Supreme Court's decision in this and other cases which interpret and apply the
Federal Arbitration Act").
134.
Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (Brennan,
J., dissenting); see also Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468, 475 (1989). See
generally 2 IAN R. MAcNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW: AGREEMENTS, AWARDS, AND
REMEDIES UNDER THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT § 17.3.1.1 (1995). But cf. Merrill Lynch,

Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117 (1973) (holding that state law is not preempted for statutory claims arising out of an arbitration agreement); Perry v. Thomas, 482
U.S. 483 (1987) (revisiting Ware in light of Southland and finding that an employee's state labor
code claim against his employer/broker must be arbitrated).
135.
Mercury Constr., 460 U.S. at 24-25 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
136.
See Allied Bruce, 513 U.S. at 273-77.
137.
See Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 79-81 (1998) (holding
that a waiver of statutory rights must at least be clear and unmistakable); First Options of Chicago,
Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995) (deciding that under FAA, the question of whether
arbitrators or courts have primary power to decide if parties agreed to arbitrate merits of dispute is
one for the courts, unless the parties agreed to submit the question to arbitration); Engalla v.
Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 15 Cal. 4th 951, 981 (1997) (holding that a health maintenance
organization may be liable in fraud if arbitration provisions held out as faster and less expensive
than litigation turn out to be longer and more expensive); Badie v. Bank of Am., 67 Cal. App. 4th
779, 805-06 (Ct. App. 1998) (holding Bank of America's unilateral imposition of mandatory arbitration on customer credit accounts unconscionable).
138.
See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99
HARV. L. REV. 668 (1986).
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Puzzling Inconsistencies: The Gap Between Institutional Support
for Alternative Dispute Resolution and Voluntary Usage
of Its Processes

The remarkable turnabout in judicial attitudes toward ADR, and the
visibly strong institutional endorsement of ADR processes, would suggest
a massive shift in dispute resolution away from litigation and toward ADR.
The empirical research, however, continues to tell quite a different story:
one of caution, uncertainty, and discomfort.
1.

Continuing Sense of Discomfort

In a 1997 speech at Stanford Law School, Dr. Deborah Hensler, a leading civil justice empiricist, described what she termed "puzzling inconsistencies in the ADR data."'39 That is, despite what appears to be high
institutional support for ADR (especially for legal disputes), voluntary use
appears to be low-and even then, ADR does not appear to achieve its goals
of lower cost and greater time efficiency, or party satisfaction.' The empiri4
cal literature on usage and efficiency is revealing. '
The most comprehensive empirical effort to date is a congressionally
mandated evaluation of pilot ADR programs authorized for certain federal
district courts under the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990.4 The study was
jointly performed by the RAND Institute for Civil Justice and the Federal
Judicial Center, and it focused on ten demonstration district courts in five
states: California, New York, Pennsylvania, Oklahoma, and Texas. In terms
of usage, the study found that the percentage of cases referred to ADR was
low-less than 10 percent for all but one of the ten demonstration districts,
43
and 5 percent or less in six others.' The findings were equally troubling for

Dr. Deborah Hensler, The Mysteries of ADR, Address at the Stanford Law School,
139.
Stanford Center on Conflict and Negotiation (Feb. 11, 1997).
See KAKALIK ET AL., supra note 39, at 48-50. But see PLAPINGER & STIENSTRA, supra
140.
note 16, at 6 (suggesting that usage rates in federal court programs are "fairly substantial" and may
not be dependent upon the mandatory referral of cases into these programs); DAVID RAUMA
& CAROL KRAFKA, VOLUNTARY ARBITRATION IN EIGHT FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: AN
EVALUATION (1994).
See generally NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON COURT-CONNECTED DISPUTE RESOLUTION
141.
RESEARCH: A REPORT ON RECENT RESEARCH FINDINGS-IMPLICATIONS FOR COURTS AND
FUTURE RESEARCH NEEDS (Susan Keilitz ed., 1993) [hereinafter NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON
COURT-CONNECTED DISPUTE RESPOLUTION RESEARCH].
See generally KAKALIK ET AL., supra note 39.
142.
See id.
143.
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efficiency claims, as the study concluded that the implementation of arbitration, mediation, and ENE in the federal courts under the act did not lead
to efficiency gains. In particular, the study showed no "statistically significant" evidence of a reduction in time to disposition, costs of litigation,
perceptions of fairness, or client satisfaction attributable to any of these
procedures (although findings were inconclusive for views of the fairness of
arbitration).'44 These results were consistent with other research indicating
that the real gains in ADR may be more qualitative than quantitative,'45 but
they still were controversial when released.'46
While there is little reliable data outside the court-annexed context,
that which is available paints a similar and consistent picture. More than
half of the lawyers questioned in an ABA Journal survey had no involvement in ADR in the five years preceding the survey.'47 This result was
similar to one found for corporations, showing that more than half of the
corporations reported no use of ADR in the past year, and that those corporations that did report the use of ADR had used it in only five or fewer
"
cases. 48
' Similarly again, in a narrow study of private dispute resolution in
Los Angeles County-an area of comparatively high ADR sophisticationresearchers used actual court filings to estimate projected private ADR
usage, determining that ADR was used to dispose of only 5.3 percent of the
144.
145.

See id. at 48-53.
See Susan Keilitz, Court Annexed Arbitration, in NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON COURTCONNECTED DISPUTE RESOLUTION RESEARCH, supra note 141, at 1, 1-50; see also Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the Mandatory Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. REV. 485, 497-98 (1985); Neil Vidmar, An Assessment of Mediation in a Small
Claims Court, 41 J. SOC. ISSUES 127, 134-37 (1985) (stating that litigant satisfaction appears to
depend upon perceptions of fairness, not whether the process used was settlement or adjudication). But see Craig A. McEwen & Richard J. Maiman, Mediation in Small Claims Court: Achieving
Compliance Through Consent, 18 L. & SOC'Y REV. 11, 40-42 (1984) (perceiving mediation as more
fair and satisfying than litigation). For an overview of empirical research that compares ADR
claims and promises against the empirical literature, see Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases

Settle": Judicial Promotionand Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1351-87 (1994).

For an example of a federal court program with results that are arguably more positive, see
Snapp, supra note 91, at 16-17 (describing an internal study of an ADR program in the western
district of Missouri that concluded that ADR reduced the time to disposition by 28 percent and
produced a median savings per case of $10,000 (based on attorney estimates) and an average per
case savings of $36,215 (assuming two sides per case)).
146.
Several of the nation's leading ADR researchers and practitioners, for example, signed
a statement coordinated by the CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution criticizing its methodology
and cautioning policymakers against using it to guide policy on ADR. See generally Views on RAND's
CJRA Report: Concerns and Recommendations, 15 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 67 (1997).
147.
See Reuben, supra note 73, at 55.

148.

See Nearly One-Half Have Used ADR During the Past Year, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, July

1994, at 37. But cf. DAVID B. LIPSKY & RONALD L. SEEBER, THE USE OF ADR IN U.S. CORPO-

RATIONS: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 (1997) (concluding that "the vast majority" of studied corporations used an ADR process within the preceding three years).
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county's total dispute case load. This finding led those researchers to conclude that private ADR had not proven to make "a meaningful difference"'149 in the administration of civil 50justice in the county. Such findings
were similar to those in earlier studies.1
2.

Possible Explanations

In her Stanford remarks, Dr. Hensler suggested four possible reasons for
the "puzzling inconsistencies" between ADR support and voluntary usage.
First, she posited that interest in ADR may in fact be supply driven, rather
than demand driven. That is, ADR may simply provide lawyers with new
marketing approaches and open up new career opportunities in dispute
resolution for nonlawyers. Second, to the extent ADR is demand driven,
that demand may be coming from the corporate sector, which may realize
modest efficiency benefits of ADR after litigation has commenced, or which
may have collateral reasons for preferring ADR that are both noble (such as
preserving business relationships) and ignoble (such as limiting remedies for
employees, consumers, and vendors). Third, she hypothesized that the
phenomenon may be explained by the clash of interests between judges,
who seek to clear their dockets, and practicing lawyers, who want to maintain fees and control.'' Finally, she suggested that ADR in practice may
not be that different from traditional litigation, with little disputant partici52
pation or control, integrative bargaining, or attention to process values.'
a.

The Legitimacy Barrier

Assuming that there is at least some truth in all of Dr. Hensler's reasons,
I would propose at least one more possibility: that ADR has not yet earned
its legitimacy as a fair and impartial means of dispute resolution, either within
ELIZABETH ROLPH ET AL., ESCAPING THE COURTHOUSE: PRIVATE ALTERNATIVE
149.
DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN Los ANGELES 17 (1994).
See, e.g., WILLIAM L.F. FELSTINER & LYNN WILLIAMS, COMMUNITY MEDIATION IN
150.
DORCHESTER, MASSACHUSETTS (1980) (citing low rates of voluntary usage of ADR in criminal

cases); Sally Engle Merry & Susan S. Silbey, What Do Plaintiffs Want? Reexamining the Concept of

Dispute, 9 JUST. SYS. J. 151, 151-53 (1984) (observing the "low rate of voluntary usage" of ADR);
Jessica Pearson, An Evaluation of Alternatives to Court Adjudication, 7 JUST. SYS. J. 420, 426-29, 439

(1982) (arguing that voluntary court-annexed ADR programs do not attract participants).
Others have argued that lawyers and judges have teamed up to further ADR. See Bryant
151.
in Virtue, Address at the Stanford Law School, Stanford Center on Conflict and
Dealing
Garth,
G.
Negotiation (Feb. 17, 1998) (summary on file with author); see also Yves Dezalay & Bryant Garth,
Fussing About the Forum: Categories and Definitions as Stakes in a Professional Competition, 21 L. &
SOC. INQUIRY 285, 286-88 (1996) (discussing how the field of professional competition in dispute
processing has changed the field of business disputes).

152.

See Hensler, supra note 139.
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the bar or with the public at large. In the language of the field, ADR is not
yet a "safe" environment for binding dispute resolution, at least partly because
of the absence of even minimal constitutional procedural safeguards.
Among lawyers, ADR is in some important respects counterintuitive. 3 Lawyers are trained to be advocates, capable of marshaling facts and
legal rules to advance the interests of their clients. Similarly, they are trained
to be decision makers, applying rules of law to facts to decide cases. While
there is considerable room for advocacy in arbitration, there are fewer rules
to define the terms of the debate, and there is, therefore, less certainty.
Mediation takes lawyers even further from the roots of their training, calling for such skills as active listening, empathy, and value creation, rather
than searing cross-examination, erudite argument, and the claiming of
value. 4 As a result, lawyers often feel somewhat uncomfortable or unprepared when in an ADR environment-a dynamic underscored in the ABA
Journal survey, in which, remarkably, only 53 percent of respondents said
they thought their training and experience as lawyers prepared them for
arbitration, and only 47 percent said the same of their preparation for
mediation. 5 '
Equally tellingly, the survey showed a healthy skepticism about ADR
processes. Only 51 percent of the responding lawyers said they preferred
mediation over litigation, while 31 percent said they still preferred
litigation.'56 When the choice was between litigation and arbitration,
43 percent said they actually preferred litigation, while only 31 percent said
they preferred arbitration.'
One of the reasons appeared to be a deep
concern about the personal biases or qualifications of arbitrators or mediators, with 70 percent of the respondents expressing such a concern.' 8 As is
discussed at length below, such a concern is rooted deeply in constitutional
due process."'

153.

See Gary Friedman & Jack Himmelstein, Deal Killer or Deal Saver: The Consulting Law-

yer's Dilemma, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Winter 1997, at 7, 7; infra Part 1.C.2.b.
154.
Blaming,
155.
156.

157.

See William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformationof Disputes: Naming,
Claiming..., 15 L. & SOC'Y REV. 631 (1980-81).
See Reuben, supra note 73, at 60.
See id. at 56.

See id.

158.
See id. at 58. Not surprisingly, perhaps, an equally overwhelming majority, 85 percent,
said their concerns were not related to the potential for ADR to reduce the revenues of their practices. See id. at 59. The Lipsky & Seeber study also found similar concerns, noting that "almost
half [of respondent corporations] say they have a lack of confidence in arbitrators and close to
30 percent say there is a shortage of qualified arbitrators." LIPSKY & SEEBER, supra note 148, at 8.
159.
See infra Part I.C.3.
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The Lawyers' Standard Philosophical Map

One plausible explanation for lawyers' concerns about the ADR
processes is that they may derive from their legal training and the value that
is placed on due process as a basic standard of fundamental fairness. This is
part of what Professor Leonard L. Riskin has described as the lawyer's
"standard philosophical map," which is predicated on two essential assumptions: that disputants are adversaries and that a third party will decide
60
between them according to a rule of law. To the extent that formal structures enhance due process, they create an environment that is safe for
binding dispute resolution. The rules, standards, and remedies are widely
known, and while skill levels may vary widely, the rules of the game are
constant. Lawyers tend to be risk averse,"' and such elements of formality
have the effect of increasing predictability and reducing risk. Moreover,
appellate rights assure an avenue of relief from undesirable results, or at
least a basis for continued negotiation.
While training and professional culture may help explain lawyer
skepticism about ADR, the lay public also has reasons to view ADR as less
legitimate than trial. To begin with, most people who do not work in
conflict-related fields, such as law, social work, or counseling, may simply
be unaware of ADR. Similarly, to the extent that lay parties are aware of
ADR, they may not understand it, or they may think that ADR provides
some aspects associated with the public system (such as adherence to public
law and the availability of judicial review) that it does not. Finally, but
significantly, one may reasonably surmise that there is a broadly held expectation that legal disputes will be resolved in public courts of law. Professor
Lawrence Friedman has referred to this "general expectation of justice" as "a

160.

See Leonard L. Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 29, 43-48 (1982); see

also DONALD A. SCHON & MARTIN REIN, FRAME REFLECTION: TOWARD THE RESOLUTION OF
INTRACTABLE POLICY CONTROVERSIES 26-28 (1994) (discussing the relationship between the

ways we frame problems and the types of solutions we see).
See, e.g., Ronald J.Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset
161.
Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239 (1984); Donald C. Langevoort & Robert K. Rasmussen, Skewing the
Results: The Role of Lawyers in Transmitting Legal Rules, 5 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 375, 379-80
(1997); Bradley Saxton, Flaws in the Laws Governing Employment References: Problems of "Over-

deterrence" and a Proposal for Reform, 13 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 45, 74 n.105 (1995); Steven
Shavell, Liability and the Incentive to Obtain Information About Risk, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 259 (1992).

A popular expression of antilawyer sentiment, making the undue caution claim, is MARK
H. MCCORMICK, THE TERRIBLE TRUTH ABOUT LAWYERS 111-12 (1987). For a different perspective on the issue, see Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, and
Settlement: A New Look at the Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEX. L. REV. 77 (1997).
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genuine feature of American legal culture."'62 Says Friedman: "If somebody
senses a wrong, she feels that there must be a remedy, somewhere in the
system. These examples, then, are chips off a larger, more significant, block:
the welfare state itself, and the principle1 63of social insurance, products themselves of changes in social expectation.
In this regard, the opportunity to have one's "day in court" is an
important cultural value with which our current understanding of ADR as

purely private is at odds.'" To be sure, there is an appreciable literature
suggesting that one of the things that participants like about ADR is that it
gives them a more meaningful "day in court."' 65 Upon closer scrutiny, however, this dynamic may be better understood as referring to a more
meaningful opportunity for parties to tell their story or, more likely, to gain
vindication.'66 After all, as currently understood, ADR does not provide a
day in court, but rather an alternative to a day in court.
162.
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, TOTAL JUSTICE 76 (1985).
163.
Id.
164.
The importance of one's day in court as an American cultural value dates back to the
initial drafting of the Constitution. Indeed, it is widely acknowledged that the lack of a civil jury
trial right was among the most important factors driving the debate between the federalists and
the antifederalists prior to the adoption of the Constitution. See generally IRVING BRANT, THE
BILL OF RIGHTS 39 (1965); ROBERT ALLEN RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 12224, 140 (1955); CHARLES WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 509-10 (1937); Edith

Guild Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARV. L. REV. 289 (1966); Charles
W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L.REV. 639 (1973).
165.
See, e.g., JANE W. ADLER ET AL., SIMPLE JUSTICE: How LITIGANTS FARE IN THE
PITTSBURGH COURT ARBITRATION PROGRAM 65 (1983) (noting that litigants want "an opportunity to have their case heard" and that they "tak[e] it for granted that they ha[ve] a right to
appear in person, to be heard fully, and to be treated even-handedly"); Samuel R. Gross & Kent
D. Syverud, Don't Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1, 57
& n.87 (1996) (citing "[sleveral scholars [who] have discussed the importance of one particular
non-economic motive: the desire to have a day in court to obtain formal justice" (citations omitted)); Deborah R. Hensler, Resolving Mass Toxic Torts: Myths and Realities, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV.
89, 99 ("[he most frequently cited objective of lay litigants in adjudicatory proceedings was to 'tell
my side of the story'...."); Roy D. Simon, Jr., The Riddle of Rule 68, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1,
63 (1985) ("A plaintiff... may want to complete the process of litigation in order to feel that she
has had her day in court. Settlement may not satisfy this litigant even if the settlement would be
more favorable than the outcome at trial .... ").
166.
See, e.g., Randall P. Bezanson, The Libel Suit in Retrospect: What Plaintiffs Want and
What Plaintiffs Get, 74 CAL. L. REV. 789, 799 (1986) (noting that libel plaintiffs sue not for economic gain but because "litigation is the only effective means of achieving a remedy for their
reputational, as distinguished from economic, harm"); Gross & Syverud, supra note 165, at 58
("[D]octors are insisting on trial in some medical malpractice cases in which they expect to obtain
public vindication. This is most likely to happen when the doctor is convinced that she acted in a
professionally responsible manner, but has nonetheless been wounded in her self-esteem .... ");
Merry & Silbey, supra note 150, at 153 (arguing that "the grievant wants vindication, protection
of his or her rights (as he or she perceives them), an advocate to help in the battle, or a third party
who will uncover the 'truth' and declare the other party wrong"); Simon, supra note 165, at 63
("[A] defendant may desire to complete the process of litigation even if victory is unlikely, because
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Contemporary Industry Standards Support This Understanding

The approach of the three most significant industry self-regulation
efforts of the modem ADR movement supports the suggestion that the lack
of constitutional safeguards and the legitimacy barrier may be at least part of
the explanation for the gap between ADR support and actual usage.
Two of these efforts-the so-called Dunlop Report'67 and The Due
Process Protocol'6 -were inspired by broadly acknowledged due process
concerns about ADR in the employment setting, in which there has been
nothing less than a holy war between management and plaintiffs' lawyers
9
over the issue of the mandatory arbitration of employment claims. The
third-the American Arbitration Association's (AAA's) Consumer Due
Process Protocol 7 -was inspired by concerns over the courts' apparent willingness to enforce mandatory arbitration provisions in contracts of
adhesion.7 Although none of the three includes an enforcement
mechanism-a crucial failure in the eyes of critics" 2-all three nonetheless
victory in court may be the only way to obtain public vindication."); David A. Rammelt, Note,
"Inherent Power"and Rule 16: How FarCan a Federal Court Push the Litigant Toward Settlement?, 65
IND. L.J. 965, 1001 (1990) ("[Tlhere are some disputes in which the litigants' primary motivation
for filing suit does not involve monetary compensation or redress, but rather involves an overwhelming element of personal vindication."). But see RICHARD LEMPERT & JOSEPH SANDERS,
AN INVITATION TO LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE: DESERT, DISPUTES, AND DISTRIBUTION 175
(1986) (concluding from a series of studies that only plaintiffs in discrimination suits were likely
to pursue litigation for the sake of justice rather than economic well-being); Gross & Syverud,
supra note 165, at 58 (finding that relatively few disputes, other than some medical malpractice
disputes, went to trial because of either party's desire for vindication).
U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR & U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FACT FINDING REPORT: COM167.
MISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS (1994). This report of the
President's Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations was chaired by Harvard
economist and former Labor Secretary John T. Dunlop, and it called for quality standards in
contractual nonunion ADR that may be seen as the functional equivalent of due process standards. See id. at 116-19.
Prototype Agreement on Job Bias Dispute Resolution: A Due Process Protocol for Mediation
168.
and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising Out of the Employment Relationship, [May-June 19951
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 91, at E-11 (May 11, 1995). For a general discussion of the process
and the protocols, see Christopher A. Barreca et al., Document: A Due Process Protocolfor Resolving Employment Disputes Involving Statutory Rights, DISP. RESOL. J., Oct.-Dec. 1995, at 37-39; see
also Arnold M. Zack, Arbitrationas a Tool to Unclog Government and the Judiciary: The Due Process
Protocol as an InternationalModel, 7 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REP. 10 (1996).
Aug.
See, e.g., Richard C. Reuben, Mandatory ArbitrationClauses Under Fire, A.B.A. J.,
169.
1996, at 58, 58-60.
NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES ADVISORY COMM., AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASS'N,
170.
CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL: A DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL FOR MEDIATION AND
ARBITRATION OF CONSUMER DISPUTES (1998).
See infra note 388 and accompanying text.
171.
See, e.g., Reuben, supra note 9, at 592 n.49; Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory
172.
Arbitrationof Individual Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENV. U. L.
REV. 1017, 1044-46 (1996).

HeinOnline -- 47 UCLA L. Rev. 987 1999-2000

988

47 UCLA LAW REVIEW 949 (2000)

resonate in constitutional due process. In particular, they call for such basic
elements as the right to a competent and impartial neutral, representation,
prehearing access to reasonably relevant information, full availability of remedies, and reasoned, written opinions. Together, these standards represent
the clearest articulation of broad-based efforts by the industry to deal with
acknowledged problems, and they were developed with an eye to constitutional and administrative law notions of due process. Moreover, there is
some empirical evidence to suggest that these rudimentary elements of due
process have made a substantial inroad into mitigating one of the more challenging aspects of the modem entrepreneurial ADR movement: the repeat
player problem. A study of employment discrimination cases administered
by the AAA compared the employee "win rate" in cases brought pursuant
to a personnel handbook arbitration clause both before and after the AAA
adopted so-called due process protocols." 3 Before the protocols became effective, the win rate of employees in handbook cases was 25 percent, as compared to a 72 percent win rate in nonhandbook claims.'74 After the due
process protocols became effective, the employees' win rate jumped to 40 percent, as compared to a nonprotocol rate of 46 percent. Researchers interpret
these data to suggest that the AAA screening (pursuant to its commitment
not to administer cases that did not comply with the protocols) 75 was effectively screening out the arbitration provisions that were structurally unfair.76
In other words, the imposition of due process standards appeared to have
been effective in'mitigating unfairness in arbitration.
D.

Conclusion: Alternative Dispute Resolution at a Crossroads

There is an old story about the well-intended but slightly confused
man who was said to have a mind like a steel trap whose jaws don't quite
close. 77 And so it is with modem ADR. Institutional support is visibly
high, but voluntary usage remains low and is marked both by a pervasive
sense of silent skepticism by ADR outsiders and by mounting disappointment and disillusionment from ADR insiders. In short, the ADR movement finds itself at an important crossroads. Two decades of enthusiastic
institutional promotion have brought ADR to a meaningful and important
173.

See Bingham, supra note 86. Employee "win rate" was defined in terms of the granting

of relief of any kind on a filed claim. See id.
174.
See id.tbl. 12.
175.
See American Arbitration Ass'n, Press Release (Oct. 30, 1995).
176.
See Telephone Interview with Professor Lisa Bingham (Apr. 3, 1999).
177.
With great appreciation to Oliver Wendell Holmes, through Professor Gerald Gunther,
for the anecdote.
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level of acceptance, particularly if one factors in court-related programs. From
the perspective of the movement's pioneers, this is cause for cheer.' s The
glass is half full rather than half empty. However, the low level of voluntary usage raises serious questions about the degree to which the glass will
continue to fill.
In this regard, the legitimacy barrier to the use of ADR is cause for
particular concern. Public policy strongly supports the use of binding dispute resolution techniques other than trial-even if the assumptions that
ADR will save time and money and relieve the courts of chronic congestion
prove to be overstated. Pluralism and choice in dispute resolution processes
are highly desirable, because the type of dispute resolution technique that
is best for any given conflict will depend upon a variety of considerations,
which include the nature of the conflict and the goals of the parties in
resolving it.'79 It is this aspect of ADR that helps to explain research
findings of party satisfaction with ADR processes and outcomes,' 8 which in
turn furthers a broader public policy favoring private rather than public ordering of nongovernmental affairs.
Such aspirations cannot be wholly realized if the legitimacy barrier is
not scaled. Because the loss of constitutional safeguards derives from the contemporary bipolar understanding that the private nature of ADR simply
makes them unavailable, this predicate assumption is worth a closer look.
Part II examines this assumption more closely, by reference to the manner
in which the U.S. Supreme Court has historically drawn that line: the state
action doctrine.
II.

THE LEGAL FOUNDATION FOR A UNITARY THEORY
OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND PUBLIC
CIVIL JUSTICE: STATE ACTION

In Part I, I suggested that the absence of even rudimentary constitutional due process protections in ADR may help explain the gap between
high institutional support for ADR and low voluntary usage of such

processes. Here in Part II, I demonstrate how the U.S. Supreme Court's state
action doctrine seems to compel an understanding of certain aspects of ADR
as public rather than private for purposes of constitutional due process, particularly court-related ADR processes and contractual arbitrations conducted

178. I thank Professor Randy Lowry for underscoring this point.
179. See Frank E.A. Sander & Stephen B. Goldberg, Fitting the Forum to the Fuss: A UserFriendly Guide to Selectingan ADR Procedure, 10 NEGOTIATION J. 49, 49-50 (1994).
180.

See supra notes 165-166 and accompanying text.
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under the FAA. 8' I begin with a general discussion of the state action doctrine and then apply it to the ADR context described in Part 1.
A. The Framework for Assessing State Action
The state action doctrine is a central, and often controversial, tenet
through which the public-private distinction is played out in the application of constitutional law. It serves as a recognition that the Fourteenth
Amendment is a limitation on government power, rather than on private
conduct and choices. 82
Historically, the Supreme Court has used either of two tests in assessing state action, finding private conduct to be state action if the private
actor performs a public function or performs a private function that has a
close "nexus" to, or "entanglement" with, the government. In recent years,
however, the Court appears to have settled on a two-part framework for
analyzing state action questions that takes a balancing approach incorporating both standards. This analytical framework was articulated in Lugar
v. Edmondson Oil Co.'83 and amplified in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete
Co."s As later articulated in Georgia v. McCollum,' the Lugar-Edmonson test
is as follows:
The first inquiry is "whether the claimed [constitutional] deprivation has resulted from the exercise of a right or privilege having its
source in state authority."...
The second inquiry is whether the private party charged with the
deprivation can be described as a state actor. In resolving that issue,

the Court [has] found it useful to apply three principles: (1) "the extent
to which the actor relies on governmental assistance and benefits"; (2)
"whether the actor is performing a traditional governmental function"; and (3) "whether the injury caused is aggravated in a unique

way by the incidents of governmental authority. ' '
These inquiries generally consider the degree to which the action of the
state either coerces personal choice or, more commonly, facilitates and makes
possible private choices toward ends that would be unconstitutional if per181.
A more comprehensive explication of this argument may be found in Reuben, supra
note 9, at 609-33.
182.
For a general discussion of the state action doctrine, see WILLIAM COHEN & JONATHAN
D. VARAT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1107-46 (10th ed. 1997); GERALD
GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 921-62 (13th ed. 1997).
183.
457 U.S. 922 (1982).
184.
500 U.S. 614 (1991).
185.
505 U.S. 42 (1992).
186.
Id.at 51 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
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formed by the state directly. As Chief Justice William Rehnquist noted in
the October 1998 term: "Whether such a 'close nexus' exists, our cases
state, depends on whether the state 'has exercised coercive power or has
provided such significant encouragement, either overt87or covert, that the
choice must in law be deemed to be that of the State."1

B. Assessing State Action in Alternative Dispute Resolution Programs
1.

The Source of Alternative Dispute Resolution in State Authority

The first question in a Lugar-Edmonson analysis is "whether the
claimed [constitutional] deprivation has resulted from the exercise of a right
or privilege having its source in state authority."'88 In analyzing this element, I consider court-related and contractual ADR in turn.
a.

Court-Related Alternative Dispute Resolution

Court-related arbitration, mediation, and other ADR programs would
seem to satisfy the threshold requirement of state authority handily because
they are effected through the state's direct statutory or administrative
compulsion of the party into the ADR process in involuntary programs, and
the state's complete, actual, and direct administration and oversight of
voluntary court-related ADR programs.'89

An arbitration conducted, for example, pursuant to California's statute
requiring that all civil cases worth less than $50,000 be arbitrated as a
condition of trial would plainly be an arbitration conducted pursuant to
statutory authority.'" But for the statute, the case would still be in a public
court. Similarly, a child custody dispute ordered to mediation pursuant to a
court rule requiring all family law matters to be mediated by a private
mediator before resorting to trial, if either party so requests, would also be a

See American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 58 (1999) (finding the pri187.
vate insurers' decisions to withhold payment of disputed worker's compensation medical treatment
payments pending utilization review was not state action requiring adherence to due process
requirements of notice and opportunity to be heard).
Lugar, 457 U.S. at 939.
188.
See PLAPINGER & STIENSTRA, supra note 16, at 3-13; Craig A. McEwen & Laura
189.
Williams, Legal Policy and Access to Justice Through Courts and Mediation, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 865 (1998); Shapp, supra note 91, at 16. Moreover, even court or agency programs that
merely "encourage" the use of ADR processes have a powerful coercive element, as it may be quite
difficult for parties, and their counsel, to distinguish such encouragement from a de facto directive,
or at least a strong and fearsome preference.

190.

See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1141.11(a) (West 1999).
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mediation conducted pursuant to state authority. 9 Again, but for the court
rule, the matter would still be in a public court for decision. Certainly both
hearings are conducted pursuant to state authority.
b.

Contractual Arbitration

Contractual arbitrations conducted under the FAA and related state
laws also meet this preliminary threshold requirement.' 92 As noted above,
in contested cases these statutes essentially route cases to public courts first
for a determination of the validity of the agreement to arbitrate, then to
arbitrators for decision (subject to the court's continuing jurisdiction), and
then back to the public courts for possible limited review, adoption, and
enforcement. 93
This is sufficient under the current doctrine to meet the threshold
requirement of state authority. Indeed, the Court pointed to just such a
structure as satisfying this element in Edmonson, noting that most jurisdictions have statutes authorizing and regulating the use of peremptory
challenges, and that without statutory authorization the defendant "would
not have been able to engage in the alleged discriminatory acts."'94 The
Court also noted the significant involvement of the judge, arguably the
ultimate state actor, in furthering the private actor's discriminatory peremptory challenge.'9 Similarly, in the creditors' rights cases discussed more
thoroughly below, 96 the Court also looked at statutory schemes that could
be availed by private parties in finding that statutes providing for private
creditor remedies constituted sufficient state authority to justify proceeding
to the attribution question. Similarly, in ADR, the FAA and related state
laws provide sufficient state authority to trigger the possible ultimate finding
of state action.

191.
See, e.g., SUPER. CT. CAL. COUNTY OF SAN MATEO CT. R. 5.3 (1999) (superseded by
id. R. 5.3 (2000)).
192.
Section 3 of the FAA, which compels a court to stay active court proceedings pending
arbitration when a contractual arbitration agreement is found to be valid, presents the most coercive of statutory arbitration environments. See 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1994). Section 4 is, arguably, slightly
less coercive because it does not necessarily direct a party out of trial proceedings and into
arbitration. Rather, it permits the party to a contract to petition a court for what is, in effect, a
positive injunction directing such party into arbitration-again, however, after a judicial finding
of the validity of the agreement to arbitrate. See id. § 4. Both provisions, however, are substantially coercive in that they direct a party that does not want to arbitrate a matter into such a
proceeding against the party's will and preference.
193.
See supra notes 110-117 and accompanying text.
194.
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 621 (1991).

195.
196.

See id. at 623-24.
See infra notes 248-256 and accompanying text.
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Contractual Mediation and Other Consensual Processes

Significantly, however, contractual mediations and most other contractual consensual ADR processes often would not meet this threshold
"source in state authority" requirement of the Lugar-Edmonson state action
analysis, even in situations in which the results were confirmed by a court.
While judicial hostility to arbitration in the form of the ouster doctrine led
to the passage of comprehensive national arbitration legislation, as discussed
above, 97 there was no such hostility to mediation by the time it meaningfully arrived as a viable dispute resolution technique at the onset of the
modem ADR movement. As a result, state authorization for mediation
tends to be scattered within substantive law statutes.' gs These statutes do
not intertwine the roles of the government and the private mediators in the
same manner that the FAA and related state laws blend the roles of courts
and arbitrators. Apart from court-related mediation, and mere statutory
authorizations to use mediation, the only meaningful involvement mediation has with the government is in the availability of judicial enforcement
of the mediation awards, by way of either contract or, in some instances,
confirmation!" For reasons discussed more fully below,2" the mere enforcement of a mediation agreement is insufficient, by itself, to give rise to state
action, both because the mediation is not conducted pursuant to state
authority and because the mere enforcement of a mediation agreement or
other such ADR process is insufficient to make the conduct of the mediator
or other ADR neutral fairly attributable to the state."'
2.

Attribution of Private Conduct to the State

The second prong of the Lugar-Edmonson analysis tests "whether the
private party charged with the deprivation can be described as a state actor.""2 2
Edmonson amplified Lugar by stressing three factors that must be
considered in answering the attribution question: (1) "the extent to which
197.
198.

See supra notes 118-120 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Florida Water Resources, Conservation, Reclamation, and Use Act, FLA.

STAT. ANN. § 373.71 (West 1997) (authorizing mediation for interstate water disputes); MONT.

CODE. ANN. § 40-4-300 (1987) (regulating mediation authorized for family disputes). See generally
UNIF. MEDIATION ACT prefatory note at 4 (Draft Mar. 2000).

199.
200.

See ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note 66, § 8:02.
See infra Part II.B.2.c.

The one possible exception to this general understanding could be the hybrid process
201.
of med/arb, and then only to the extent of the arbitration component, assuming, as is likely the
case, that the arbitration is conducted pursuant to the FAA or a related state law. In such cases, it
may be the conduct of the arbitrators may be fairly attributable to the state.
See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1991).
202.
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the actor relies on governmental assistance and benefits," (2) "whether the
actor is performing a traditional governmental function," and (3) "whether
the injury caused is aggravated in a unique way by the incidents of governmental authority."2 3 As I show below, the first two considerations effectively recast the Court's historical public nexus (or entanglement) and public
function approaches, while the third wisely forces the state action proponent to confront the broader policy considerations at stake. To further analytical congruity, I address them in an order slightly different from the
Court's, beginning with the public function aspect before moving on to the
reliance (entanglement) and aggravation (policy) factors.
a.

Performance of a Traditional Government Function

The earliest cases in the modem era of state action recognize that state
action will be found when private actors perform a traditional public function.
The classic, and easiest, case is Marsh v. Alabama,2° in which the court held
that Chickasaw, Alabama, a company town wholly owned by a corporation,
could not prohibit a Jehovah's Witness from passing out religious literature
near the local post office."' From that baseline, the analysis becomes more
complex, in part because the Court has never been able to delineate just
what a public function is. Indeed, the task may be beyond the possibility of
broad-based consensus. 6 In Marsh, the question was arguably easy because
the township, a local government, in effect had been wholly re-created by
the private company. However, in the modem era that is a rare instance and
certainly is not central to the U.S. Supreme Court's later public function
jurisprudence.
Rather, the Court's public function cases after Marsh have more commonly drawn upon the concept of delegation. That is to say, when a state
traditionally and exclusively performs a function and then delegates all or
part of that function to a private actor, the constitutional character of the
delegated function follows the delegation. A critical limitation here has been
the concept of traditional exclusivity. If anything has been clear in this
otherwise murky jurisprudential backwash, it is that a function must be
traditionally performed exclusively by the government in order for its per203.
204.

Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 621-22 (1991) (citations omitted).
326 U.S. 501 (1946).

205.

See id. at 506-09.

206.
See, e.g., Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1128-49
(1980) (arguing that the private-public distinction cannot justify the longstanding refusal to grant
real power to cities); Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the PubliclPrivateDistinction,
130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349, 1350-57 (1982) (using the public-private distinction to illustrate the
sequence of stages by which a distinction loses its clarity).
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formance by private parties to be deemed attributable to the state under a
public function rationale.
A pair of contrasting public function cases helps illustrate the point.
In the first, Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,27 the Court refused to find a
utility's provision of electricity services to be a public function, even though
the utility allegedly had been granted a government monopoly, because the
provision of such services is not a function "traditionally the exclusive
prerogative of the State."2° Because the provision of utility services was not
a traditionally exclusive public function, held the Court, the challengers
had no constitutional ground upon which to complain that the summary
termination of services without notice or a hearing violated their rights to
procedural due process. The state's comprehensive regulation of the utility
was of no consequence to the state action determination.
In the white primary cases, however, the Court was willing to find the
administration of Texas election primaries by private clubs to be a public
function."° This series of cases stemmed from the claims of African
Americans that they were being improperly excluded from meaningful par21 °
ticipation in this important aspect of democracy and sovereignty. One of
211
the more salient of these cases is Terry v. Adams, which involved the
delegation of the election function to a private voting club, the all-white
jaybird Democratic Association, to conduct an all-white private primary
before the public primary and general election. Eight Justices agreed that
the Jaybirds were state actors and that this "three-step" elective system
violated the Fifteenth Amendment's specific protection of black voting
rights."2 The Court's plurality opinion provided three separate rationales for
finding state action in the private Jaybird voting club. In the lead opinion,
Justice Hugo Black found the club to be a state actor because it performed a
207.
208.

419 U.S. 345 (1974).
Id. at 353.

The white primary cases were decided before the Court's decision in Jackson formally
209.
introduced the concept of an exclusivity limitation. However, the Court has never disavowed
these cases on that ground, and it continues to cite them approvingly in state action and other cases,
including Jackson. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 981-82 (1996); Georgia v. McCollum,
505 U.S. 42, 53 (1992); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 621 (1991); Lugar
v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 928 (1982); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 63-64
(1980); Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 158 (1978); Jackson, 419 U.S. at 352.
See, e.g., Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944). In Alluright, the Court held that
210.
white primaries established by state convention are unconstitutional under the Fifteenth Amendment. Stressing the importance of elections in a constitutional democracy, the Court said, "The
party takes its character as a state agency from the duties imposed upon it by state statutes; the duties
do not become matters of private law because they are performed by a political party." Id. at 663.
345 U.S. 461 (1953).
211.
See id. at 484 (Minton, J., dissenting). Only Justice Sherman Minton dissented, finding no
212.
dissenting).
state action whatsoever arising from the Jaybird primary. See id. at 484-94 (Minton, J.,
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traditional public function, the conduct of political elections."' Three
concurring Justices-Tom C. Clark, Stanley F. Reed, and Robert H.
Jackson-advanced a separate delegation theory in finding the voting club
to be a state actor as an "auxiliary" of the local Democratic Party." ' Finally,
Justice Felix Frankfurter's solo concurring opinion found the private
discrimination to be "clothed with the authority of the State" in part because
of the role of county election officials as "participants in the scheme."2 5'
While Frankfurter's concurring opinion stands alone in the white primary
cases, it may also be seen as presaging what would become the court's modem
entanglement rationale, the notion of joint participation. This concept is
examined more fully below,216 but for now it is enough to understand the
white primary cases as standing in part for the principle that delegation is
the essence of a public function rationale.
(1)

Court-Related Alternative Dispute Resolution

A public function analysis seems to paint a fairly clear portrait of courtrelated ADR as state action. As noted above, these programs are generally
developed and administered by the state through court rules and administrative or legislative mandates that require or encourage parties to participate
in arbitrations, mediations, or other ADR processes, often as a condition for
proceeding to trial.2"7 The compulsion into these ADR hearings is direct,
and participation is often nonvolitional. ' When a court delegates its author
ity to administer a dispute to private attorney-neutrals who serve on rosters
at the court's pleasure, the court's essential constitutional obligations flow
to the private neutral along with the delegation of authority to act on the
court's behalf in the resolution of a dispute. The presence of state action
seems beyond reasonable question. Indeed, there has long been tacit
recognition of this point, as evidenced by the fact that court-related ADR

213.
See id. at 469.
214.
See id. at 483-84 (extending AllUwright, 321 U.S. at 664).
215.
Id. at 475-76. In this way, Justice Frankfurter concluded, citing Justice Holmes, the
public and private actors 'are bound together as the parts of a single plan. The plan may make
the parts unlawful."' Id. at 476 (quoting Swift & Co. v. U.S., 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905)). The Court
later expressly rejected this comprehensive-regulation rationale as a basis for finding state action.
See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350 (1974); see also Public Utils. Comm'n
v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 462 (1952).
216.
See infra notes 232-258 and accompanying text.

217.

See supra Part I.B.1.

218. See ROGERS & McEwEN, supra note 66, §§ 7:01-:02. Situations in which the neutral
is a court staffer do not require sophisticated analysis; such staffer-neutrals are by definition state
actors.
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programs, including in particular arbitration programs, are nonbinding, in
deference to state and federal jury trial rights.219
(2)

Contractual Alternative Dispute Resolution

The public function argument is a bit more attenuated in the contractual ADR context. Given the contemporary bipolar view that ADR

hearings are private matters, the argument can be made that the resolution
of disputes outside of the courthouse is hardly a public function. After all,
disputes are resolved every day without resort to the public courts, through
personal negotiations and wholly private interventions by friends, family
members, professional colleagues, and others. Thus, the argument goes,
because these negotiations and interventions are the functional equivalents
of arbitrations, mediations, or other informal ADR processes, ADR is most
certainly not a traditional government function. The U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit, in a recent opinion by Judge Stephen R. Reinhardt,
Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co.,22 expressly and exclusively relied on this
argument in refusing to find state action in securities industry employment
discrimination arbitrations,221 noting that "since dispute resolution is not an
'exclusive' governmental function, neither private arbitration nor the judicial
222
'
act of enforcing it under the FAA constitutes state action."

While appealing in its simplicity, the Ninth Circuit's analysis just as
simply ignores a distinction that has long been recognized by other courts,
scholars, and practitioners: the distinction between binding and nonbinding

dispute resolution processes.223 The binding resolution of disputes is,of course,
a traditionally exclusive public function. Indeed, it isdifficult to contemplate
a function traditionally more exclusive than what the second Justice John
Marshall Harlan described in Boddie v. Connecticut224 as "the State's monopoly
219.

See, e.g., Dwight Golann, Making Alternative Dispute Resolution Mandatory: The Con-

stitutionalIssues, 68 OR. L. REV. 487, 502-21 (1989); see also Kimbrough v. Holiday Inn, 478 F.
Supp. 566 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (holding that the application of a local experimental rule providing for
compulsory nonbinding arbitration as a prerequisite to a jury trial in certain civil suits for recovery
of money damages of $50,000 or less does not violate the right to a jury trial or to equal protection). See generally STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION,
MEDIATION, AND OTHER PROCESSES 372-73 (3d ed. 1999).

144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cit. 1998).
220.
221. See id. at 1201-02. It should be disclosed that I served as counsel of record for an amicus brief filed on behalf of "several concerned scholars" urging the court to rule in favor of the
plaintiff-appellant, and I offered the state action theory presented herein as an alternative state
action theory to that presented by the plaintiff-appellant.
222. Id.
See Abel, supra note 20, at 488-502; see also, GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 33, at 4-6.
223.
401 U.S. 371 (1971).
224.
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over techniques for binding conflict resolution." 22' This dynamic may be
seen most vividly in arbitration cases, such as Duffield, in which the thirdparty neutral, like a trial judge, actually decides the dispute by contractual
agreement of the parties, in a ruling that is made enforceable by the state per
force of the FAA or related state laws. Put another way, under a public
function rationale, the statutory delegation of the judicial function to private
arbitrators in arbitrations conducted under the FAA and related state laws
transforms the conduct of those private adjudicators into state action, just
as the delegation of trial functions to magistrates or discovery masters extends
constitutional duties to those unquestionable state actors.226
Again, the white primary cases are instructive in furthering the public
function analysis of contractual arbitration, shedding light on the nature of
the function being delegated in at least two respects. First, one sees a strong
analogy between the elective function seen in the white primary cases and
the judicial function reflected in arbitrations conducted under the FAA or
related state laws. Both functions are expressly provided for in the Constitution, 27 and both are central to the maintenance of a democracy. While
elections ensure representation, the judicial function ensures a continuing
commitment to the rule of law in a constitutional democracy that ultimately
depends upon that commitment for its very survival. In both instances, that
function is delegated to private parties pursuant to statutory schemes
expressly authorizing such delegations. Following the logic of the white
primary cases, constitutional obligations follow the delegation to the private
party.
225.
Id. at 375. It can be argued that Boddie was context-specific because its divorce context
is state-exclusive, and that it is inapposite because it was not a state action case. However, the
Court has never so limited its application of Boddie, and the tenor of Justice Harlan's stirring
words resonate much deeper than merely state matters, and farther than questions of state action.
See infra note 295 and accompanying text. In any event, because my constitutional arguments do not
rest only on a judicial access theory, my reliance on Boddie is limited to Harlan's more transcendent and perhaps unparalleled discussion of the essence of due process and its relationship to
the rule of law and the ordering of society.
226.
Further analysis of contractual arbitration under a public function theory would suggest
that there are two delegations. Legislatures have delegated to arbitrators decisional power over
disputing parties that will be enforced by the state, and parties have further contractually agreed
both to delegate the power to decide their dispute to an arbitrator and to be bound by that decision. Because of these delegations, a central question for reviewing courts is whether the arbitrator exceeded the scope of his or her authority and therefore acted ultra vires. See BERNARD
SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: A CASEBOOK 65 (3d ed. 1988);

see also 9 U.S.C.

§ 10(a)(4)

(1994) (stating that an arbitration award may be vacated if arbitrators exceeded their powers);
UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 12(a)(3), 7 U.L.A. 281 (1997).
227.
See U.S. CONST. art. I (providing for the election and power of legislators); id. art. III
(providing for an independent judiciary); id. amend. XV (barring abridgment of the right to vote
on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude); id. amend. XIX (barring abridgment
of the right to vote on account of gender).

HeinOnline -- 47 UCLA L. Rev. 998 1999-2000

Cart titutianalGravit

999

Moreover, an important teaching of the white primary cases is that a
central concern of the Court's, as a matter of constitutional law in the state
action inquiry, is with the use of government power and its imprimatur to
further the deprivation of a fundamental constitutional right. For this
reason, the Court has continued to cite these cases for this proposition in a
broad range of non-voting-rights state action cases, including cases
229
concerned with creditor remedies228 and with peremptory challenges.
Indeed, in Edmonson, Justice Kennedy suggested that a state-created scheme
that operates to deprive important constitutional rights may be more
constitutionally problematic in the judicial context than in the electoral
context.3 0 We need not go that far here, however, for if we are to adhere to
the belief that the courts are a coequal department of our constitutional
order, such deprivations merit no less constitutional concern in the judicial
context than in the electoral.2 ' This concern provides a useful bridge from
the public function rationale to the entanglement rationale for finding state
action.
b.

Extent of Government Assistance and Benefits

The second element of the attribution prong of the Lugar-Edmonson
analysis tests "the extent to which the actor relies on govermental
assistance and benefits," and it provides an even stronger and more direct
basis for finding state action in contractual arbitration than the previously
discussed delegation of a traditionally exclusive public judicial function.
It effectively updates the Court's historical public nexus (or entanglement)
approach, in which a court "sift[s] facts and weigh[s] circumstances" to
determine whether the relationship between the government's action and
conduct is sufficiently close to attribute that conthe complained-of
232private
duct to the state.
228.

See, e.g., Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 928-29 (1982); Flagg Bros., Inc.

230.

See Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 628.

v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 158 (1978). In this regard, note too Justice White's remarkable concession in Lugar that the various state action tests may be "simply different ways of characterizing
the necessarily fact-bound inquiry that confronts the Court" in such cases. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 939.
See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 621-22, 625-26 (1991). For other
229.
references to Terry in the nonrace, nonvoting context, see San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United
States Olympic Committee, 483 U.S. 522, 549, 556 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Rendell-Baker
v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 849 n.3, 850 (1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting); and Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 250 n.18 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 179-80 (1803) ("[It is apparent, that
231.
the framers of the constitution contemplated that instrument as a rule for the government of courts,
as well as of the legislature.").
See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
232.
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233
The traditional starting point in the nexus analysis is Shelley v. Kraemer,
the landmark decision holding that judicial enforcement of racially restrictive
covenants is enough, by itself, to constitute state action sufficient to invalidate the covenants on equal protection grounds."' The Court has not
extended this rationale materially beyond Shelley, and for good reason; its
unimpeded logical extension would improperly constitutionalize the law of
23 5
contract.
While Shelley is discussed more specifically below, 2 36 one of the central
concepts the Court has used to restrain the case is the principle that mere
approval, encouragement, or authorization of private conduct is insufficient
to establish state action.237 In Jackson, for example, the Court used this
principle as a basis for refusing to find the comprehensive regulation of a
utility to be sufficient to create state action under a public function theory
as noted above."3 More recently, the Court used this as a basis for rejecting
the possibility that the decisions of private insurers working in a state worker's
compensation context could constitute state action.239
A liquor-licensing case, Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis,'4° is even more illustrative. There, the Court rejected a claim that, because a private club served
alcoholic beverages under one of a limited number of liquor licenses issued
by the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, its racial discrimination was unconstitutional. In rejecting the state action claim, then-Justice William Rehnquist24 '

233.
334 U.S. 1 (1948).
234.
See id. at 14-18.
235.
At least one court has expressly cited this consideration as a basis for rejecting a constitutional claim arising out of a contractual ADR agreement. See Sportastiks, Inc. v. Beltz, No.
88-C-9293, 1989 WL 26825, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 22, 1989). Some scholars have argued this is entirely
appropriate. See, e.g., Harold W. Horowitz, The MisleadingSearchfor "State Action" Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 30S. CAL. L.REV. 208, 221 (1957).
236.
See infra Part II.B.2.c.
237.
But see Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 380-81 (1967) (accepting the holding
of the California Supreme Court that a popular initiative amending the state's constitution
to permit "absolute discretion" of a property owner in the sale, lease, or rental of real property would impermissibly encourage and significantly involve the state in private racial
discrimination).
238.
See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 358-59 (1974); supra note 208
and accompanying text.
239.
See American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 52-53 (1999).
240.
407 U.S. 163, 165 (1972).
241.
Throughout his tenure on the Court, Rehnquist has had a particularly influential role
in shaping the state action doctrine. See Lino A. Graglia, State Action: Constitutional Phoenix, 67
WASH. U. L.Q. 777, 791-92, 795 (1989).
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stressed the remoteness of the relationship between the club's discrimination and the state's licensing scheme:
[Tihe Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board plays absolutely no part in
establishing or enforcing the membership or guest policies of the club
that it licenses to serve liquor ....[Therefore, hiowever detailed

be said
this type of regulation may be in some particulars, it cannot
242
discrimination.
racial
encourage
or
to in any way foster
In the arbitration context, the argument against the existence of state
action under this element would be that any actions of the arbitrator that
raise constitutional problems may no more be attributed to the state than
could Moose Lodge's decision to discriminate on the basis of race.
The argument, however, does not withstand serious analysis. As a factual matter, it is plainly inconsistent with the Court's more recent findings
243 In Lugar, it must be
of state action in cases like Lugar and Edmonson.
recalled, the Court found state action in what a Moose Lodge analysis would
have concluded was a creditor's purely private choice of electing to secure
its rights through the prejudgment attachment procedure-a choice in which
2
the government played "absolutely no part." " Edmonson provides an even
more compelling example. There, the Court found state action in a private
245
attorney's exercise of a peremptory challenge -a choice so private that
the attorney need not even disclose a reason for it unless challenged on
constitutional grounds.246
This is not to suggest that these cases have overruled Moose Lodge sub
silentio. To the contrary, they have simply sharpened its meaning.
Properly understood, Moose Lodge addresses the degree of proximity
between the governmental conduct and the private conduct necessary to
fairly attribute the private conduct to the state, not whether the act of government by itself compels private conduct or merely authorizes it. Critical
to this inquiry, the Court has repeatedly stated, is the degree to which
government servants actively participate in, facilitate, and give effect to
Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 175-77 (1972).
242.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's more extreme views on state action have been rejected by the
243.
Court. He was left to join Justice Lewis F. Powell's dissent in Lugar, in which Powell argued that
the participation of government actors with private actors must rise to the level of a conspiracy
to violate constitutional rights in order to constitute state action on a nexus rationale. See Lugar
v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 953-56 (1991). Similarly, he joined Justice O'Connor's
dissent in Edmonson, which took a similarly narrow view of the degree of government involve-

ment necessary to convert private conduct into state action. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete
Co., 500 U.S. 614, 631 (1991).
244. Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. at 175.
245. See Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 618-28.
246. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986).
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private choices, particularly for conduct that would be unconstitutional if
committed directly by the state.247
A series of cases involving statutory remedies for private creditors, culminating in Lugar, confirms this analysis. These creditors' rights cases also
underscore the central importance of the role of the government as a joint
participant in the private actor's conduct in making such conduct fairly
attributable to the state.
As a matter of background, the Court historically had been receptive
to procedural due process challenges arising from summary procedures
providing for the attachment or sale of debtors' property.24
In Flagg
Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks,249 however, the Court seemed to be embarking on a
different path, as it upheld a New York warehouseman's lien procedure on
the ground that constitutional challenges to the procedure could not lie, for
lack of state action, because the legislation upon which the procedure was
based merely authorized, but did not compel, the private decision to sell the
affected personal property. Neither courts nor any other government
personnel were involved in the execution of the lien, as the statute was selfexecuting and required only notice to the affected parties and a ten-day
waiting period before a creditor warehouseman could lawfully sell chattels
in his possession to satisfy a debtor's obligations.2 ' Therefore, in the language of the current Lugar-Edmonson analysis, any deprivation of property
rights resulting from the warehouseman's lien procedure could not be fairly
attributed to the state because the nexus between the statutory scheme for
the self-executing warehouseman's lien procedure did not involve government assistance and benefits to an appreciable extent. In other words, the
nexus between the government and the sale of the chattels was too remote
to fairly attribute the warehouseman's private conduct to the state.
The opinion generated much controversy, as Flagg Brothers could easily
be read to have superseded the general principle of due process availability
that was at the heart of the earlier creditors' rights cases.2"' The Court ulti247.
For an outlier case, however, see Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435, 444 (1970) (holding
that the application by a state court of its normal principles of will construction, which resulted in
the reversion to a testator's heirs of property that had been dedicated to a city as a whites-only
park, did not constitute state action).
248.
See, e.g., North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969). These are often
referred to generically as the "creditors' rights cases."
249.
436 U.S. 149 (1978).
250.
See id. at 153 n.1.
251.
See, e.g., Paul Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory: A Casenote on Flagg Brothers v.
Brooks, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1296, 1317-22 (1982); Kenneth M. Casebeer, Toward a Critical
Jurisprudence-A First Step by Way of the Public-Private Distinction in Constitutional Law, 37 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 379, 413-14 (1983); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Emerging Threshold Approach to State
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mately used Lugar to ease the serious tension between Flagg Brothers and earlier cases.
Lugar involved a Virginia statutory prejudgment attachment procedure
that allowed creditors to attach a debtor's property if the creditor alleged, in
an ex parte petition, a belief that the debtor might dispose of property in
order to defeat creditors. The Lugar Court concluded that this "procedural
'
252
scheme created by the statute obviously [was] the product of state action"
and therefore was fairly attributable to the state. It distinguished Flagg Brothers
by reference to the critical role of court personnel in participating in the
execution of the levy, stating: "[W]e have consistently held that a private
party's joint participation with state officials in the seizure of disputed property is sufficient to characterize that party as a 'state actor' for purposes of
the Fourteenth Amendment .... ""'
In other words, a private creditor's use of the Virginia statutory prejudgment attachment procedure was fairly attributable to the state because
state servants were literally involved in the execution of the procedure, while
a private creditor's use of the New York warehouseman's lien statute was not
fairly attributable to the state because it was self-executing and state servants
were not involved in the actual execution of the lien.
This understanding of the case is fully consistent with the Court's
treatment of the "extent of government assistance and benefits" factor in
Edmonson. In that case, the Court explained its meaning by reference to a rela4
tively obscure case, Tulsa ProfessionalCollection Services, Inc. v. Pope." Tulsa
addressed the constitutionality of a nonclaim provision of the Oklahoma
Probate Code that required creditors to file claims against an estate within
two months of the published notice that probate proceedings had begun.
The threshold question was whether there was sufficient state action to trigger the Constitution's Due Process Clause on behalf of creditors who failed
to meet the filing deadlines. The Court rejected an argument that the provision was simply a self-executing statute of limitations and instead found
"significant state action" because the probate court was "intimately involved
throughout [the procedure], and without that involvement the time bar is

Action Determinations: Trying to Make Sense of Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 69 GEO. L.J. 745, 750-51
(1981).

252.
253.
254.

Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 941 (1991).
Id.
485 U.S. 478 (1988). The case continues to be cited to illustrate the Court's approach

to joint participation. See American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 52-55 (1999)
(holding that the mere receipt of a form indicating insurer's intent to appeal disputed medical
treatment in a worker's compensation case, without further analysis, review, or processing of any
kind, is insufficient to establish joint participation for purposes of state action).
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' This
never activated."255
intimate involvement included commencing the probate proceeding, appointing the executor to publish the notice, and filing
copies of the notice and the affidavit of publication with the court.256
Applying this consideration to peremptory challenges in Edmonson,
' by
the Supreme Court found "significant participation"257
the government
through the intimate involvement of the trial court in the exercise of a peremptory challenge, including the statutory processes governing the summoning
and qualification of jurors, the trial court's "substantial control" over voir dire,
and, of course, the approval or rejection of peremptory challenges. 58
Having thus described the meaning of the "extent of government assistance benefits" element of the attribution prong of the Lugar-Edmonson
state action analysis, I now apply it to contractual ADR and then to courtrelated ADR.

(2)

Contractual Alternative Dispute Resolution

(a)

Arbitration

In a recent opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist expressly endorsed the
59
possibility of a private nonjudicial adjudicator's being deemed a state actor,'
and, as we have seen, contractual arbitration seems to provide a fairly explicit
example. Indeed, contractual arbitration rests on state involvement, through
the FAA and related state laws, that is at least as intimate in the arbitration
proceeding as it was in Oklahoma's nonclaim probate provision, the creditor
remedy procedures in the creditors' rights cases, and the federal peremptory
challenge scheme. In fact, the overt joint participation of government and
private actors required under the FAA is much greater, 260 extending far beyond
26
the "mere use of the State's dispute resolution machinery. '
The trial court has an intimate involvement in contractual arbitration,
well beyond its statutory authorization to enforce arbitration agreements.
In the typical case challenging the validity of an arbitration agreement, the
court will receive either a litigant's formal complaint followed by a responsive motion to compel arbitration,262 or a motion to compel arbitration in cases
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
tion], like

Tulsa, 485 U.S. at 487.
See id.
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 622 (1991).
See id. at 623-24.
See Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 52. "While the decision of a [Utilization Review Organizathat of any judicial official, may properly be considered state action, a private party's

mere use of the State's dispute resolution machinery, without the 'overt, significant assistance of state
officials,' cannot." Id. at 54 (quoting Tulsa, 485 U.S. at 486).
260. See supra notes 110-117 and accompanying text.
261.
Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 54.
262. See 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1994).
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in which one disputing party simply refuses to comply with the terms of the
contract without court intervention.263 In either situation, the trial court
must decide whether to compel arbitration and must determine the legitimacy
of any contract-based defense to the validity of the agreement to arbitrate. 64
Further, the statutory scheme permits the court to stay the litigation
pending the arbitration and to retain an active supervisory role even after
the case has been ordered to arbitration;265 it authorizes the trial court to
correct, modify,266 or vacate an arbitration award.26 Lastly, the statute
authorizes the trial court to adopt the award and to confirm it as its own
judgment,2 8 thus making it available for enforcement like any other judgment,
with the full panoply of vehicles available for enforcement, including
garnishment and attachment. 9
Finally, it is worth noting that the additional benefits conferred upon
arbitrators are substantial. Arbitrators are often statutorily vested with broad
judicial powers to administer depositions27 and discovery,271 including subpoena272 and sanction... powers. In addition, arbitrators often receive the
263.
264.

See id. § 4.

See, e.g., id. § 2; UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 1, 7 U.L.A. 6 (1997); CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 1281.2 (West 1999); First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995)
(finding that under the FAA, the question of whether arbitrators or courts have the primary
power to decide if the parties agreed to arbitrate the merits of the dispute is one for the courts,
unless the parties agreed to submit the question to arbitration).
265. See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. § 3; UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 2, 7 U.L.A. 109; CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE §§ 1284-1286.8.
266.
See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. § 11; UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 9, 7 U.L.A. 244; CAL. Civ. PROC.
CODE § 1286.
267.
See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. § 10; UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 12, 7 U.L.A. 280; CAL. Civ. PROC.

CODE §§ 481.010-493.060.
268. See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. § 9; UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT

§

11, 7 U.L.A. 264; CAL. Civ. PROC.

CODE §§ 1283, 1283.5.
269.
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 481.010-493.060.

270. See UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 7, 7 U.L.A. 199; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1283,
1283.05.
271.
See UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 7, 7 U.L.A. 199; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1283.05,
1283.1. It should be emphasized that discovery rights are far more limited in arbitration than they
are in trial. The arbitrator's central statutory power with regard to discovery is the subpoena
power to order the attendance of witnesses. However, parties may include provisions describing
permissible discovery in the arbitration process, and they frequently do as a matter of practice.
Moreover, the proposed Revised Uniform Arbitration Act includes new provisions specifically
allowing for discovery unless the parties agree not to permit discovery, in a process that would be
presided over by the arbitrator. See UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 17 (Proposed Revisions Mar.
2000). For a general discussion of this provision, see Heinsz, supra note 51.
272.
See 9 U.S.C. § 7; UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 7, 7 U.L.A. 199; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 1282.6.
273.

See 9 U.S.C. § 7; UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 7, 7 U.L.A. 199; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE

§ 1283.05. For a discussion of the broad array of sanctions to which mandatory ADR participants
may be subject, see Katz, supra note 98, at 37-41.
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same "judicial" immunity from civil liability that is reserved exclusively for
the states' own constitutionally authorized judiciary."'
In short, the statutory schemes that establish an intimate involvement
between arbitrators and the public courts toward the single end of stateenforced dispute resolution may be seen as establishing an inseverable and
indispensable nexus between seemingly private actors and their governmental
partners. This relationship appears to represent an extremely high level of
government assistance and benefits for seemingly private conduct. As such,
it would seem that the "private 27use
of [arbitration] with the help of state
5
action.,
state
constitutes
officials
(b)

Mediation and Other Consensual Processes

As discussed above, contractual mediation does not operate under the
authority of a state statute and therefore need not be analyzed further under
the state action doctrine.2 6
(3)

Court-Related Alternative Dispute Resolution

As with the public function rationale, court-related ADR programs
again seem to provide an easier case for finding state action under an
entanglement rationale than contractual ADR.
Take, for example, an arbitration conducted pursuant to California's
court-related arbitration statute, which provides that "all at-issue civil
actions... shall be submitted to arbitration, by the presiding judge or the
judge designated,.... if the amount in controversy in the opinion of the
2 77
court will not exceed fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) for each plaintiff.
In such a case, the trial court receives the initial claim, makes the
determination of the likely value of the case (an unappealable determination) 278and then orders the case to be transferred to arbitration 279 under a
274.
The arbitral immunity doctrine has been accepted by courts for years and sometimes is
statutory. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 44.107 (West 1999). The proposed Revised Uniform
Arbitration Act would not only codify this immunity for arbitrators but would also extend it for
provider organizations, such as the American Arbitration Association (AAA) and JAMS/Endispute,
according to an article by the Reporter for the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act Drafting Committee
of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Dean Timothy J. Heinsz of the
University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law. See Heinsz, supra note 51. For a general discussion of

statutory and common law immunity, see Reuben, supra note 9, at 594 n.54 and cases cited therein.
275.
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 933 (1982).
276.
See supra notes 198-201 and accompanying text.

277.

CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §

278.
279.

See id.
See id.§ 1141.16(a).

1141.11(a).

HeinOnline -- 47 UCLA L. Rev. 1006 1999-2000

ConstitutionalGravity

1007

program wholly organized, administered, and supervised by the state. California's supervision also includes the use of seemingly private arbitrators on
an official roster of potential arbitrators. The California statute is typical
in providing for continuing jurisdiction through de novo review of the arbitration award2" as well as for the power to correct, modify, or vacate the award
altogether."' If the parties choose not to seek de novo review, the statute
authorizes the trial court to adopt the award and to confirm it as a judgment
of the court."' Finally, the statute even provides for the administrative costs
of the arbitration to be paid for by the county in which it takes place,
including the proportional share of the arbitrator's fees, if a party cannot
afford it.283
The case management procedure would be substantially for courtrelated mediations. Consider, for example, the court rule previously
described for family law mediations."' In such a case, the divorce petition
would be filed in a state court. If one of the parties requested the case to be
mediated, the case would, if it is a well-run program, likely be evaluated by the
court for suitability for mediation; the matter would not be ordered to
mediation if, for example, there is a history of domestic violence or child
abuse. Assuming the court found the case to be amenable to mediation, the
court would issue the order and send the parties to a mediator. Depending
upon the program, the mediator would either be provided by the court
(perhaps even a member of the court or the court's staff), be selected by the
parties from a roster provided by the court, or be selected by the parties
themselves and retained with the approval of the court. The parties would
then go to mediation, which if successful would produce an agreement that
could be returned to the court for confirmation and enforcement as an
appropriate decree of that court.
In both of the above situations, the participation of government servants
is intimate, necessary, ongoing, and substantial. Therefore, the conduct of
the private neutrals in court-related ADR programs is fairly attributable to
the state under a nexus or entanglement theory.

c.

A Transitional Comment on Shelley v. Kraemer

It may be argued that I am merely calling for an extension of Shelley v.
Kraemer to the contractual arbitration context. I am not, for I do not
280.

See id. § 1141.20.

281.
282.
283.
284.

See id. § 1141.22.
See id. § 1141.23.
See id. § 1141.28.
See supra note 191 and accompanying text.

HeinOnline -- 47 UCLA L. Rev. 1007 1999-2000

1008

47 UCLA LAW REVIEW 949 (2000)

believe that mere enforcement of a contractual ADR agreement is sufficient
for a finding of state action. Rather, I believe more must be shown, such as
the statutory delegation of a traditionally exclusive public function or the
partnership of public and private actors in facilitating unconstitutional
conduct. 85 In the contractual arbitration context, this is seen in the
statutory delegation of binding decisional authority to seemingly private
arbitrators, as well as in the interwoven actions of public courts and
seemingly private arbitrators that together advance the single goal of the
binding resolution of a dispute. 86 By contrast, this is not seen in contractual
mediations, which typically operate under the authority of mediation
87
authorization provisions embedded within substantive law statutes.
This is not to disavow Shelley as being wholly fact-specific or
inapplicable. Rather, I submit that the case law before and after Shelley
suggests that the opinion is more about judicial participation in conduct
that would be unconstitutional if performed directly by the state than it is
about the mere enforcement of contractual terms, such as the racially
restrictive covenant at issue in Shelley. Indeed, the Supreme Court continues
to cite Shelley for the proposition that judicial actions, including the enforcement of private choices, bear special but not dispositive consideration in
weighing state action because of the place of the courts in our constitutional
democracy. As Justice Kennedy said for the Court in the Edmonson
peremptory challenge case,
By enforcing a discriminatory peremptory challenge, the court "has
not only made itself a party to the [biased act], but has elected to
place its power, property and prestige behind the [alleged]
discrimination." In so doing, the government has "create[d] the legal

framework governing the [challenged] conduct," and 288in a significant
way has involved itself with invidious discrimination.
This understanding of Shelley is consistent with the Supreme Court's
reasoning in the white primary cases. In both Shelley and the white primary
cases, the Court recognizes that it is not mere judicial enforcement that
converts private conduct into state action. Rather, the Court holds that
direct and intimate judicial participation in private conduct that would
offend the Constitution if committed directly by the government aggravates

See supra notes 204-258 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 110-117 and accompanying text.
287. See ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note 66, § 1:03.
288.
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 624 (1991) (alterations in original) (quoting, respectively, Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961) and
National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 192 (1988)).
285.
286.
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the injury in a unique way because of the unique place of the courts in a
democratic government built upon the rule of law."s9
I believe that such an understanding of Shelley, being less about mere
enforcement and more about the role and place of the courts in a constitutional democracy, puts Shelley in a much more narrow and accurate light.
The decision's emphasis on broad systemic concerns serves both to cabin
Shelley from unwarranted expansion and to recognize the special place that
courts and the rule of law hold in our constitutional order. It is small wonder, then, that the final element of the Lugar-Edmonson analysis, arguably
the only "new" element of the state action analysis reiterated by the Supreme
Court, addresses precisely this concern. It is to this element that I now turn.
d.

Aggravation of the Injury by Incidents
of Governmental Authority

While the government benefits and public function elements of the
Lugar-Edmonson analysis may be seen as modem idioms for analytical
approaches with long and rich heritages, the aggravation element adds a
new dimension to the analysis by explicitly forcing the consideration of
higher policy questions. This analysis should be understood as a limiting
principle, similar to traditional exclusivity, that ensures that the application
of constitutional force to private actors is occasioned judiciously and is
reserved for the most fundamental of concerns. In this regard, there is no
need to distinguish between court-related and contractual ADR procedures
in analyzing harms to individuals and to society that flow from constitutional
violations in ADR hearings driven by state action."' 0
(1)

Harm to the Individual

Due process violations that result from state action can result in
significant and troubling harms to individuals, in terms of both their property rights and the dignitary rights that some scholars have proposed lie at the
core of procedural due process as a constitutional value.' While those who
289. See Eugene V. Rostow, The Democratic Characterof Judicial Review, 66 HARV. L. REV.
193 (1952).
290. It may be contended that there can be no harms arising from due process violations
in court-related ADR because such processes are nonbinding, even arbitration. However, such a
"no harm, no foul" argument overlooks the fact the potentially important information may be disclosed and strategies revealed during the ADR hearing that a party may not have disclosed or revealed
had the ADR hearing not been compelled.
See Jerry L. Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary Theory, 61
291.
B.U. L. REv. 885, 886-87 (1981).
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do not prevail in court are almost always injured in some way, the injuries
in an arbitration are aggravated by a public court's participation in and
ultimate adoption of the arbitration award (regardless of its legal correctness),
and by the individual's knowledge that there is no other viable avenue of
relief.292 As Justice Kennedy observed in Edmonson:
Few places are a more real expression of the constitutional authority
of the government than a courtroom, where the law itself unfolds.
Within the courtroom, the government invokes its laws to determine

the rights of those who stand before it. In full view of the public,
litigants press their cases, witnesses give testimony, juries render

verdicts, and judges act with the utmost care to ensure that justice is
done. 93
By compelling, overseeing, and ultimately enforcing such decisions,
the trial court is both a direct and an indirect participant in the seemingly
private process of arbitration. The trial court places its power, prestige, and
imprimatur behind the result, foreclosing any inquiry into the fairness of the
process. While it may be true that the hearing is conducted and the decision
reached outside the four walls of the public courtroom, that hearing is conducted in the shadow of the courthouse, and its result is given effect, meaning, and enforcement in the same public courtroom to which society turns for
final and binding resolution of other conflicts.294
Beneath Justice Kennedy's words lies a much deeper concern for the
procedural and democratic values that are at the very heart of the American
democratic experience. As the second Justice Harlan so eloquently observed
nearly a quarter of a century ago when describing the meaning and spirit of
due process,
At its core, the right to due process reflects a fundamental value
in our American constitutional system....

Perhaps no characteristic of an organized and cohesive society is
more fundamental than its erection and enforcement of a system of
rules defining the various rights and duties of its members, enabling
them to govern their affairs and definitively settle their differences in

an orderly, predictable manner. Without such a "legal system," social
organization and cohesion are virtually impossible; with the ability to
seek regularized resolution of conflicts individuals are capable of
interdependent action that enables them to strive for achievements
292.
Special legislation is always a theoretically available remedy. But any suggestion that it
is the appropriate remedy to correct individual injustices serves only to underscore the unique
aggravation caused by public law enforcement of harms that can be caused in seemingly private

ADR processes.
293. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 628.
294. See Abel, supra note 20, at 270-79; Mnookin & Kornhauser, supranote 32.
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without the anxieties that would beset them in a disorganized
society....
American society, of course, bottoms its systematic definition of

individual rights and duties, as well as its machinery for dispute settlement, not on custom or the will of strategically placed individuals, but
on the common-law model. It isto courts, or other quasi-judicial official

bodies, that we ultimately look for the implementation of a regularized,
orderly process of dispute settlement. Within this framework, those
who wrote our original Constitution, in the Fifth Amendment, and
later those who drafted the Fourteenth Amendment, recognized the

centrality of the concept of due process in the operation of this
system. Without this guarantee that one may not be deprived of his
rights, neither liberty nor property, without due process of law, the
State's monopoly over techniques for binding conflict resolution

could hardly be said to be acceptable under our scheme of things.
Only by providing that the social enforcement mechanism must
function strictly within these bounds can we hope to maintain an

ordered society that is also just. It is upon this premise that this
years of adjudication put flesh upon the due
Court has through
29
5
process principle.

(2)

Harm to Society

Justice Harlan's powerful words suggest how the current bipolar understanding of ADR as purely private dispute resolution devoid of enforceable
due process rights might play a role in diminishing the strength of American
democracy. Although scholars may differ as to the exact definition of democracy,296 nearly all agree on at least two central and interrelated themes: citizen

Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374-75 (1971). "[Dlue process does prohibit a
295.
State from denying, solely because of inability to pay, access to its courts to individuals who seek
judicial dissolution of their marriages." Id. at 374. But see Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656,
659-60 (1973) (holding that a $25 filing fee for appellate review of an agency's decision to reduce
welfare benefits was not a denial of access to the courts); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434,
449-50 (1973) (holding that the federal bankruptcy filing fee of $50 did not amount to a denial of
due process).
The conceptual confusion over the meaning of democracy is so serious that scholars
296.
have identified nearly 550 "subtypes" of democracy. See DAVID COLLIER & STEVEN LEVITSKY,
DEMOCRACY "WITH ADJECTIVES": CONCEPTUAL INNOVATION IN COMPARATIVE RESEARCH

(Helen Kellogg Inst. for Int'l Studies, University of Notre Dame Working Paper No. 230, 1996).
The seminal elaboration of democracy has been Robert H. Dahl's conception of "polyarchy,"
which overtly has two dimensions: opposition, which involves organized contestation through
regular, free, and fair elections, and participation, the right of virtually all adults to vote and to
contest for office. However, a third dimension is embedded within these two: civil liberty, which
includes the freedom to speak and publish dissenting views, the freedom to form and join organizations, and the existence of alternative sources of information. So understood, civil liberty reflects a
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participation in governance and the accountability of government to those
citizens."' These principles rest at the core of the decision of this nation's
founders to establish a democratic republic.29 Indeed, the Federalists were
ultimately able to reach a consensus on the appropriateness of a national
constitution only by arguing that it was "the People" who were delegating
the authority to draft such a document in the first instance.299 The Constitution itself was drafted under the theory of a social contract and the
consent of the governed."° Later, it was the assurance of civil liberties in the
Bill of Rights-especially the rights to freedom of speech and the press,301
and to participate in the administration of the law as jurors in civil and
criminal trials-that persuaded the colonists to ratify the charter.3 2 As Chief
Justice John Marshall recognized nearly two hundred years ago in Marbury
v. Madison,3 °3
The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of
every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he
receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford
that protection.
The government of the United States has been emphatically
termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease
to deserve this high appellation, if the laws fumish no remedy for the
violation of a vested legal right.3 °
broad social pluralism that makes political opposition and participation truly meaningful. See
Larry Diamond, Is the Third Wave Over?, J.DEMOCRACY, July 1996, at 20.
297.
Civic participation and accountability are but two of nearly a dozen core values
described by Schmitter and Karl. See Philippe C. Schmitter & Terry Lynn Karl, What Democracy
Is... and Is Not, in THE GLOBAL RESURGENCE OF DEMOCRACY 47-49 (Larry Diamond & Marc
F. Plattner eds., 1993).
298.
While the notion of "taxation without representation" provides only a starting point
for a discussion of the factors leading to the American revolution, it is, in this regard, a telling
starting point nonetheless.
299.
See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: 1776-1787, at
532-36 (1969).
300.
See generally JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES
(G.D.H. Cole trans., Dutton 1950) (1762). For an overview of consensual theories of rights and
state action, see Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 503, 531-35
(1985) (arguing for the abandonment of the state action requirement).
301.
See U.S. CONST. amend. I; New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)
("[Diebate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and... may well include
vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public
officials."); see also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989) (upholding flag burning as protected speech).
302.
See Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57
MINN. L. REV. 639, 653-73 (1973).
303. 5 U.S. (1Cranch) 137 (1803).
304. Id. at 163.
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The catalogue of procedural values identified by Professor Jerry Mashaw
provide a helpful standard against which to measure the degree to which
5
ADR processes comport with these elements of democracy." Central to
procedural fairness, he contends, is the independence of the neutral and
0 6 The public law system
the equality of treatment in the proceedings.
safeguards these values through a public selection process,"' procedures for
0
disciplining or removing judges in certain circumstances, ' and a constitutional basis, in the form of due process, for invalidating judgments made
by biased tribunals."
This is generally not always the case, however, with ADR. For
example, the overwhelming majority of states have no disciplinary requirements for arbitrators or mediators, other than the possibility of removal
from the rosters of court-related programs. In most states, barbers and taxidermists are subject to far greater regulation than ADR neutrals."' While it
is true that arbitrator bias provides what may well be a central basis for
overturning an arbitrator's award, the standard for proving such bias is
extraordinarily high, requiring proof of actual bias against a party in the
case, rather than a mere appearance of impropriety.' As a result, the vacatur
305.

See Mashaw, supra note 291, at 899-906 (discussing the application of "process values,"

306.

See id. at 899-901.

which include equality, predictability, and privacy).

The vast majority of state court trial and appellate judgeships are filled by popular elec307.
B. ROTTMAN ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATE COURT ORGANIZATION
DAVID
See
tion.

1993, at 32-43 (1995). While federal judicial seats are filled by presidential appointment, such

appointments are subject to the advice and consent of the Senate and, therefore, to representative

controls. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. The failed nomination of Robert Bork demonstrates
just how strong these controls can be, at least when the appointment is to the Supreme Court.

See generally ETHAN BRONNER, BATTLE FOR JUSTICE: HOW THE BORK NOMINATION SHOOK

AMERICA (1989).
308.

The federal scheme for the discipline and removal of judges is codified at 28 U.S.C.

§ 372 (1994). Impeachment is also a possibility. See U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 4. For a case confirming

the constitutionality of the federal statute and an example of its operation, see Hastings v. Judicial
Conference of the United States, 829 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 1987). For more on federal judicial
discipline, see Charles Gardner Geyh, Informal Methods of Judicial Discipline, 142 U. PA. L. REV.
243 (1993), and Emily Field Van Tassel, Resignations and Removals: A History of Federal Judicial

Service-and Disservice-]789-1992, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 333 (1993). State laws also provide several
avenues for the discipline and removal of judicial officers. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. II, § 13
(recall); id. art IV, § 18 (impeachment); id. art. VI, § 16 (elections); id. art. VI, § 18 (discipline,
including removal).
309.

See infra Part IV.C.2.a.l.a.

310. Formal requirements for the qualifications of arbitrators are rare, although some states
require arbitrators to take an oath of fairness and impartiality as a condition of their appointment.
See 3 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 134, §§ 27.2.1, 27.4. Qualifications for mediators are similarly
rare. See Reuben, supra note 73, at 60 ("Only a small handful-Florida, New Jersey and Hawaii-

have adopted qualifications requirements for mediators.").
was evident partiUnder the FAA, an arbitration award may be vacated "[wihere there
311.
2
State laws
)
(1994).
§
10(a)(
U.S.C.
9
them."
of
either
or
arbitrators,
the
in
ality or corruption
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of an arbitration award on this ground is rare. It is here that constitutional
due process
is perhaps most deeply offended, an issue discussed at length
12
below.1
This troubling aspect of ADR is only exacerbated by the absence of
even the most basic procedural safeguards, particularly the right to counsel"'
and the right to present and confront evidence. 3 4 Public hearings are
typically held at a neutral public site, which is one nuance of formality that
some have contended goes a long way toward ensuring procedural fairness." 5
By contrast, private arbitrations, mediations, and other ADR procedures are
often held wherever space can be found, and they can easily take place in
the conference room of a law firm known for advocating one side of an
issue.316
Procedural values, Mashaw says, also further a sense of rationality and
predictability in the law, ensuring that the rules governing a conflict will be
applied accurately and in a way capable of guiding future individual and
societal behavior. Not so in ADR. The processes are removed from public
witness, negating any possibility that the dispute's resolution will have any
public educational or deterrent value. Perhaps more importantly, there is
no mechanism for ensuring that society's laws are accurately administered,
an issue that seems less troubling when the ADR agreement is the product
of a knowing and voluntary agreement to waive those substantive rights, '1 7
but one that can be very disturbing when there is no such waiver and participation in the ADR process is compelled. Indeed, one of the ironies
of contemporary compulsory ADR is that it can result in the removal by the
state of the availability of public law to redress a party's harms, either sub-

are similar. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1286.2 (West 1999); Luster v. Collins, 15 Cal.
App. 4th 1338, 1345 (Ct. App. 1993) ("To support a claim of bias, a party must demonstrate the
arbitrator had an interest in the subject matter of the arbitration or a preexisting business or social
relationship with one of the parties which would color the arbitrator's judgment."); 3 MACNEIL
ET AL., supra note 134, § 28.2; 4 id. § 40.1; see also UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 12, 7 U.L.A. 280
(1997).
312.
See infra Part IV.C.2.a.l.a.
313.
See infra Part IV.C.2.c.
314.
It is easy to shrug off issues regarding the presentation of evidence as limited to arbitration, which is essentially an adjudicatory procedure. But these issues can also arise in mediation, in
which one of the parties can be essentially silenced by a biased or hurried mediator. Cf. Grillo, supra
note 42, at 1585.
315.
See Delgado et al., supra note 42, at 1387-89 (arguing that formality and adversarial
procedures counteract bias among legal decision makers).
316.
See Telephone Interview with Jeffrey Liddle, Attorney (Feb. 9, 1996) (observing that
Securities and Exchange Commission arbitrations are frequently held in law offices of firms that
represent securities brokerages).
317.
See infra Part III.C.
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stantively or procedurally, even though the provision of a remedy for a given
harm may be precisely the law's intent.
The net effect is that the very law that citizens have agreed will govern
their lives ultimately has little bearing on how their disputes are resolved in
ADR. This in turn could lead to a diminution of democracy itself, as ADR
continues to expand and becomes more institutionalized, and as the mass of
potential individualized injustices continues to get more critical. In his
landmark work on democracy in the largely autonomous Italian regional
governments since 1970, Harvard political scientist Robert Putnam concludes that civic culture and social capital are far more effective than positive
law, political institutions, and economic factors in generating effective democracy."' Successful regional governments, he finds, are marked by a civic
culture that broadly encourages cooperation and reciprocation among its
citizenry at all levels of national life, from social to political to economic
and beyond.319 Drawing on modem game theory, Putnam suggests that such
cooperation leads to a constantly deepening sense of trust and order, both
horizontally among the citizenry and vertically between the citizenry and its
32 °
governmental and national institutions. He concludes that social capital
is more powerful and effective than positive law or economics in ordering
human affairs, and that it is the very engine that drives effective democracy.
Stoke this social capital and democracy will flourish; starve it and democracy will wither.
The rule of law is inarguably one of the central elements of government in a democratic regime. It provides the stability and order that permits
electoral and other institutions to operate without chaos or arbitrariness.
Yet it depends on the very kind of voluntary compliance and cooperation
that Putnam finds so important to the success of effective regional democracies in Italy-the belief and trust among the public that we should obey
3
the law because others will do so as well. " In many ways, the procedural
See ROBERT D. PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: Civic TRADITIONS IN MOD318.
ERN ITALY 165-85 (1993) (comparing effective and ineffective regional democratic governments
in Italy since the devolution of most powers to regional governments in 1970); see also GABRIEL
A. ALMOND & SIDNEY VERBA, THE CIVIC CULTURE: POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND DEMOCRACY

IN FIVE NATIONS 473 (1963) (arguing that cultural factors shape political institutions).

See PUTNAM, supra note 318, at 165-85.
319.
See id. at 173-76.
320.
This research is consistent with the findings of social psychologist Tom R. Tyler in his
321.
study of procedural justice. See generally E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988); THOMAS R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE
LAW (1990) (contending that compliance with the law may be traced to such normative considerations as legitimacy, legitimacy to such normative issues as procedural fairness, and procedural fairness to such normative matters as the citizenry's having a voice in the decisions that
affect them). Tyler generally concludes that if the authorities are "good guys," the citizens will be
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values described above are intended to facilitate the trust and cooperation
that provide the basis for this nation's social capital and commitment to the
rule of law. To the extent that they are not accounted for in ADR that
takes place under the aegis of state action, America's social capital may
decline and the effectiveness of our democracy may be diminished. One
need look no further than the 1991 Los Angeles riots, which followed the
acquittal of four officers charged with using unlawful force against motorist
Rodney King, to see how quickly order can turn into chaos and destruction
when society's desire to accept the rule of law breaks down.322
Justice Kennedy's concerns for these procedural and democratic values
led the Supreme Court to find state action in the administration of peremptory challenges in a private civil action, because the private injury was
aggravated by the incidents of governmental authority." The aggravation
of injury in the ADR context certainly seems no less than in the peremptory challenge context. In fact, it can be much greater.
C. Conclusion
In law, the state action doctrine is the measure used to draw the line
between that which is public in nature, and therefore subject to constitutional limitations, and that which is private, and therefore bound by no such
constraints. An application of the doctrine to ADR shows that court-related
arbitration, mediation, and advisory procedures are the product of state
action by virtue of the direct compulsion of litigants into these seemingly
private ADR processes through mandatory programs, and by the state's
complete responsibility for the administration, supervision, and execution
of voluntary court-related programs. This analysis also presents a strong case
for finding state action in contractual arbitration because of the unprecedented level of entanglement of public courts and private arbitrators toward
the single end of binding dispute resolution, and because the delegation of
binding decisional authority to arbitrators is the delegation of a traditionally
exclusive governmental function that is comparable to the delegations of
"good citizens," not because they have to be but because they feel they should. See id. at 178;
see

also JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE
THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 35 (William Rehg trans., MIT Press 1996) (1992); Robert J.
Lukens, Comment, Discoursing on Democracy and the Law-A Deconstrucrive Analysis, 70 TEMP. L.
REV. 587, 596 (1997) (applying to deliberative democracy theory the philosophy of Habermas
that law is the central vehicle for the "coordination of coordinated activity" that gives community
norms meaning and legitimizes obedience to law).
322.
See, e.g., Marc Lacey & Shawn Hubler, Rioters Set Fires, Loot Stores; 4 Reported Dead,
L.A. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1992, at Al; Melvin L. Oliver, It's the Fire Every Time, and We Do Nothing,
L.A. TIMES, May 1, 1992, at B7.
323.
See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 630-31 (1991).
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electoral functions found to be state action in the white primary cases. In
both contexts, the private neutrals engage in dispute resolution under color
of state law, and their actions are fairly attributable to the state. In courtrelated ADR, this attribution is fair because of the state's actual operation
of the ADR program, even when the hearing itself may be conducted by a
seemingly private neutral. In contractual arbitrations conducted under the
FAA and related state laws, this attribution is fair because the arbitrators
are performing the traditionally exclusive public function of binding dispute
resolution, facilitated and made possible by the extraordinary benefit of the
state's active participation. Both individual and societal harms are aggravated by the state's unique role in these court-related and contractual ADR
processes because the state has lent its power, prestige, and imprimatur to
the results of those processes. The effect of such aggravated harms may be
the diminution of democracy itself if participation in those processes is not
voluntary.
In Part III, I propose a methodology for assessing the voluntariness
of participation in contractual arbitrations conducted under the FAA
and related state laws while discussing the larger relationship between
contractual and constitutional rights in the ADR context. I again focus
on contractual arbitrations conducted under the FAA and related state
laws.
III.

THE EXPANSION OF PUBLIC JUSTICE: CONTRACTUAL
AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN ALTERNATIVE
DISPUTE RESOLUTION

The recognition that there can be state action in contractual
arbitration under the FAA and related state laws raises important questions
regarding the fundamental relationship between the individual and the
state. In particular, it forces consideration of the central struggle between
personal autonomy as expressed in the freedom of contract and the
needs of a constitutional democracy built upon "the concept of ordered
'
liberty."324
This is a familiar source of tension in American constitutional
jurisprudence, and one that led the Supreme Court to one of its darker
periods as it embraced private contractual rights over the ability of government to enact laws that protect the safety, health, morals, and general
324.

Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395

U.S. 784 (1969). Carrington and Haagen suggest that the Court's recently renewed embrace of
contract rights is one explanation for its strong support of contractual arbitration. See Carrington
& Haagen, supra note 42, at 333-34.
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welfare of citizens through its police powers.32 More specifically, the Court
during the Lochner era interpreted the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to include the freedom of contract and strictly scrutinized
state and federal laws that interfered with contractual rights. Thus, the
326
Court struck down laws setting maximum hours that bakers could work,
minimum wages for women,3 21 and various forms of consumer legislation
setting maximum prices, while also striking down legislation making it a
crime for employers to force employees not to join unions32 9 and limiting
the use of injunctions in labor disputes. " ' Economic and political pressure
led to the demise and ultimate discrediting of the Lochner era33' in favor of a
new course for the Court's Fourteenth Amendment due process jurisprudence
that focused instead on the political process and the protection of "discrete
and insular minorities. '
Addressing this pressure between individual and group rights need not
be so traumatic in the contractual arbitration context, for the FAA and
related state laws appear to assign a fairly specific role to contract: that of
waiving one's legal rights to have one's claims heard in a public court.
Although simple enough to state, the requirements and scope of the waiver
present complex questions. As I demonstrate in this part, when state action
is present in contractual arbitration, the waiver, if valid, operates to waive
all substantive law rights and most procedural rights. However, it does not
waive all procedural rights. Rather, arbitration procedures energized by the
constitutional gravity of state action must conform to at least rudimentary
notions of fundamental fairness in order to be constitutionally adequate. This
constitutional dimension supplements, rather than supplants, the traditional
contractual foundation of contractual arbitration and, in so doing, expands
our concept of public civil justice to include all those processes beyond trial
that are affected by the constitutional gravity of state action.
325.
See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). For a general discussion of the Lochner
era, see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLIcIES 471-86 (1997);
COHEN & VARAT, supra note 182, at 504-25; GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 182, at 460-74.
326.
See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53-61.
327.
See Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
328.
See Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235 (1929) (involving prices for gasoline);
Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350 (1928) (involving fees charged by employment agencies); Tyson
& Brother v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418 (1927) (involving prices for theater tickets).
329.
See Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
330.
See Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921).
331.
See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1935) (overruling Adkins, and
representing a case in which Justice Owen Roberts is alleged to have responded to political pressures
and switched his vote to uphold a state law requiring a minimum wage for women employees).
For a concise general discussion of these pressures, see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 325, at 487-91.
332.
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); see also Geoffrey
P. Miller, The True Story of Carolene Products, 1987 SUP. Cr.REV. 397.
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A. The Approach of the Federal Arbitration Act
As discussed above, the FAA was enacted to overturn legislatively the
historical refusal of courts to enforce agreements to arbitrate."' Furthermore, members of the Supreme Court have interpreted the act to reflect a
34
"federal [or national] policy favoring arbitration" and have effectively
used this policy to bring down the ouster doctrine. Precisely what that
ambiguous phrase means is highly debatable. Some courts and scholars
have interpreted it to mean a national policy favoring arbitration over
litigation as the primary means of resolving claims under the Constitution,
But the history of the ouster
statutes, and laws of the United States.
doctrine, the plain language of the FAA, and its unambiguous legislative
intent suggest that "the federal policy favoring arbitration" should be
viewed as meaning that federal courts should strongly support knowing and
voluntary agreements to arbitrate commercial disputes, not the displacement of litigation with arbitration.3 As the Court stated in Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees," 7 "the federal policy is simply to ensure
the enforceability, according to their terms, of private agreements to arbitrate.0338 In other words, it may be more accurate to think of the policy as
procontract than as proarbitration.
B.

The Waiver of Legal Rights Under the Federal Arbitration Act
and Related State Laws

1.

Contractual Validity: The "Knowing and Voluntary" Standard

As the FAA suggests, the waiver of legal rights represented by a contractual agreement to arbitrate must be assessed according to familiar principles
of contract. Under contract law, a waiver occurs when a party to a contract
See supra notes 118-120 and accompanying text (discussing the ouster doctrine).
333.
Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 (1983) (con334.
struing the FAA for the first time to represent a "federal policy favoring arbitration"); see also
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1984) (finding that the FAA's national policy
favoring arbitration preempts state laws that are hostile to arbitration); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood
& Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403-04 (1967) (holding that the FAA's national policy favoring arbitration means that arbitrability issues must be decided with a healthy regard for arbitration).
For discussion and criticism, see Stemlight, supra note 127, at 641.
335.
See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942-43 (1995) (holding that
336.
under the FAA, the question whether arbitrators or courts have primary power to decide if parties
agreed to arbitrate the merits of a dispute is one for the courts, unless the parties agreed to submit
the question to arbitration).
489 U.S. 468 (1989).
337.
Id. at 476; see also First Options, 514 U.S. at 942-43.
338.
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promises to render performance under the contract, even though a certain
contractual condition of the obligation to perform has not occurred.3 9 It is
often spoken of in terms of the "voluntary relinquishment of a known right, 3 40
thus calling for consideration of (1) the voluntariness of the relinquishment
and (2) the party's knowledge of the right being relinquished. Courts have
frequently applied this standard to agreements to arbitrate in particular,
including situations in which the claim is that enforcement of the relevant
41
arbitration provision violates the constitutional right to a jury trial.1
2.

Giving Substance to Knowing and Voluntary Waivers

The talismanic "knowing and voluntary" phrase provides little by way
of substantive analytic guidance, as the courts remarkably have not clearly
articulated just how such essential characteristics are to be determined.
Only recently, the Supreme Court confirmed that such a waiver must be at
the very least clear and unmistakable.342 Two cases, however, do provide
a starting point on the substance of knowledge and voluntariness: D.H.

339.
See 2 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS 424-31, 510-20 (2d
ed. 1998).
340.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 84 cmt. b (1979) (warning that the common definition is somewhat inexact because it may lead one to the faulty belief that "the promisor
must know his legal rights and must intend the legal effect of the promise").
341.
See, e.g., Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Crane, 804 F.2d 828, 832-33 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding
that a waiver of the Seventh Amendment right to a jury must be knowing and voluntary); K.M.C.
Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 755-57 (6th Cir. 1985) (upholding a magistrate's refusal to
enforce a contractual waiver of a jury trial right, and concluding that application of the "knowing
and voluntary" standard was appropriate); National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Hendrix, 565 F.2d 255,
257-58 (2d Cit. 1977) (upholding a court's grant of a jury trial, despite a jury trial waiver "buried
in the eleventh paragraph of a fine print, sixteen-clause agreement," and stating that the right to
a jury trial can only be waived knowingly and intentionally); Smyly v. Hyundai Motor Am., 762
F. Supp. 428, 438 (D. Mass. 1991) (similar); Reggie Packing Co. v. Lazere Fin. Corp., 671 F. Supp.
571, 573 (N.D. Ill.
1987) (similar); N. Feldman & Son, Ltd. v. Checker Motors Corp., 572
F. Supp. 310, 313 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (similar); Dreiling v. Peugeot Motors of Am., Inc., 539 F.
Supp. 402, 403 (D. Colo. 1982) (similar); McKinstry v. Valley Obstetrics-Gynecology Clinic, 405
N.W.2d 88, 96 (Mich. 1987) (similar); Sanchez v. Sirmons, 467 N.Y.S.2d 757, 760 (Sup. Ct.
1983) (similar). See generally Debra T. Landis, Annotation, Contractual Jury Trial Waivers in Federal Civil Cases, 92 A.L.R. FED. 688 (1989).
Interestingly, the Supreme Court has not clearly stated whether the constitutional standard
for waivers so familiar in the criminal context applies to waivers of constitutional rights in the
civil context, such as claims that arbitration provisions violate the Seventh Amendment right to a
jury trial in certain cases. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 94-96 (1972) (indicating that
it would have used the constitutional formulation, but holding that it was not necessary because
the waiver was facially invalid); D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 185-86 (1972)
(assuming the constitutional formulation applied in the civil context, and applying it). Both decisions are discussed more thoroughly at infra notes 343-353 and accompanying text.
342.
See Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 79-80 (1998).
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Overmyer Co. v. Frick43 and Fuentes v. Shevin."' In Overmyer, the Court
upheld a contractor's confession of judgment, or cognovit note, waiving due
process and other legal rights, finding that it was very specific, that it had
been carefully negotiated by an attorney on behalf of a sophisticated client
rather than imposed in a contract of adhesion, and that it was granted in
'
By contrast, the Court in Fuentes
return for substantial consideration. 45
held that an unsophisticated woman did not waive her due process rights to
notice and a hearing when she purchased a stove and a stereo using a standard form contract that included a replevin provision permitting the seller
to seize the property in the event that she defaulted on her monthly
installment obligations."'
Professor Jean Stemlight forcefully argues that the Supreme Court
used a virtually identical analysis to assess the knowingness and voluntariness of consent in both cases, which she contends focuses on four fact-specific
considerations: (1) the visibility and clarity of the agreement, (2) the relative
knowledge and economic power possessed by the parties, (3) the degree of
voluntariness of the purported agreement, and (4) the substantive fairness
of the purported agreement.347 Writing in favor of incorporating broader
constitutional due process standards into arbitrations than are ultimately
suggested in Part IV, 34s Sternlight further suggests that these factors should
be used to assess the validity of the contractual waiver under the FAA and
related state laws.
Despite its appeal to formalism and precedent, this proposed analysis is
difficult to fully embrace because of inherent analytical problems with two
of the four factors. In particular, the "degree of voluntariness" factor is logically fallacious, merely begging the ultimate question as an element that
would assess inter alia the voluntariness of consent.349 Moreover, the "substantive fairness" element bespeaks a subjectivity that is reminiscent of the
continuing debate over substantive due process.350
343.
344.

405 U.S. 174 (1972).
407 U.S. 67 (1972).

345.
346.

See Overmyer, 405 U.S. at 186-88.
See Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 95-96.

While the Court's holding in Fuentes was based on the lack of a clear waiver, the Court
347.
made a point of addressing the other listed factors at length and drawing an explicit contrast to
Overmyer. For a comprehensive discussion, see Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality

of the Supreme Court's Preferencefor Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation
of Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L.REV. 1, 53-82 (1997).
348. Compare the minimal process-value integrative approach suggested infra Part IV,with
the categorical approach suggested by Sternlight, supra note 347, at 80-97.
349. See generally RUoGERO J. ALDISERT, LoGIC FOR LAWYERS: A CLEAR GUIDE TO LEGAL
THINKING (1989).
350. See generally GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 182, at 454-60.
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Still, Sternlight rightly identifies and elaborates the value of the
Overmyer and Fuentes decisions in informing the meaning of a "knowing
and voluntary" waiver in the arbitration context. I, however, propose a
slightly different formulation, yet one that is still faithful to the contractual
principles upon which the FAA and its related jurisprudence rests. In my
view, the knowing and voluntary waiver analysis should be structured according to the following three factors: (1) the visibility and clarity of the waiver
agreement on its face, (2) the general contractual environment in which
the waiver was secured, and (3) the specific facts and circumstances of the
actual bargaining over the waiver.35' The first factor (visibility and clarity),
which addresses the knowingness of the waiver, is drawn from Stemlight's
proposed analysis and needs no further explanation. The second factor
(general contract environment) addresses the voluntariness of the waiver
and assesses the coerciveness of the environment by considering such elements as the sophistication of the parties, the relative economic bargaining
strength of the parties, whether the parties were represented by counsel, the
availability of alternative means of procuring the product, service, or opportunity that is the broader subject of the contract, and other relevant factors
relating to the overall coerciveness of the situation. Finally, the third factor
(specific facts and circumstances) also addresses voluntariness and weighs
the degree to which the waiver was in fact the result of an actual bargainedfor exchange. The inquiry into this factor should be taken with "particular care" ' in situations suggestive of substantial coercion, such as the
inclusion of an arbitration provision in the boilerplate of a form contract.
All three factors should be balanced against both the presumptive validity of such agreements under the FAA and the federal policy favoring
arbitration.353
a.

A General Rule of Construction: Voluntariness Is a Serious Inquiry

While it is well established that substantive and procedural legal rights
can be contractually waived, the common law of exculpatory agreements
teaches that such waivers should be scrutinized seriously because of the
important nature of the rights involved.

351.
Arguably, the second and third factors I propose could be collapsed into a single consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case. But I prefer separating the elements to bring
greater clarity to the distinct considerations involved in analyzing the actual waiver negotiations
and the coerciveness of the environment in which those negotiations take place.
352.
See Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165, 176 (Cal. 1981). For more on the case,
see infra notes 403-413 and accompanying text.

353.

See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
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As a general rule, courts are sometimes willing to uphold exculpatory
agreements, which typically call for a waiver of legal rights, such as the right
to bring a tort action, in exchange for the opportunity to undertake a
particular activity, such as participating in recreational sports." 4 However,
exculpatory agreements are strongly disfavored as a categorical matter and
are subject to constraints so substantial that these exceptions can often be
seen as swallowing the rule that exculpatory agreements are severally enforceable.35 As the proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts stresses, the strong
public policy considerations that flow from the elimination of substantive
law rights "has led the courts to strictly scrutinize such agreements, construing them against the party invoking them, and to require as a condition
to validity that the 'intention of the parties [be] expressed in clear and
unambiguous language."'" 6 That is, the exculpatory agreement must clearly
"alert the party agreeing to such a provision that it is giving up a very substantial right."3"7 Judicial inquiry into the question of the validity of an
exculpatory agreement (waiving legal rights) is a wide-ranging factual
analysis that should be understood as a "hard look" to assure their voluntariness and consistency with public policy.
This hard look originates in the common law but is consistent with
standards that have been imposed legislatively. For example, in 1990, Congress passed the Older Workers Benefits Protection Act (OWBPA), which
amended the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) to provide
354.
See, e.g., Clanton v. United Skates of Am., 686 N.E.2d 896, 901 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997)
(upholding an ice skating rink's exculpatory clause in a personal injury suit for damages arising
from a skating accident); Wagenblast v. Odessa Sch. Dist. No. 105-157-166J, 758 P.2d. 968
(Wash. 1988) (holding that releases that public school students were required to sign as a condition of engaging in school-related activities such as interscholastic athletics and that released
the school districts from consequences of all future school district negligence were invalid as violating public policy); Arnold v. Shawano Agric. Soc'y, 330 N.W.2d 773, 778 (Wisc. 1983) (finding that an exculpatory clause in an auto racer's contract with track owners and race promoters
did not bar a claim for "negligent rescue"). However, exculpatory agreements can also be found
in other contexts involving hazardous activities, including commercial activities. See, e.g., Continental Airlines, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 819 F.2d 1519, 1525-29 (9th Cir. 1987)
(upholding the exculpatory clause in a contract between an aircraft manufacturer and a commercial
airline); Morgan v. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 466 So. 2d 107, 118 (Ala. 1985) (holding an exculpatory clause in a telephone "yellow pages" company's contract with a periodontist invalid as
violative of public policy).
355.
See, e.g., Alexander T. Pendleton, Enforcing Exculpatory Agreements, WIS. LAW., Nov.
1997, at 10 (noting that all five of the exculpatory agreement cases that the Wisconsin Supreme
Court has considered in the past 15 years have resulted in a voiding of the agreement for one reason or another).
356.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 8 cmt. k (1998) (reporter's
note) (quoting Jones v. Dressel, 623 P.2d 370, 376 (Colo. 1981) (en banc)).
Sirek v. Fairfield Snowbowl, Inc., 800 P.2d 1291, 1295 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (con357.
struing a ski rental agreement's exculpatory agreement narrowly to exclude negligence).
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special protections for older workers in recognition of their unique
vulnerability. 58 Among other things, the OWBPA says that the waiver of
rights under the ADEA must be "knowing and voluntary" and enumerates
six specific considerations in making this assessment, including a plaintiffs
sophistication and the availability of counsel. 59 Together, the exculpatory
agreement cases and the OWBPA legislation evince a broad legislative and
judicial policy requiring that the waiver of legal rights through a contractual
arbitration clause is not to be lightly inferred and must satisfy the requirements of actual knowledge and voluntariness.
b.

The Knowledge Requirement: Assessing the Visibility
and Clarity of the Arbitration Agreement

The assessment of whether a contractual waiver of legal rights is knowing should focus first on a textual analysis of the clarity and content of the
arbitration clause itself.36 As the Supreme Court stated in Fuentes, if the
clause is unclear on its face, then no further analysis is required-there can
be no waiver. 6 Other courts have used similar language in the arbitration
context.362
358.
See 29 U.S.C. § 626 (1994); Bruce P. McMoran, Age Discrimination: Coping with Ambiguity,
Decisionson the Merits and Supreme Court Pronouncements, in 26TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON EMPLOYMENT LAW, at 589, 612 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 571, 1997).
359.
See 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1). These include (1) the plaintiff's education and business
experience, (2) the amount of time the plaintiff had possession of or access to the agreement
before signing it, (3) the role of the plaintiff in deciding the terms of the agreement, (4) the
clarity of the agreement, (5) whether the plaintiff was represented by or consulted with an attorney, and (6) whether the consideration given in exchange for the waiver exceeds employee benefits to which the employee was already entitled by contract or law. See id.; see also Oubre v. Entergy
Operations, Inc., 522 U.S. 422, 426 (1998) (holding that a release that does not comply with
requirements of the Older Workers Benefits Protection Act (OWBPA) may not bar an employee's
ADEA claims, even if the employee has neither returned nor offered to return money she received
in consideration of signing the release).
360.
Significantly, there is no requirement under a contractual waiver analysis that the
waiver be "intelligent" in that the waiving party understands fully the consequences of the waiver.
This appears to be the principal difference between the standards for waiver of civil law rights and
those for waiver of constitutional criminal procedural rights. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S.
742, 748 (1970) ("Waivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be
knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely
consequences."); see also Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516 (1962) ("Presuming waiver [of
Sixth Amendment right to counsel] from a silent record is impermissible. The record must show,
or there must be an allegation and evidence which show, that an accused was offered counsel but
intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer. Anything less is not waiver.").
361.
See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 95 (1972) ("We need not concern ourselves with
the involuntariness or unintelligence of a waiver when the contractual language relied upon does
not, on its face, even amount to a waiver.").
362.
See, e.g., Nelson v. Cyprus Bagdad Copper Corp., 119 F.3d 756, 761 (9th Cir. 1997), cert.
denied, 523 U.S. 1072 (1998); Doe v. Marsh, 105 F.3d 106, 111 (2d Cir. 1997); Sewell v. Jefferson
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This element of the analysis would seem to call into question the
validity of waivers in a typical broadly worded predispute ADR agreement
providing, for example, that "all disputes arising under this contract shall be
' It would seem that a waiver of future rights
decided by binding arbitration."363
could not be knowing if the substantive nature of a possible dispute were not
known or prospectively described with particularity at the time of contracting " This view has been adopted in several recent Ninth Circuit cases that
arose in the context of securities employment arbitration.36 In all of those
cases, the route to arbitration was contractual, based upon the employees'
signing of the U-4 form.3"
In what is arguably the lead case, PrudentialInsurance Co. of America v.
367
Lai, a sexual harassment case, the court noted that:
[Elven assuming that appellants were aware of the nature of the U-4
form, they could not have understood that in signing it, they were

agreeing to arbitrate sexual discrimination suits. The U-4 form did
not purport to describe the types of disputes that were to be subject
to arbitration. Moreover, even if appellants had signed a contract
containing the NASD arbitration clause, it would not put them on
notice that they were bound to arbitrate Title VII6sclaims. That
disputes.'
provision did not even refer to employment

County Fiscal Court, 863 F.2d 461, 468-69 (6th Cir. 1988) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Bueno v. City of Donna, 714 F.2d 484, 492-93 (5th Cir. 1983); Bowens v.
North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 710 F.2d 1015, 1018 (4th Cir. 1983).
See, for example, Standard Applications for Securities Industry Registration, Form U-4,
363.
which is required by the NASD. Paragraph 5 of the form, the arbitration clause, reads as follows:
I agree to arbitrate any dispute, claim or controversy that may arise between me and my
firm, or a customer, or any other person, that is required to be arbitrated under the rules,
constitutions, or by-laws of the organizations with which I register, as indicated in item
10 as may be amended from time to time.
Id.
364. For a contrary view, see Samuel Estreicher, Predispute Agreements to A)'bitrate Statutory
Employment Claims, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1344, 1346-50 (1997).
See, e.g., Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1189-90 (9th Cir.
365.
1998) (holding that mandatory and binding predispute arbitration clauses do not apply to Title
VII claims), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 996 (1998); Nelson, 119 F.3d at 761 (holding that because a
waiver of the right to a judicial forum must be "knowing," an employee did not knowingly agree to
arbitrate claims by signing a form acknowledging receipt of a revised employee handbook); Renteria
v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 113 F.3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that the arbitration
clause contained in the Uniform Application for Securities Industry Registration did not
constitute a "knowing" waiver of Title VII and related state claims because the clause did not refer
specifically to employment disputes); Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1305 (9th
Cir. 1994).
366. See cases cited supra note 365.
42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994).
367.
Id.at 1305.
368.
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The Ninth Circuit's judicial wisdom is buttressed by common sense
and has been relied upon by several other courts. 9 If the concept of a knowing decision means anything, it means that one had some specific and
known information upon which to base that decision. Because generalized,
broadly worded clauses, such as that found in the U-4 form, speak only in
terms of the full range of possible disputes, they cannot be said to constitute
a knowing waiver of any specific rights.37
It can, of course, be argued that the choice to accept a broadly worded
arbitration provision in a standard form contract is still a choice, and that
agreements such as the U-4 form represent a voluntary waiver of one's
substantive legal rights. But such Lochner-era logic grossly distorts the
reality of the bargaining environment. The selection of an alternative
method of dispute resolution is supposed to represent a choice between trial
and another means of resolving conflicts, not a choice between working in
a given industry and finding another livelihood"--or between purchasing a
stove, hiring a doctor, or procuring the services of a stock broker and walking
away from the opportunity to obtain those goods and services.
A much closer call is presented if a predispute arbitration clause
specifically delineates the types of disputes to which the clause applies, that
is, claims of gender, age, race, or other types of discrimination in the employment context. In such cases, it could be argued that the claimant at least
knew some information about the class of disputes for which legal rights
would be waived. Even then, however, the choice of a dispute resolution
forum can ultimately be expected to depend upon the unique facts and
circumstances giving rise to the dispute,3 Z including how the dispute is
handled by the parties prior to legal intervention.373 This is particularly true
in the context of alleged violations of statutory rights that reflect substantial
public policy decisions made at the legislative level, such as rights against
employment discrimination. Alleged violations of statutory and other
rights do vary in kind and degree, and the public scrutiny or vindication
369.
For Ninth Circuit cases, see cases cited supra note 365. Prudentialhas been followed in
other circuits as well. See, e.g., Chisolm v. Kidder, Peabody Asset Management, Inc., 966 F.
Supp. 218, 226 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 965
F. Supp. 190, 197 (D. Mass. 1997), affd, 163 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 1998); Oldroyd v. Elmira Say.
Bank, 956 F. Supp. 393, 398 (W.D.N.Y. 1997). But see, e.g., Seus v. John Nuveen & Co., 146
F.3d 175, 183-84 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1139 (1999); Maye v. Smith Barney Inc.,
897 F. Supp. 100, 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Hall v. MetLife Resources, No. 94 CIV.0358 (JFK), 1995
WL 258061, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 3, 1995); Lockhart v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., No.
CIV.A.93-2418-GTV, 1994 WL 34870, at *3-*4 (D. Kan. Jan. 25, 1994).
370.
See Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1186.

371.

See Richard C. Reuben, Reforming ADR, CAL. LAW., Feb. 1998, at 31.

372.

See Sander & Goldberg, supra note 179, at 66.
See LEVINE ETAL., supra note 82.

373.
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that can accompany a public trial might not seem significant until the harm
has been personally felt.
Moreover, as noted above,374 courts in other contexts have instructed
375
that waivers of substantive legal rights are not to be inferred lightly and
76
should at minimum be "clear and unmistakable. 3 This admonition suggests
a presumption against the validity of predispute waivers of legal rights that
would operate in clear tension with those cases holding that the FAA
377 However,
establishes a presumption of validity for arbitration provisions.
a more nuanced understanding of the history and structure of the FAA and
related state laws helps ease the tension within this line of cases by putting
this presumption favoring the validity of arbitration agreements in a more
precise context. As a historical matter, it must be remembered that the FAA
took agreements to arbitrate that were otherwise valid under standard principles of state contract law and made them "valid, irrevocable, and enforce378 That
able thus overturning legislatively the common law ouster doctrine.
is, to the extent that the FAA and related state laws legitimized agreements
to arbitrate, they did so by reversing the common law's refusal to enforce
such agreements even when they were contractually valid. They did not,
however, do away with the requirement that they be contractually valid as
an initial matter. 79 In other words, there is a rebuttable presumption against
the validity of contractual agreements to arbitrate just as there is for other
contracts that waive substantive legal rights. This presumption may be overcome by a showing that a waiver of rights in an arbitration agreement was
the product of knowing and voluntary affirmative assent. This assent may
be deduced by an analysis of the environment of the negotiation (that is,
the sophistication or relationship of the parties, evidence of knowledge and
acquiescence to industry customs, etc.), and the actual negotiation over the
arbitration agreement itself. Once that showing has been made, the arbitration provision's presumption of validity becomes essentially irrebuttable, and
the waiver of legal rights that flows from that arbitration agreement becomes
perfected.
Applying this understanding to predispute waivers of legal rights made
through contractual arbitration provisions suggests that the better view would
be that even the narrowing of generalized clauses to describe specific classes
of covered disputes should be inadequate to save their validity as a facial
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.

See supra Part III.B.2.a.
See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 94 n.31 (1972).
Wright v. Universal Maritime Servs. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 80 (1998).
See supra Part I.B.2.b.
9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
See id.
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matter without additional indicia of voluntariness. Rather, just as predispute
waivers of substantive legal rights are not to be lightly inferred in other contexts, they should be presumptively invalid as described here because, simply
put, they cannot be said to be knowing in a substantive sense,3" absent
rebutting evidence that the waiver was knowing and voluntary as described
below.
c.

The Voluntariness Requirement: Assessing the General
and Specific Waiver Contexts

If a court concludes that an arbitration agreement is clear enough to
permit a knowing waiver, it should go on to consider the voluntariness of
that agreement by analyzing (1) the general contractual environment and
(2) the specific negotiations (if any) attendant to the agreement. Again,
the Overmyer and Fuentes decisions are instructive starting points for demonstrating how the analysis is to be applied.
In Overmyer, the general contractual environment appears to have been
relatively balanced. Both Overmyer and Frick were corporations of some
apparent size in a populous state (Ohio), were represented by counsel, were
sophisticated in business, and had alternative means of procuring the goods
and services each sought from the other. That is, Overmyer could have
sought manufacturers other than Frick to manufacture and install an automatic refrigeration system in an Overmyer warehouse, and Frick could have
found other warehouses to buy its refrigeration services.38 Against this
general contractual background, the parties engaged in lengthy negotiations
over how to handle Overmyer's financial plight, which ended in a contract
that included Overmyer's agreement to sign the cognovit note (confession
of judgment) in exchange for the release of mechanic's liens and the securing
of preferred payment terms as to the amount, time, and interest rate of future
payments. 82 As such, the cognovit provision was freely bargained for
between sophisticated parties of relatively equal bargaining power. While
the environment was somewhat coercive in the sense that Overmyer was
experiencing financial difficulty, the nature and complexity of the negotiations suggested that Overmyer had options other than signing the cognovit
note. Based on these facts, the Court held that Overmyer voluntarily agreed
to the confession of judgment and that it was not imposed involuntarily

380.

See Sternlight, supra note 347, at 49-50.

381.
382.

See D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 177-78 (1972).
See id.at 178-81.
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upon the company. Therefore, the Supreme Court properly found that it was
enforceable. 3
The circumstances in Fuentes, on the other hand, were "a far cry" from
those in Overmyer." The general contractual environment was highly
coercive, involving a contract of adhesion rather than the negotiated agreement seen in Overmyer. Moreover, one of the parties, Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co., was a sophisticated national corporation that was represented
by counsel, while the other was an unsophisticated, unrepresented (at the
time of contracting) woman of lesser economic means who spoke little
or no English. 8 Clearly, the general environment in which Fuentes came to
be bound by the replevin provision was highly suggestive of a lack of assent,
calling for an assessment of the actual circumstances of the negotiation with
particular care to determine whether she actually consented to that provision. In this regard, the opinions of the federal district court and the U.S.
Supreme Court note that there were no actual negotiations over the replevin
provision or any other terms of the retail agreement, and that Firestone had
made no effort to make her aware of the "fine print now relied upon as a
386
'
Given her lack of sophistication and
waiver of constitutional rights."
that Fuentes simply purchased the
assume
to
English skills, it is reasonable
gas stove in question without negotiating price or being aware of any other
terms or conditions of sale. In this regard, while it is true that she could
have gone to another seller, she may reasonably have believed that it would
have been futile to try to find one willing to proceed on an installment basis
without the repossession clause. The Supreme Court rightly found that she
had not voluntarily waived her basic due process rights to a preseizure hearof
ing, and in the end the replevin provision was "no more than a statement
37
events.""
certain
of
occurrence
upon
the seller's right to repossession
Overmyer and Fuentes provide a useful vehicle for illustrating the
applicability of the three-part test I have proposed for the assessment of
whether waivers of legal rights under the FAA and related state laws are
knowing and voluntary and therefore valid under state law. Traditional

It is important to note that the Supreme Court explicitly observed that its conclusion
383.
might have been different had the cognovit note been imposed as a contract of adhesion. See id.

at 188.
See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 95 (1972).
384.
See Fuentes v. Faircloth, 317 F. Supp. 954, 956 (S.D. Fla. 1970), vacated, Fuentes v.
385.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
386. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 95.
Id.at 96.
387.
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contracts that include terms that are substantially the result of bargaining,
such as in Overmyer, readily lend themselves to this analysis and require no
further discussion. As in Overmyer, they can most certainly be valid. On the
other hand, adhesion contracts, such as the one in Fuentes, call for a slightly
extended analysis because of their unique character.
3.

The Special Problem of Arbitration Clauses in Contracts
of Adhesion

Rather than being the products of negotiation, contracts of adhesion
are generally characterized by a lack of real bargaining in that they are
generally tendered on a "take it or leave it" basis and often include terms
that are favorable to the drafting party.38s As such, there seems to be little
place for voluntariness, other than simply walking away from the larger
opportunity because of the offensive provision-assuming, of course, that
one is aware of its existence. 9 Therefore, the waiver analysis must be
extended slightly to include an assessment of the validity of the adhesive
arbitration provision before proceeding to discern the adhering party's
voluntary assent to it.
While some scholars have argued that contracts of adhesion should be
presumptively invalid,3" the courts have rejected that call as a categorical
matter. Rather, the courts have generally upheld adhesion contracts on
prudential grounds, albeit with some reluctance, as a necessary compromise
between the demands of doctrinal regimen and the pragmatic needs of a
large and complex society.39"' In an immediately relevant example, the U.S.
388.
See 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 339, at 533-45.
389.
See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1148-49 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that
an arbitration provision included in a computer package from a direct-order manufacturer was
effective, even though it was not received until after completion of the transaction). Elsewhere
I
have argued that one way of approaching the voluntariness problem in the context of consumer
contracts of adhesion is by having consumers check off whether they agree to use mandatory arbitration if a dispute arises under the contract, similar to the way that consumers check off whether
they have accepted insurance and refueling options when renting an automobile. See Richard C.
Reuben, The Pendulum Swings Again: Badie, Wright Decisions Underscore the Importance of Actual
Assent to Arbitration, Disp. RESOL. MAG., Fall 1999, at 21.
390.
See Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 1173, 1242 (1983) (arguing that the form terms contained in contracts of adhesion
should
be presumptively unenforceable).
391.
See generally 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 339, at 533-45 and authorities cited therein. This
acceptance has not been unqualified, however, as some courts have been willing, on occasion, to
void standardized contracts, or at least mitigate their harshness, through a variety of techniques.
These techniques include finding the contract not to have been supported by an offer, finding
that the term is not one that reasonably would have been expected to be a part of the offer, and
construing the term against the drafter and in favor of the other party. See id.; see also Ellis v.
Mullen, 238 S.E.2d 187, 189 (N.C. Ct. App. 1977) (holding that illiterate persons ignorant of the
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Supreme Court has brushed aside concerns over hardship and inconvenience in favor of efficiency and economic rationales in upholding "forum
selection" clauses in contracts of adhesion that require all claims arising from
392 Similarly,
passenger cruises to be decided in the cruise line's home state.
3 93
the franchise agreement upheld in Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto
was also a contract of adhesion, as were the termite extermination contract
3 94
in Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson and the investor agreements in the
' 9'
Shearson cases.
As these cases suggest, mandatory arbitration requirements in contracts of adhesion are increasingly pervasive and may be found in the banking, securities, health care, real estate, employment, and consumer sales
contexts, to name just a few.3 96 Indeed, their proliferation is arguably the
fastest growing aspect of arbitration today-and the most troubling, given
3 97 These
the gravity of rights being waived and the potential for abuse.
concerns have given rise to two significant practice protocols during the last
contents of a writing signed by them may be relieved from obligations under it "on proof of
anything in the nature of overreaching or unfair advantage taken of their illiteracy"). But see
St. Landry Loan Co. v. Avie, 147 So. 2d 725, 728 (La. Ct. App. 1962) (finding an illiterate Frenchspeaking man to be bound to a promissory note by his "X" regardless of a showing that he had not
read it, had not had it read or explained to him, and did not understand its provisions); Gingell v.
Backus, 227 A.2d 349 (Md. 1967) (holding a 61-year-old laborer with a fourth-grade education to
be bound by a release form he signed but did not read).
See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593-94 (1991). CarnivalCruise
392.
Lines built upon the Court's decision in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972),
which had held that "reasonable" forum-selection clauses, while not historically favored, are
"prima facie valid" when freely negotiated by commercial parties in an international context. See
id. at 9-10. Carnival Cruise Lines extended The Bremen to consumer cases in upholding a forum
selection clause in a standard form cruise line ticket requiring all claims to be decided in Florida.
Carnival Cruise Lines, 499 U.S. at 592-93. It has been severely criticized, perhaps most strikingly
by Justice Stevens, who affixed a copy of the contested standard form contract containing the fine
print forum-selection clause to his dissenting opinion. See id. at 597-605 (Stevens, J., dissenting);
see also Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916 F.2d 372, 376 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, C.J.)
("If ever there was a case for stretching the concept of fraud in the name of unconscionability, it was
[Carnival Cruise Lines]; and perhaps no stretch was necessary."); Lee Goldman, My Way and the
Highway: The Law and Economics of Choice of Forum Clauses in Consumer Form Contracts, 86 NW.
U. L. REV. 700, 716-20 (1992) (contending that economic analysis does not justify the Carnival
Cruise Lines decision); Linda S. Mullenix, Another Easy Case, Some More Bad Law: Carnival
Cruise Lines and ContractualPersonalJurisdiction, 27 TEX. INT'L L.J. 323, 325-26 (1992) (arguing that
Carnival Cruise Lines failed to properly apply well-established contract law).
393. 517 U.S. 681, 683 (1996).
394. 513 U.S. 265 (1995).
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
395.
See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
396.
See supra note 63 and accompanying text; see also Mark E. Budnitz, Arbitration of Disputes
397.
Between Consumers and Financial Institutions: A Serious Threat to Consumer Protection, 10 OHIO ST. J.
ON DISP. RESOL. 267, 309-29 (1995); David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big
Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WiS. L.
REv. 33, 40-53.
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five years: one for disputes arising out of adhesive arbitration in the employment context3 98 and the other for conflicts arising out of adhesion contracts
used in consumer transactions. 99 Both of these protocols at least tacitly
endorse the validity of arbitration provisions in adhesion contracts. On the
other hand, arbitration provisions in contracts of adhesion have also attracted
the attention of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws (NCCUSL) in its proposed Revised Uniform Arbitration Act
(RUAA). After considerable discussion, the Commissioners' Drafting Committee decided to note the trend and the substantial potential for unfairness
to the weaker or adhering parties but to leave further regulation to the states,
primarily through their contract doctrines of unconscionability. 0° However,
the official comments to the RUAA are still expected to "accentuate the
importance of considering whether the weaker party was actually free to
make an informed decision about arbitration and whether arbitration can
provide adequate remedies."' The Drafting Committee's reporter, Dean
Timothy J. Heinsz, has further noted that "[w]ithout these safeguards,
arbitration loses some credibility as an appropriate option to litigation.'O°
Both due process protocols are to be applauded as thoughtful ADR
industry efforts to regulate difficult problems of fairness in arbitration that
arise from valid predispute arbitration clauses in contracts of adhesion. However, the aspirations of an industry do not override the obligations of state
contract law and the strong policies favoring at least fundamental fairness
in the execution even of adhesion contracts. As the cautious NCCUSL
approach encourages, state courts should begin taking a more serious look at
arbitration provisions in standard form agreements and should be willing to
recognize when they are unconscionable, and therefore unenforceable, under
general state contract law.
A strong and well-accepted model for state courts is the California
Supreme Court's decision in Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc.,4°3 a ruling that is
398.
See supra notes 167-169 and accompanying text.
399.
See supra note 170 and accompanying text. Professor Stipanowich has referred to it as
the "consumerization of arbitration." See Stipanowich, supra note 63, at 1-11.
400.
See UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 3 (reporter's note 6) (Proposed Revisions Oct. 1999).
401.
Heinsz, supra note 51, at 17.
402. See UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT (Proposed Revisions Oct. 1999).
403.
623 P.2d 165 (Cal. 1981). An earlier California Supreme Court opinion, Madden v.
Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 552 P.2d 1178 (Cal. 1976), is frequently thought of as endorsing the
enforceability of arbitration clauses in standard form contracts. However, the court in that case
found that the health services agreement containing the arbitration provision was freely negotiated by the Kaiser Foundation Health Plan and the Board of Administration of the California
Employees Retirement System as a benefit for state employees, and therefore was not a contract of
adhesion. As a result, the court never reached the unconscionability question finally decided in
Graham. See id. at 1185-86.
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frequently cited in state and federal opinions as the touchstone of unconscionability analysis." The facts are worth noting in some detail as a
demonstration of how efficiency and fairness are balanced in assessing the
validity of arbitration provisions in this unique context of adhesion contracts. The plaintiff, Bill Graham, was a major producer of rock concerts.
The defendant was the corporation of a popular rock star known publicly
as Leon Russell, who was a member of the American Federation of Musicians
(AFM). The two had agreed to separate contracts for four concerts, using
5 The form contract
the standard AFM Form B contract for each event.
included an arbitration clause providing, in relevant part, that all disputes
arising out of the contract "shall be submitted to, heard, arbitrated and
determined by the International Executive Board of the American Federation of Musicians pursuant to and in accordance with the laws, rules and
regulations of the said Federation." 6
In a per curiam opinion, the California Supreme Court used a two-part
analysis in refusing to enforce the clause. The court first analyzed whether
the contract was one of adhesion and found it to be so, despite Graham's
substantial bargaining power as a major concert promoter; Graham had no
choice but to use the form contract if he wanted to promote the Russell
concerts. 7 It proceeded to determine whether the contract fell within one
of two common law exceptions to the enforceability of adhesion contracts:
that the contract (or term) does not fall within the "reasonable expectations of the weaker or 'adhering' party," or that it is "unduly oppressive
or 'unconscionable."'' 40 The court found that the arbitration provision was
within Graham's reasonable expectations because he frequently did business
with AFM artists and therefore should reasonably have been aware of the
arbitration provision in the standard form contract. However, the court
found that the provision was substantively unconscionable because it failed
to meet "minimum levels of integrity" by requiring arbitration before a
4
presumptively biased panel, the AFM board. ' Addressing the tension
between contractual freedom and state law policies calling for fundamental
See, e.g., Badie v. Bank of Am., 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273, 289 (Ct. App. 1998); Stirlen v.
404.
Supercuts, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138, 144 (Ct. App. 1997); see also Smith, Bucklin & Assocs., Inc. v.
Sonntag, 83 F.3d 476, 480 (D.C. Cir. 1996); American Bankers Mortgage Corp. v. Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corp., 75 F.3d 1401, 1412 (9th Cit. 1996); Taylor v. Nelson, 615 F. Supp. 533,
537 (W.D. Va. 1985); Gilchrist Mach. Co. v. Komatsu Am. Corp., 601 F. Supp. 1192, 1201 (S.D.

Miss. 1984).
405.
406.

See Graham, 623 P.2d at 168.
Id. at 168 n.2.

407.

See id.at 172.

408.
409.

Id. at 172-73.
See id. at 175-76.
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fairness in the enforcement of adhesion contracts, the court acknowledged
that parties are not necessarily prohibited from engaging an arbitrator who
may in some respects be biased, adding, however, that
[alt the same time, we must note that when as here the contract
designating such an arbitrator is the product of circumstances sugges-

tive of adhesion, the possibility of overreaching by the dominant
party looms large; contracts concluded in such circumstances, then, must
be scrutinized with particular care to insure that the party of lesser
bargainingpower, in agreeing thereto, isnot left in a position depriving him
of any realisticand fair opportunity to prevail ina dispute under its terms.410
The two-part inquiry in Graham provides a useful and well-accepted
model for analyzing the validity of an arbitration provision in a contract of
adhesion. Under Graham, a contract or provision thereof is adhesive if the
adhering or weaker party has no real choice but to accept the terms. Even
then, the adhesion contract may be enforced unless it (1) frustrates the
reasonable expectations of the parties, or (2) is unconscionable or unduly
oppressive. Such an assessment should be taken with "particular care"
because of the adhesive nature of the contracting environment. 1' For
purposes of arbitration clauses in adhesion contracts, unconscionability may
be defined as failing to meet minimal levels of integrity, which in Graham
meant the requirement of arbitrating claims before a presumptively biased
tribunal. Significantly Grahamdid not limit or otherwise define what those
minimal levels are, expressly leaving it for courts to determine on a case-bycase basis. 4 12 Factors and considerations that courts have used in the course
of an unconscionability analysis include unequal bargaining power, whether
the weaker party could opt out of arbitration, the arbitration clause's clarity
and conspicuousness, whether an unfair advantage was obtained, whether
the arbitration clause was negotiable, whether the arbitration waiver was contained in a boilerplate provision, whether the aggrieved party had a meaningful choice or was compelled to accept the arbitration provision, whether
the arbitration agreement was within the reasonable expectations of the
weaker party, and whether the stronger party used deceptive tactics.4"3 All
of these factors would, of course, be considered within the discussion of the
general contractual environment and the analysis of the specific negotiations over the arbitration provision, which I have suggested are part of a
three-part analysis of the validity of an agreement to arbitrate.

410.

Id. at 176 (emphasis added).

411.
412.
413.

See id.
Seeid.
See Heinsz, supra note 51, at 17.
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4.

The Scope of the Waiver That Is Effected by a Valid Agreement
to Arbitrate

As with any waiver, the question of scope is critical. In other words,
assuming that there is a valid waiver of legal rights effectuated by a valid
agreement to arbitrate, just what rights does that agreement waive? Two
possibilities present themselves immediately: (1) the right to access a public
forum, and (2) the right to avail oneself of relevant substantive and procedural law.
a.

The Right to Access a Public Forum

The first possible right waived is the right to access a public forum to
redress public harms, which may be defined in terms of positive rights
conferred by the Constitution, a statute, or another law. Both intuition and
some case law seem to support the view that an agreement to arbitrate
waives one's right to access a public forum,414 even though such a right does
not appear expressly in the Constitution.
As noted above, the right to trial, to the extent that it is available, is
the essential entitlement under our constitutional system of dispute
resolution. Civil jury trials are, of course, expressly provided for in the Bill
of Rights, although that right has been held to be more limited than its
plain text might suggest."' Whether there is a fundamental right of access
to judicial forums is a broader question, and one upon which reasonable
See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
414.
The Supreme Court's Seventh Amendment jurisprudence has been dominated by the
415.
search for the types of cases and issues to which the Seventh Amendment civil jury trial right applies.
Over a century and a half, this quest has led to the construction and interpretation of the so-called
historical test for making such determinations.
Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987), provides: "First, we compare the statutory action
to 18th-century actions brought in the courts of England prior to the merger of the courts of law
and equity .... Second, we examine the remedy sought and determine whether it is legal or equitable in nature." Id. at 417-18 (citations omitted).
This test generally looks to the practices of the English courts in 1791, when the amendment
was ratified, to determine whether a jury trial would be required in a given action or for a particular issue. Thus, under the test, if a jury would have been empaneled in 1791 England to decide
a matter, then the jury right would be seen as attaching here under the amendment. Here, as in
England, that question has been answered primarily by reference to the remedy sought by the
plaintiff; legal remedies avail themselves to jury trials in civil cases (as they did in 1791 English
courts of law), while equitable matters do not (as juries were not empaneled in courts of equity in
1791 England). See Beacon Theaters, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 507 (1959).
The primary utility of the historical test in this country has been to determine the types of
civil issues subject to the jury trial. But it has also been used to answer questions regarding the
mode of the trial, such as the allocation of duties between judges and juries, jury size, and unanimity requirements.
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minds may disagree. In a famous article, Professors Henry M. Hart, Jr., and
Herbert Wechsler fleshed out the debate over this question of access in the
context of Congress's power to limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts.416
Citing Ex Parte McCardle," 7 they developed the view that the Constitution
provides no absolute right to access the courts in civil cases, and that the
gate into the federal courts is controlled instead entirely by Congress."'
Another view is that at least some access is required because Congress would
otherwise have the power to "destroy the Constitution" without judicial
remedy." 9 Others have suggested that the right to access the courts is an
incident of due process,42 ° a point noted in the Hart-Wechsler debate as
well.42'
Plainly, the ADR movement has given this old debate very modem
currency, for the FAA and related state laws ultimately authorize private
parties to bar access to the public courts and the public law that would apply
therein. I do not presume the capacity to resolve this difficult questionwhich ultimately, in my view, is one of philosophy rather than of a
discemable rule of law-and this Article is not in any event the appropriate
place for its thorough vetting. However, I can say that at least some access
seems to be required, a view consistent with the Seventh Amendment
jurisprudence recognizing the validity of pretrial procedures that do not
result in "total prostration" of the constitutional right to a jury.422 Viewing
416.
Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdictionof Federal Courts: An
Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953). While it is not always clear which of the
professors was articulating which viewpoint, the contours of the debate are plainly visible.
417.
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 515 (1869) (recognizing the power of Congress to frustrate a
determination of the constitutionality of the post-Civil War reconstruction amendments by with,
drawing, during the pendency of the appeal, its jurisdiction to review decisions of the federal
circuit courts in habeas corpus).
418.
See Hart, supra note 416, at 1364-65.
419.
Id.
420.
For an argument that there is a right to access the courts as a matter of due process, see
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-1, at 1437 (2d ed. 1988). See also
Jeffrey R. Pankratz, Comment, Neutral Principles and the Right to Neutral Access to the Courts, 67
IND. L.J. 1091 (1992).
421.
See Hart, supra note 416, at 1366 n.19 (citing Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. v.
Kuykendall, 265 U.S. 196, 204-05 (1924), and Porter v. Investors Syndicate, 286 U.S. 461 (1932),
for the proposition that due process requires an opportunity to apply to a court for an interlocutory
stay of a state administrative order challenged on constitutional grounds).
422.
See, e.g., Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 235 (1819). In this arbitration case, the Court said:
It is true, cases may be supposed, in which the policy of a country may set bounds to the
relinquishment of private rights. And this Court would ponder long before it... produced
a total prostration of the trial by jury, or even involved the defendant in circumstances
which rendered that right unavailing for his protection.
Id. at 243.
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the development and application of law as an exercise in democratic dialogue,423 I agree with Chief Justice Marshall that there can be little reason
for law if there is not a concomitant public forum in which to vindicate the
rights that it confers.424 To the extent that our constitutional and, particularly, statutory law represents the consent of the governed, the primary forum
for the vindication of these rights must be the judicial forum that is a critical component of our constitutional democracy. Naturally, Congress can
expressly require that specific statutory rights be vindicated in nonjudicial
forums, just as it can expand or contract the jurisdiction of the courts.425
But in matters of constitutional rights, statutory rights, and even common
law rights, it seems to me that the presumption must be that when the law
creates a right that may be vindicated, it also creates a corollary right to
vindicate that right in a judicial forum, unless Congress or another appropriate legislative body has properly circumscribed that right.426
b.

The Waiver of Substantive and Procedural Rights

Despite the foregoing discussion, any judicial reluctance to recognize a
right of access to a public forum for the vindication of positive law rights
need not be fatal to our inquiry. A second, less controversial approach to
the question of what rights are waived by virtue of a valid arbitration
agreement may be found in the distinction between substantive and procedural rights.427
(1)

Substantive Rights

As an initial matter, our discussion of the exculpatory agreement cases
and the OWBPA legislation makes clear that substantive legal rights may
be waived as a matter of contract through a valid knowing and voluntary
The notion of "total prostration" as a limit on the condition required of litigants to exercise
their civil jury trial rights has resonated through the Court's cases on the subject since Okely. See,
e.g., Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 159-60 (1973) (stating that the use of six jurors does not
violate the Seventh Amendment); Capital Traction v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 18 (1899) (stating that
trial by magistrate is not a jury trial for purposes of the Seventh Amendment); Walker v. New
Mexico & S. Pac. R.R. Co., 165 U.S. 593, 596-98 (1897) (holding that the Seventh Amendment
is not violated by the use of special questions and directed verdicts); Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S.
90, 91-93 (1875) (holding that because a state statute permitting a trial judge to take a case from
the jury if it could not agree did not result in a complete prostration of civil jury trial rights, there
was no need to determine the applicability of the Seventh Amendment to the states).
See Reuben, supra note 9, at 582 n.5 and accompanying text.
423.
See supra notes 303-304 and accompanying text.
424.
425.
See U.S. CONST. art. Il.
See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/3ohnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26-29 (1991).
426.
Great appreciation is due Professor William Cohen for this insight.
427.
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agreement. Implicit within this teaching is that substantive rights may also
be waived without constitutional concern. Though such agreements are
clearly disfavored, courts are nonetheless willing to uphold them as waivers
of substantive legal rights, such as the right to bring a personal injury claim
against a ski lift operator on a simple negligence theory, or even a gross
negligence theory, if certain criteria are met.428 The question of the waiver
of substantive law rights is a serious matter, but if the waiver is valid-that
is, knowing and voluntary-then it operates to extinguish the substantive
law rights.
(2)

Procedural Rights

The waiver of procedural rights is a different matter. Arbitrations,
mediations, and other ADR processes frequently affect the life, liberty, or
property of one or more of the parties. The Supreme Court has repeatedly
held that an essential principle of due process is that a deprivation of life,
liberty, or property by the government must be "preceded by notice and
opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.' 29 Much of the
law in this area has developed in the administrative law context, in which
the Supreme Court has struggled to balance the efficiency needs of a large
bureaucracy with the constitutional demands of individuals requiring due
process when their life, liberty, or property is affected by government
action.
In Goldberg v. Kelly,43° for example, the Supreme Court spelled out the
requirements for due process in judicial trial-type administrative adjudications that result in the termination of welfare benefits. These include the
rights to notice and an opportunity to be heard,43' the right to present evidence,432 the right to retain counsel,433 the right to a written statement
explaining the reasons for the decision and the evidence relied upon,434 and,
of course, the right to an impartial decision maker." The Court's decision
in Goldberg was limited to trial-type adjudicatory agency hearings and expressly
allowed that other types of government actions might warrant fewer procedural safeguards that are more appropriately adapted to the "nature of the
428.
See supra note 354 and cases cited.
429.
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
430.
397 U.S. 254, 260-67 (1970) (holding that welfare benefits may not be terminated without a pretermination hearing that meets rudimentary standards of due process).
431.
See id. at 267-68.
432.
See id. at 268.
433.
See id. at 270.
434.
See id. at 271.

435.

See id.
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' The Court's cases in the administrative law
controversies to be resolved."436
area since Goldberg may be "explained as part of an effort to construct defen'
sible limits on the scope of its holding in Goldberg."437
Still, the principle of notice and opportunity to be heard when government action affects life, liberty, or property stands firm, and the Court has
further made clear that a hearing, any hearing, conducted by a government
actor must accord with at least rudimentary constitutional due process standards, regardless of the substantive nature of the claim. For example, in
Goldberg,the Court found that Goldberg was entitled to a constitutionally fair
process, even though the nature of the right at stake-welfare entitlementswas determined according to state law standards.438 A constitutionally
adequate process was necessary, the court said, less as a matter of vindicating
Goldberg's substantive rights, and more to ensure the integrity of governmental decision-making processes against the possibility of arbitrary,

capricious, or erroneous government action.439

This principle had perhaps its most significant challenge in the public
employment cases, in which now-Chief Justice -Rehnquist attempted to
advance the so-called "bitter with the sweet" argument as a limitation on
constitutional due process rights for government employees whose positions
are created by statute. Rehnquist's approach was essentially this: If a statute
that confers substantive legal rights, such as the right to government employment, also sets out procedural mechanisms for enforcing that right, such as a
removal procedure, then the substantive and the procedural rights are limited
to those found in the statute. Therefore, if a government employee's employment right is defined in a statute that provides fewer procedural safeguards
for termination than might otherwise be available as a matter of constitutional due process, the employee does not get the sweet benefit of those
additional constitutional protections. Rather, he must take the bitter with
the sweet that the public employment statute gives him, accepting the bitter
limitations of the termination procedures prescribed in the statute.
Rehnquist first articulated this theory in a plurality opinion for the
Court in Arnett v. Kennedy, 4 ° stating:
[W]here the grant of a substantive right is inextricably intertwined
with the limitations on the procedures which are to be employed in
See id. at 267.
436.
1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
437.
§ 8.5 (3d ed. 1994). For a discussion of a key case in this respect, Mathews v. Eldridge, see infra
notes 483-494 and accompanying text.
See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 256-60.
438.
439.
See id. at 260-64.
416 U.S. 134 (1974).
440.
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determining that right, a litigant [must] take the bitter with the
sweet.... Here the property interest which appellee had in his employment was itself conditioned by the procedural limitations which had
accompanied the grant of that interest."

The theory carried the day for the three justices who signed the plurality
opinion in Arnett,"2 which resulted in a decision rejecting a nonprobationary federal civil service employee's claim to a full hearing prior to dismissal.
However, Rehnquist never was able to garner the necessary additional
votes to get it adopted as a majority opinion of the Court.443 Finally,
in Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill,444 the Court put the argument to rest for good expressly, with Justice Byron R. White stating
emphatically:
[It] is settled that the "bitter with the sweet" approach misconceives

the constitutional guarantee. If a clearer holding is needed,
we provide it today. The point is straightforward: the Due Process Clause provides that certain substantive rights-life, liberty, and
property-cannotbe deprived except pursuant to constitutionally adequate
procedures."'

Such reasoning also operates to limit the nature of the waiver of legal
rights that flow from a valid arbitration agreement, at least in hearings that
are administered by state actors under the FAA and related state laws
(as well as in court-related hearings that may not be subject to a waiver
analysis). While the FAA waiver applies clearly to substantive legal rights,
as well as to the full panoply of procedural rights that would be available in
a full-blown trial, constitutional due process still requires some appropriate
procedural protections of fundamental fairness to ensure that dispute resolution processes administered by state actors are constitutionally adequate. The
rule of law that supports our democratic system plainly has an institutional
interest in preserving its own integrity. The contours of such procedural protections are described more fully below in Part IV.

441.
Id. at 153-55.
442.
Rehnquist's opinion was joined by Chief Justice Warren Burger and Justice Potter
Stewart. Six justices, however, affirmatively rejected his "bitter with the sweet" argument. See id.
at 166--67 (Powell, J., joined by Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 177-78 (White, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part); id. at 211 (Marshall, J., joined by Douglas and Brennan, JJ.,
dissenting).
443.
See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 432 (1982); Vitek v. Jones, 445
U.S. 480, 490 (1980); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 355-61 (1976) (White, J., dissenting); Goss
v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 586-87 (1975) (Powell, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Blackmun and
Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting).
444.
470 U.S. 532 (1985).
445.
Id. at 541 (emphasis added).
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c.

Consistency of Approach

The understanding that minimal procedural safeguards are retained in
contractual arbitration despite a waiver of substantive legal rights under the
FAA or related state law is consistent with the doctrinal teachings of both
the law of collective bargaining arbitration and the common law doctrine of
fair procedures.
Until the modem ADR movement's expansion of FAA arbitration,
union arbitration of workplace grievances was the primary context for American arbitration." 6 Those private arbitrations are conducted primarily under
the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), and the Court has insisted
that they be conducted in accordance with "minimal levels of integrity," language that echoes the minimal notions of due process expected in government hearings. As Justice White wrote in the leading case on this point, Hines
v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc.," "Congress has put its blessing on private dispute settlement arrangements provided in collective [bargaining] agreements,
but it was anticipated, we are sure, that the contractual machinery would
operate within some minimum levels of integrity.""
While Hines was written in the context of LMRA arbitrations, surely,
as courts have recognized, no less integrity would be expected of the contractual machinery of the FAA, 9 especially when the arbitration is conducted
by a government actor. Indeed, the Court hinted as much in Gilmer v.
See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
446.
424 U.S. 554 (1976).
447.
Id.at 571.
448.
See, e.g., Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 344, 349 (1854) ("If the award is within
449.
the submission, and contains the honest decision of the arbitrators, after a full and fair hearing
of the parties, a court of equity will not set it aside for error, either in law or fact."); Bowles Fin.
Group, Inc. v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 22 F.3d 1010, 1013 (10th Cir. 1994) ("The courts seem
to agree that a fundamentally fair hearing requires only notice, opportunity to be heard and to
present relevant and material evidence and argument before the decision makels, and that the
decision makers are not infected with bias." (citation omitted)); Forsythe Int'l, S.A. v. Gibbs Oil
Co., 915 F.2d 1017, 1020 (5th Cir. 1990) ("In reviewing the district court's vacatur, we posit
the ... question ...whether the arbitration proceedings were fundamentally unfair."); see also
Robbins v. Day, 954 F.2d 679, 685 (11th Cir. 1992) ("[Tlhe Federal Arbitration Act allows arbitration to proceed with only a summary hearing and with restricted inquiry into factual issues.");
Sunshine Mining Co. v. United Steelworkers, 823 F.2d 1289, 1295 (9th Cir. 1987) ("A hearing
is fundamentally fair if it meets 'the minimal requirements of fairness'-adequate notice, a hearing
on the evidence, and an impartial decision...." (quoting Ficek v. Southern Pac. Co., 338 F.2d
655, 657 (9th Cir. 1964))); Hoteles Condado Beach, La Concha & Convention Ctr. v. Union de
Tronquistas Local 901, 763 F.2d 34, 39 (1st Cir. 1985) (holding that an arbitrator must give each
party an adequate opportunity to present evidence and arguments); Bell Aerospace Co. Div. of
Union, 500 F.2d 921, 923 (2d Cir. 1974) ("[An arbitrator need not
Textron v. Local 516, Int'l
[observe] all the niceties [ofi federal courts ....He need only grant.., a fundamentally fair
hearing.").
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Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp.,45° even as it summarily rejected generalized
facial challenges to the securities arbitration system. The reasoning of the
Court's opinion in Gilmer, also written by Justice White, was closely tied to
the procedural standards of the rules of the New York Stock Exchange.45" ' As
such, its invitation for more specific challenges to arbitration procedures
necessarily implies that it is possible for such a proceeding to be found
procedurally defective, an invitation that has since been accepted by a few
lower courts."' In this regard, arbitration processes governed by other rules
may not be as satisfactory as the Court found the New York Stock Exchange
procedures to be in Gilmer, either in their structure or in their application.
While White did not specifically state what the standard of proof would
be to establish procedural deficiencies under the FAA, one may reasonably
suppose that the Court may ultimately consider adopting the same "minimal
levels of integrity" standard it used in Hines for collective bargaining arbitrations under the LMRA.
Finally, additional support for the expectation of minimal levels of
integrity may also be found in the common law doctrine of fair procedures,
a doctrine that has developed to assure some level of fair processes with regard
to memberships in professional societies. Indeed, the Graham court expressly
relied upon the fair procedures doctrine as a separate basis for invalidating
the AFM arbitration provision,453 even though the case it cited for the
proposition, Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Society of Orthodontists,"4 did not arise in
the adhesion context.
Pinsker arose when Dr. Leon Pinsker, licensed in California as both a dentist
and an orthodontist, was denied membership in the orthodontists' professional membership societies, ostensibly because his partner, also a licensed
dentist, was not a licensed orthodontist. According to the professional society defendants, this working relationship violated professional ethical rules
barring the delegation of orthodontic duties to nonlicensed orthodontists.
In challenging the rejection of his application, Pinsker claimed he should at
least have been given an opportunity to rebut the charges that he had
violated the nondelegation-of-work rule. The California Supreme Court, in
an opinion by Justice Matthew 0. Tobriner, agreed, stating that "[a]lthough
the fair procedure required in this setting clearly need not include the formal
embellishments of a court trial, an affected individual must at least be pro-

450.

500 U.S. 20, 21 (1991).

451.

See id.at 30-32.

452.
453.
454.

See supra note 369 and cases cited.
See Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 28 Cal. 3d 807, 825-27 (1981).
12 Cal. 3d 541 (1974).

HeinOnline -- 47 UCLA L. Rev. 1042 1999-2000

ConstitutionalGravity

1043

vided with some meaningful opportunity to respond to the 'charges' against
him.'""5 Other courts have also employed the common law doctrine of fair
procedures." 6
C.

The Effect of Waiver: Expansion of Public Civil Justice

Recognition of the constitutional limitations on the waiver of procedural rights has a profound impact on our understanding of the breadth
of our public system of civil justice. That is, the recognition of state action
in some ADR hearings, and the attendant obligation to provide at least
rudimentary levels of due process in such hearings, necessarily expands our
concept of public civil justice to include those dispute resolution mechanisms beyond trial that are subject to the force of constitutional gravity
because of the presence of state action.
This expansion of public justice is similar to the government's own
expansion during the rise of the administrative state. Indeed, the rise of the
administrative state during much of the twentieth century and the rise of the
ADR movement at the end of the century bear several important similarities. Both were born into environments of distrust, particularly by the legal
profession, for similarly stated reasons: concerns about the absence of
process safeguards for participants in their relative processes." 7 In the ADR
context, this distrust was initially reflected in the courts in the adoption of

Id. at 545. Interestingly, in an earlier case involving the same parties, the court said it
455.
had the power to review the decision making of private professional societies because the "associations still wielded monopoly power and affected sufficiently significant economic and professional
concerns so as to clothe the societies with a 'public interest."' Id. at 552 (citing Pinsker v. Pacific
Coast Soc'y of Orthodontists, I Cal. 3d 160 (1969)).
See, e.g., Hatley v. American Quarter Horse Ass'n, 552 F.2d 646, 655-56 (5th Cit.
456.
1977) (refusal to register a member's horse); Marjorie Webster Junior College, Inc. v. Middle
States Ass'n of Colleges & Secondary Schs., Inc., 432 F.2d 650, 655-57 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Dietz v.
American Dental Ass'n, 479 F. Supp. 554, 559 (E.D. Mich. 1979); Blende v. Maricopa County
Med. Soc'y, 393 P.2d 926, 928-29 (Ariz. 1964); Virgin v. American College of Surgeons, 192
N.E.2d 414, 423 (II1. Ct. App. 1963); Kurk v. Medical Soc'y of County of Queens, Inc., 260
N.Y.S.2d 520, 525-26 (Sup. Ct. 1965); Davidson v. Youngstown Hosp. Ass'n, 250 N.E.2d 892,
895 (Ohio Ct. App. 1969). But see Elizabeth Hosp., Inc. v. Richardson, 269 F.2d 167, 168-70
(8th Cit. 1959) (finding no cause of action under Arkansas law for denial of membership).
The ABA's hostility to the rise of administrative law was particularly fierce. In 1938,
457.
the second major ABA committee to study administrative law, this time headed by Harvard Law
School Dean Roscoe Pound, reported "ten tendencies" of administrative agencies that were particular cause for concern, including their powers to decide without a hearing, to hear only one
side, to decide on evidence not produced at the hearing, and to make decisions on the basis of
preformed opinions. Report of the Special Committee on Administrative Law, 63RD ANN. REP. ABA
331, 346-51 (1938). For a brief history of administrative law, see 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note
437, § 1.3-7.
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the ouster doctrine." 8 More recently, it has been reflected in scholarly
debate,45 9 as well as at the grass-roots level.4" In the administrative context,
this distrust was played out at a more political level.46' In both ADR and
administrative law, legislation proved necessary to overcome the threshold
obstacles to institutionalization.462 Skirmishing continues to this day in both
cases, but as a practical matter both have seen a turnaround in legal attitudes
from skepticism to embrace.4"3
Moreover, both ADR and administrative law share a common mission,
that of balancing the tension between bureaucratic management and individual justice in an informal context." In this regard, both operate under
458.
See supra notes 119-124 and accompanying text.
459.
See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
460.
The epic battle over mandatory and binding arbitration in the employment context
has been a particularly intense flashpoint of contention. At one point, a leading organization of
employment-side plaintiffs' lawyers, the National Employment Lawyers Association, threatened to
boycott the two leading providers of alternative dispute resolution services (the AAA and
JAMS/Endispute) if they continued to accept cases arising from mandatory and binding arbitration agreements. See Reuben, supra note 73, at 61-62; Reuben, supra note 169, at 58-59. The
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has formally opposed such practices as
an interference with its statutory mission, on grounds reminiscent of the ouster doctrine. See
EEOC Policy Statement on Mandatory Binding Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Disputes as a Condition of Employment (Policy Statement No. 915.002, July 10, 1997). The
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) took a similar position, contending that mandatory arbitration can constitute an unfair labor practice. Bentley's Luggage Corp., [May-June 1996 & Supp.]
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 96, at A-11 (May 17, 1996) (describing the outcome of Bentley's
Luggage Corp., NLRB, 12-CA-16658 (May 16, 1996)). The National Academy of Arbitrators also
took the rare step of announcing its formal opposition to mandatory and binding arbitration.
National Academy of Arbitrators' Statement and Guidelines, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 103, at E-1
(May 29, 1997).
461.
See 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 437, at § 1.3-7.
462.
The Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (APA) represented a compromise between
competing interests that paved the way for the modern consolidation of administrative law as an
integral part of the American governmental structure that it is today. Administrative Procedure
Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
5 U. S. C. (1994)). The FAA and the UAA had a similar effect for ADR.
463.
Despite ABA objections over the diminished role of the formal judiciary that continued into the 1970s, administrative law saw regular mileposts of institutionalization. The first
comprehensive treatise in the field was published in 1951. See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1951). The APA was amended in 1966 to include a Freedom of Information
Act, § 552 of the APA. The Administrative Conference of the United States, an agency to monitor
agencies, was established in 1968. By the late 1970s, the U.S. Supreme Court began to settle on a
judicial policy of strong deference to administrative actions. See, e.g., Chevron v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844-45 (1984) (finding that the agency's interpretation of
its authority will not be reversed if such interpretation is reasonable); Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 439 U.S. 519, 543-44 (1978) (barring
reviewing courts from adding to the procedures that agencies must use in rulemaking). For a
discussion of ADR's modern embrace, see supra notes 126-138 and accompanying text.
464.
See JERRY L. MASHAW ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW
SYSTEM 269 (3d ed. 1992).
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a theory of delegation of powers," and as a result, a central question for
reviewing courts is whether the decision maker exceeded the scope of his
authority and therefore acted ultra vires.466
There are also parallels in the roles played by the primary governmental actors in both administrative agencies and ADR hearings. To the extent
that agency rulemaking represents a consensual democratic process balancing
competing political interests, it is readily analogous to mediation in general,
467
and to public policy mediation in particular. Administrative adjudication
is similarly analogous to arbitration as a more relaxed adjudicatory process,
although the two differ significantly in that administrative adjudication provides for judicial review while arbitration under the FAA and related state
laws often does not.468 ADR fact-finding and evaluative processes also find
commonality with the broad investigatory powers conferred upon administrative agencies to ferret out information necessary to "make rational use
'
This includes the power to require reports, to
of its substantive powers."469
70
inspect books, records, and premises, to subpoena witnesses and documents,
and to hold hearings.
Finally, ADR and administrative law are also analogous in terms of their
process values, needs, and concerns. Both are intended to bring expertise
and efficiency to decision making in an environment that stresses informality,
substantive expertise, and interest-based participation. Similarly, both ADR
neutrals and administrative agencies need great discretion in the fulfillment
of their respective mandates, but they differ in that administrative agencies
provide for greater accountability to the rules of law and to the public at
large than is seen in ADR. Lastly, both ADR neutrals and administrative
agencies are subject to similar types of mischief-that is, concentrations of
power in repeat players, vague mandates for decision making, institutional
biases, influence by special interests, and relatively low levels of accountability (even within administrative agencies).
465.
466.

See id. at 15.
See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: A CASEBOOK

65 (3d ed. 1991).
467. See generally LAWRENCE

SUSSKIND & JEFFREY CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE IMPASSE:
CONSENSUAL APPROACHES TO RESOLVING PUBLIC DISPUTES (1987); SUSSKIND & FIELD, supra

note 45; Gerald W. Cormick, Strategic Issues in StructuringMulti-Party Public Policy Negotiations, 5
NEGOTIATION J. 125 (1989); Philip J.Harter, The Adolescence of Administrative ADR, 21 ADMIN.
& REG. L. NEWS, Spring 1996, at 2; Peter R. Steenland, Jr. & Peter A. Appel, The Ongoing Role
of Alternative Dispute Resolution in FederalGovernnient Litigation, 27 U. TOL. L. REV. 805 (1996).
See infra Part IV.C.2.d (commenting on written and reasoned opinions).
468.
SCHWARTZ, supranote 466, at 164.
469.
See REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE
470.
PROCEDURE, S. Doc. No. 8, at 414 (1st Sess. 1941).
See 5 U.S.C. § 556.
471.

HeinOnline -- 47 UCLA L. Rev. 1045 1999-2000

1046

47 UCLA LAW REVIEW 949 (2000)

I do not want to make too much of the analogy between ADR and
administrative law, as it does have its imprecisions; after all, the former is a
collection of processes that is undergoing institutionalization, while the other
is a separate substantive structural entity within a larger system of government. However, these similarities between ADR and administrative law, particularly administrative adjudication, are reassuring in that they help provide
a broader context for understanding the current paradoxical state of ADR
seen in Part I, and, equally importantly, suggest a bright and powerful future
for ADR under the unitary theory of public civil dispute resolution described
in Part IV.
IV.
CONSTITUTIONAL GRAVITY: INCORPORATING
CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS INTO SEEMINGLY
PRIVATE ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
The recognition in Part II that there can be state action in courtrelated ADR and contractual arbitration gives rise to an obligation to address
the consequences of that finding.
This is a delicate task for several reasons. To begin with, there has
been substantial reliance on the vast body of law that has developed under
the current bipolar approach to ADR and public civil justice-particularly
the FAA-and the introduction of constitutional standards must respect
both that body of law and the reasonable expectations that it has created.
Similarly, one must also be concerned with the possibility that the application of constitutional standards to ADR could cast a broader, and
potentially nefarious, constitutional shadow on other areas of contract law.
The application of federal due process standards to the ADR mechanisms
used to resolve state law claims also inevitably raises significant issues of
federalism, as it will, in the end, be federal courts that will be called upon to
decide what those standards are in the context of specific cases that will
often arise under state law. Finally, one must also acknowledge the
possibility that the incorporation of due process standards into these ADR
processes, if taken to its extreme, could subvert the very informality that
makes these ADR processes attractive, rather than enhancing those
processes.
Here in Part IV, I propose that these very real challenges can be met
by uniting the strands of our understanding of ADR developed in Part I,
state action in Part II, and the relationship between contractual and
constitutional rights in Part III into a unitary theory of public civil dispute
resolution that acknowledges the place of minimal but meaningful due
process standards in those dispute resolution hearings that are driven by
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472
In particular, a unitary theory of public civil dispute
state action.
resolution joins trial and some of what is now called private ADR into a
single system of interrelated dispute resolution processes, with the intensity
of constitutional force decreasing the further removed the dispute resolution
process becomes from the purview of the government. This constitutional
force, or gravity, is determined by reference to the nature of the ADR process,
in the process, and the coerthe nature of the constitutional values at risk 471
civeness of the role of the state in that process.
So implemented, a unitary approach preserves the virtues of the various
ADR processes while acknowledging their minimal but meaningful constitutional limits when they operate under the aegis of state action. While it does
not eliminate the federalism problem-arguably an impossible task in an integrated system of federalism such as ours474 -the minimal but meaningful
nature of constitutional gravity under a unitary approach at least abates its
impact by narrowing the field of possible issues that can be raised to those
in which state and federal laws, and often the best of industry practices, are
likely to be in substantial accord. Finally, a unitary theory of public civil dispute resolution also has the additional virtues of simplicity and predictability.
I begin Part IV by harmonizing the various dispute resolution processes
into a general unitary theory of dispute resolution, before proceeding to demonstrate how constitutional due process norms may be incorporated into
seemingly private dispute resolution processes, focusing primarily on arbitration and then on mediation, and to a much lesser degree, on advisory
processes, particularly evaluation and fact finding. ,

A.

Constitutional Gravity: The Structure of a Unitary Theory
of Public Civil Justice

The concept of a unitary theory of public civil dispute resolution, built
on a foundation of state action, when it is present, may best be illustrated
through an analogy to the order seen in our own solar system. The power of
the Constitution to protect life, liberty, and property from arbitrary confiscation by the government through the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments, and to advance our democratic system of government, is the gravity that holds together a unitary theory of public justice.
Just as the physical gravity of the sun keeps her planets properly in orbit
The unitary theory is my proposal for organizing and addressing the challenge created by
472.
the recognition of state action in seemingly private ADR. It is, of course, not the only possibility.
See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 259 (1970).
473.
See, e.g., Richard C. Reuben, The New Federalism, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1995, at 76, 77 (refer474.
ring to the notion that American federalism is more like a marble cake than like a layer cake).
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around her, so too this constitutional gravity keeps the different methods of
dispute resolution that are driven by state action from veering off into
directions that can cause constitutional harms. Just as the intensity of the
sun's gravitational pull on her planets diminishes the further away her
planets are removed, so too the Constitution's gravitational pull diminishes
the further the dispute resolution process is removed from the purview of
the government.
With this understanding, it is easy to see that trial, as a dispute resolution method, is subject to by far the greatest constitutional gravity. It is
adjudicatory in nature, and its jury form is expressly provided for in the
nation's founding charter for both civil and criminal cases as a popular
check against the arbitrary wielding of government power by the judiciary.475
Moreover, the entire trial process is linked to the public court, beginning
with the filing of pleadings and responses and running through trial and
appeal.476 Virtually all of this activity takes place in the public courthouse
and is presided over by a judge with plenary power to administer and decide
the case as he or she deems appropriate. This power includes both powers
conferred by positive law-including constitutions, statutes, court and administrative rules, and the common law-as well as the trial judge's inherent
powers, which may be drawn upon on occasion to fill in many gaps.477 Therefore, it is here, at trial, that constitutional values of due process, the rights
to counsel and confrontation, decision making by juries in certain cases,
and other statutory rights-such as those of evidence and procedure-see
their greatest expression.
Moving outward in the solar system of unitary public civil justice,
court-related and contractual arbitration orbit fairly close to trial. They are
adjudicatory in nature and, like trial, are also built on a premise that truth
will emerge from the clash between adversaries. As in trial, the role of the
475.
See U.S. CONST. amend. VI, which provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed

of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the

Assistance of Counsel for his defense.

Id. See also U.S. CONST. amend. VII, providing that:
[iun suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right
of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined

in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.
Id.
476.
See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
477.
See, e.g., Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43-45 (1991) (noting that federal district courts have inherent power to issue sanctions). For a general discussion of the inherent power
doctrine, see id.
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central government actor, the arbitrator, is highly coercive in that he or she
is appointed to render a decision in the case, either by the parties themselves
or by a public court." 8 Because of these significant structural similarities, constitutional gravity applies with considerable force in arbitration, although
not nearly so much as in formal trial itself. The informal nature of the
arbitration process plays a significant role in diminishing the constitutional
gravity, as the constitutional principles that support the various evidentiary,
procedural, and substantive legal rules are muted by the fact that such rules
need not be applied by the arbitrator.
Well beyond arbitration is court-related mediation, a process different
in kind from arbitration and trial in that it is consensual in nature, and in
that the mediator, the state actor in such cases, does not have the coercive
authority to decide cases. Rather, the mediator's challenge is to help the
parties resolve the dispute themselves through a structure and process that
he or she establishes and administers. This structural difference has the effect
of limiting instances in which state action will be found in mediation, as well
as reducing the constitutional gravity exerted upon the mediator, although
not completely eliminating it, when state action is present. Similarly, constitutional gravity on the mediation process itself is also reduced as it is in
arbitration, as formal rules of law need not be the basis for decision making
by the parties.
Beyond mediation lies a faint cluster of techniques that may be considered advisory (evaluation or fact-finding) processes. When such processes
are engaged pursuant to government action, as in court-ordered neutral
evaluation, constitutional force is even more diminished than in mediation
because the role of the government actor in the resolution of the dispute is
even less coercive than the active facilitative role seen in mediation. Rather,
the fact finder collects facts to present to a third party who decides the
disputes or the evaluator merely offers an opinion about the dispute to the
parties (or their representatives), which the parties are free to take or reject.
Similarly, while there may be rules of law that apply to the fact-finding
process, such as notice or privilege, these are collateral to the larger process
that ultimately decides the dispute. For these reasons, constitutional force
is at its weakest in advisory processes.
Finally, outside the purview of government power is the process of
negotiation between and among private parties. Like a nebula seen throughout the solar system of dispute resolution, negotiation has more of a pervasive
Here
presence that is part of and influences all of the other processes.'
478.
479.

See 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1994);

UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT

§§ 5, 8, 7 U.L.A. 99, 116 (1997).

See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 32, at 950-59.

HeinOnline -- 47 UCLA L. Rev. 1049 1999-2000

1050

47 UCLA LAW REVIEW 949 (2000)

there is no constitutional power because there is no government actor
exerting coercive authority, only private parties and their agents talking and
negotiating among themselves, albeit in the shadow of the law.
In sum, constitutional force applies differently in each of these processes
because of their differing natures and needs.
B.

The Essence of Due Process Under a Unitary Theory: Vindication
of Constitutional Values

Having seen in Part II that constitutional force applies to ADR
proceedings that are court-ordered, legislatively or administratively mandated, or in some cases contractual, because of the presence of state action,
the next question for purposes of due process is: What process is due?
Apart from a few key guideposts, the Supreme Court has not spoken
with great clarity on the contours of due process outside of the trial context,
nor has it adopted and adhered to a single approach for making such determinations.48 ° Most of its pronouncements have been in the administrative
context, which differs from ADR in that its procedural requirements are prescribed by statute, including, in particular, the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA).48 ' After a considerable evolution in methodology,482 the Court
has come to rely frequently on a three-part balancing test for determining
what process is due in the administrative context. In particular, Mathews v.

Eldridge483 calls for courts to balance the following factors:

First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's inter-

est, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative

burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would
entail. 484

That said, the Mathews test is not always applied by the Court4 5 and has
been widely criticized by commentators. One criticism is that the test inherently tilts in favor of the government's position because, as an efficiency480.

See MASHAW ET AL., supra note 464, at 273.
481.
See supra Part III.C.
482.
See generally 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 437, at § 1.4-7.
483.
424 U.S. 319 (1976).
484.
Id. at 335.
485.
See, e.g., Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 444-45 (1992) (finding the Mathews
analysis inapplicable to proceedings regarding the mental competency of a criminal defendant).
See generally MASHAW ET AL., supra note 464, at 263 (arguing that the Court continues to vacillate between historical, fundamental fairness (or natural rights), and balancing approaches).
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oriented measurement, it "weighs an inevitable and immediately recognizable administrative cost against a largely prophylactic interest in the use of
specific procedural protections. '4 6 Another criticism is that it is "difficult
to apply, unpredictable in its results .... and based on factors more appropriate for consideration by a legislative body than by a court.'"8 7 Still another
is that its informational requirements are excessive,4"' and, even then, the
test is essentially contentless and easily manipulated by those with a results
orientation.8 9
I agree with those criticisms and further question the amenability of
Mathews to the analysis of contexts other than those involving requests for
more formalized procedures than the government is providing."9

Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of
486.
ProceduralDue Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 473 (1986).
1 DAvIS & PIERCE, supra note 437, at § 2.5. For examples of inconsistent applications
487.
of Mathews, compare Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978), with Ingraham
v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977), and compare Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979), with Vitek v.
Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980), and finally compare Greenholtz v. Inmates, 442 U.S. 1 (1979), with
Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682 (1979). See generally MASHAW ET AL., supra note 464, at 301-02.
488.
See Jerry L. Mashaw, Administrative Due Process as Social-Cost Accounting, 9 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 1423, 1438 (1981).
489.
See generally Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factorsin Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L.
REv. 28 (1976).
Virtually all of the U.S. Supreme Court cases that have employed the Mathews analysis
490.
have arisen pursuant to such requests for greater procedural protections than the government
wanted to provide. See Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924 (1997) (employment suspension); United
States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43 (1993) (forfeiture of real property); Heller
v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (1993) (involuntary commitment procedures); Connecticut v. Doehr,
501 U.S. 1 (1991) (prejudgment attachment of real estate); Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation
Survivors, 473 U.S. 305 (1985) (attorney fees for representation of Veteran's Administration
benefits claimants); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985) (access to a psychiatrist in capital
cases); Illinois v. Batchelder, 463 U.S. 1112 (1983) (suspension of a driver's license for failure to
submit to a breath test); Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982) (deportation proceeding); Little
v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981) (payments for blood-grouping tests for purposes of determining
paternity in a child support action); Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1 (1979) (driver's license suspension for refusal to take a breath-alcohol test); Parham v. JR., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (procedures
for voluntary admittance of minors into a mental hospital); Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v.
Craft, 436 U.S. 1(1978) (termination of utilities for nonpayment); Board of Curators v. Horowitz,
435 U.S. 78 (1978) (state medical school student dismissal); Smith v. Organization of Foster Families
for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977) (removal of foster children from foster homes); Dixon
v. Love, 431 U.S. 105 (1977) (summary suspension of a driver's license for repeated traffic
offenses); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (corporal punishment).
For cases expressly refusing to apply Mathews, see Medina v. California,505 U.S. 437, 443-46
(1992) (finding the Mathews analysis inapplicable to proceedings regarding the mental competency
of a criminal defendant), and Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127-39 (1990) (arguing that Mathews
did not apply in assessing procedures for determining whether an adult suffering from mental
health disorders was competent to give informed consent to voluntary admission into a mental
hospital).
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Consider, for example, the right to an impartial decision maker, arguably the most fundamental of due process rights49"' and one that is covered in
greater detail below. 92 Is it possible that one's claim that a given tribunal
in a government proceeding was biased or partial would be analyzed according to an efficiency-based balancing test? Of course not, and the Supreme
Court has never even attempted as much.493 Similarly, to the extent that it
has utility, Mathews's balancing may aid in assessing the validity of particular
elements within a system of dispute resolution. However, it simply does not
have the capacity to evaluate a dispute resolution system as a whole. Because
of these weaknesses of the Mathews analysis, I join the weight of scholarship
that supports a values-based approach to due process,4" proceeding in the
remainder of this part to assess the constitutional issues in light of the degree
to which they affirm or deny constitutional values, rather than the degree to
which individual requests for greater process may be balanced against the
government's need for efficiency and the additional costs attendant to ensuring the accuracy of decision making.
Again, Mashaw's catalogue of constitutional values that are seen in
procedural due process-equality, predictability, transparency, rationality,
participation, privacy, and intuitiveness495-provide a common ground for
understanding. By equality, Mashaw means that one party's contribution of
facts, legal interpretation, policy arguments, and so forth are not entitled to
"greater respect" by the decision maker than another's.496 Mashaw describes
predictability, transparency, and rationality as "a family of... values" that
protect against party "befuddlement," "alienation, terror, and ultimately, self' Predictability fosters the ability of parties
hatred."497
"to engage in rational
planning about their situation," while transparency and rationality provide
some assurance "that the issues, evidence, and processes were in fact
meaningful to the outcome."4' 9 Participation is an extraordinarily important
491.
475-91.

492.
493.
494.

For a complete explication of the argument, see Redish & Marshall, supra note 486, at

See infra Part IV.C.2.a.1.
See infra Part IV.C.2.a.1.a.i.
See, e.g., Friendly, supra note 23, at 1268; Mashaw, supra note 291, at 898-906; Frank

I. Michelman, Formal and Associational Aims in ProceduralDue Process, in DUE PROCESS: NOMOS
XVIII 126 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1977); Richard B. Saphire, Specifying
Due Process Values: Toward a More Responsive Approach to ProceduralProtection, 127 U. PA. L.
REV. 111, 151-77 (1978); Robert S. Summers, Evaluatingand Improving Legal Processes-A Pleafor
"Process Values," 60 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1974); William Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New Property": Adjudicative Due Process in the Administrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 445, 485-90 (1977);
see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 502 (1st ed. 1978).
495.
See Mashaw, supra note 291, at 899-906.
496.
See id. at 899-900.
497.
Id. at 901.
498.
Id. at 901-02.
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value to both constitutional and ADR systems4 and needs little additional
explanation other than to note Mashaw's emphasis on its potential to
enhance self-respect and human dignity.5s° Privacy, too, is familiar enough
for Mashaw as "at base a demand to be let alone, to be respected as an
autonomous being with legitimate claims to separateness."" ' Finally, Mashaw
considers intuitiveness to be a "residual category" that would include values
like "humaneness," "individualization," and "appropriate symbolism" to the
extent they are not already included within the other previously described
values.502
How these values are given meaning is the challenge in conceiving a
unitary system of dispute resolution, as the nature of the process should determine the degree to which these values are implicated and fulfilled. In the
trial context, of course, constitutional values are maximized and are manifest
in the detailed rules of jurisdiction, procedure, evidence, and substantive
law. It is a system of relatively complete formality, wherein constitutional
force has its greatest strength. 3 In less formal adjudicatory systems, such as
those found in the administrative context, constitutional values are expressed
in less detail. Judge Henry Friendly, in a famous article, lists the minimal
mechanisms through which these due process values may be vindicated in
administrative contexts under the APA: an unbiased tribunal, notice of the
proposed action and the grounds asserted for it, an opportunity to present
reasons why proposed actions should not be taken, the right to call
witnesses, the right to know the evidence against oneself, the right to have
a decision based exclusively on the evidence presented, the right to counsel,
the making of a record, the availability of a statement of reasons for the
decision, public attendance, and judicial review. 5°4
In the ADR setting, largely unfettered by the types of affirmative
procedural requirements seen in the APA-particularly requirements of
499.

See supyra notes 294-323 and accompanying text; infra Part IV.C.2.b.1.

500.

See Mashaw, supra note 291, at 903.

501.
Id. at 905.
502.
See id. at 905-06.
But see GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 111 (1977) ("The worse the
503.
society, the more law there will be. In Hell there will be nothing but law, and due process will be
meticulously observed.").
504.
See Friendly, supra note 23, at 1279-95. It should be noted that Judge Friendly's list
is substantially similar to the basic elements of procedural due process described by the Court

in Goldberg v. Kelly, as summarized by Professor Bernard Schwartz: to receive notice (including an
adequate formulation of the subjects and issues involved in the case), to present evidence (both testimonial, typically under oath, and argument), to rebut adverse evidence (through cross-examination
and other appropriate means), to appear with counsel, to have a decision based only upon evidence
introduced into the record of the hearing, and to have a complete record (consisting of the
transcript of the testimony and arguments, together with the documentary evidence and all other
papers filed in the proceeding). See SCHWARTZ, supra note 466, at 414-15.
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reasoned opinions and judicial review-constitutional due process values
may be expressed as described in the following parts.
C. The Application of a Unitary Theory of Public Civil Justice
1.

Trial

Trial already has been discussed in detail in Part I,505 and little
elaboration is needed here other than to reiterate that constitutional gravity
is at its zenith in the public trial system because the entirety of the process
takes place within the purview of the government. The incorporation of due
process values within this system is too familiar even to require citation. 506
2.

Arbitration

As explained above, arbitration is a dispute resolution process that is
essentially adjudicatory in nature, similar in this respect to trial, except that
the formal rules of law and procedure are not necessarily applied absent the
agreement of the parties, and the awards of the arbitrators are generally
final."' For this reason, the force of constitutional due process, maximized
at trial along with other formal rights of law, may be understood as applying
with slightly less force in the arbitration context because of the unique
process needs of arbitration.
In particular, arbitration calls upon flexibility of worldly judgment,
fortified by substantive expertise, rather than on the arguably more mechanical application of legal standards that is the duty of trial courts." 8 It is for
this reason that rules of evidence and procedure do not apply in arbitration.
Similarly, arbitration calls for a more proactive investigatory role by the
arbitrator as well as the consideration of such factors as industry customs
and practices, party preferences, and, perhaps most important, the greater
use of specialized knowledge and experience in the exercise of decisional
judgment than may be available in trial courts. Finally, in the contractual
context, arbitration calls for the finality of arbitration awards, allowing for
vacatur in only the most limited of circumstances." All of these are benefits
505.
See supra Part I.A.1.
506.
But see supra Part I.A.1.
See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
507.
See United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 37-38 (1987); United
508.
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960).
509.
For an excellent review of the case law of both statutory and nonstatutory grounds for
vacating commercial arbitration awards, see Stephen L. Hayford, Law in Disarray:Judicial Stan-

dards for Vacatur of Commercial ArbitrationAwards, 30 GA. L. REV. 731, 745-800 (1996).
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of the arbitration process that are a part of the process itself rather than the
participants' use of the process,"'0 and which any unitary theory of public civil
dispute resolution must protect.
On the other hand, the very informality that is arbitration's strength
also creates arbitration's greatest potential for mischief. The central concerns
are for the impartiality of the neutral, equality of treatment of the parties,
the ability of the parties to participate in a meaningful way, the potential
for arbitration to exacerbate power imbalances, and the transparency and
rationality of the process itself."' The incorporation of minimal but meaningful constitutional standards can address most of these concerns while
at the same time enhancing the values that are central to the arbitration
function and the larger goals of a public system of civil justice, and while
remaining generally consistent with the best practices and standards of a
given industry. Those minimal but meaningful due process standards include
the assurance of a neutral forum, the meaningful opportunity to present and
confront evidence, and the qualified right to counsel. The failure to
provide a party with any of these critical minimal standards during a courtrelated or FAA arbitration can constitute a due process violation, requiring
the award to be vacated.
a.

The Neutrality of the Forum

The relevant U.S. Supreme Court cases suggest that the promise of
a neutral arbitration forum may be understood according to two essential
dimensions-the impartiality of the arbitrator and the neutrality of the
venue-each of which may give rise to a constitutional violation on a forumbased due process claim.
(1)

The Impartiality of the Arbitrator

As a constitutional matter, one of the bedrock principles of due
process is the right to have one's cause heard by an impartial tribunal," 2
Such efficiency-based claims as higher speed and lower cost of dispute resolution are
510.
often touted as benefits of arbitration. However, these are in large part dependent upon how the
parties use the process, rather than the nature of the process itself. As an adjudicatory process,
arbitration is susceptible to gamesmanship and manipulation that can easily dissipate the efficiency advantages that the process can provide. Put another way, obstreperous counsel can be just
as obstreperous in arbitration as in trial. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 570 (1974);
Engalla v. Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 15 Cal. 4th 951, 960 (1997); Advanced Micro Devices,
Inc. v. Intel Corp., 9 Cal. 4th 362, 363 (1994).
See Mashaw, supra note 291, at 899-906.
511.
512.
See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970).
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especially one without a personal interest in the outcome."' One of the
leading authorities in this regard is Tumey v. Ohio,14 a Prohibition-era case
in which the Court unanimously agreed that Ed Tumey's constitutional
rights to due process were violated when he was convicted of unlawfully
possessing intoxicating liquor after a "Liquor Court" hearing presided over
by the mayor of North College Hill, Ohio. Under the state and local statutes
and ordinances, the mayor was authorized to serve as a judge in matters
involving violations of the Ohio Prohibition Act, known as the Crabbe
Act.515 Part of the fines received for Crabbe Act violations went to pay for
future enforcement efforts and municipal improvements, while another part
went to pay for the mayor's judicial services, as well as the compensation of
other court personnel." 6 As one might expect, the mayor was therefore compensated only when he convicted a defendant-he received about twelve
dollars for an average first-time offender fine of one hundred dollars-but
received no such compensation when a defendant was acquitted. In finding
the statutory scheme unconstitutional, Chief Justice William Howard Taft
noted that "t]here are doubtless mayors who would not allow such a consideration as $12 costs in each case to affect their judgment. . . ." But, he
added, "the requirement of due process of law in judicial procedure is not
satisfied by the argument that men of the highest honor and the greatest
self-sacrifice could carry it on without danger of injustice."' Rather, he said,
[elvery procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the
average man as a judge to forget the burden of proof required to
convict the defendant, or which might lead him not to hold the
balance nice, clear and true between
518 the State and the accused,
denies the latter due process of law.
Taft's opinion critically distinguished between questions of judicial
competence-such as kinship, personal bias, and remoteness of interest
(which are generally matters left to legislative discretion)-and the kind of
bias that would constitute a violation of due process. In this regard, Taft
wrote, while
[a]Ill questions of judicial qualification may not involve constitutional
validity ...it certainly violates the Fourteenth Amendment, and
deprives a defendant in a criminal case of due process of law, to subject
For a fairly concise discussion of the doctrine's history, see Chief Justice William
513.
Howard Taft's opinion in Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 522-531 (1927), and infra notes 700-709
and accompanying text.
273 U.S. 510 (1927).
514.
See id. at 520-21.
515.
See id. at 523.
516.
Id. at 532.
517.
Id.
518.
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his liberty or property to the judgment of a court the judge of which
has a direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest in reaching a
conclusion against him." 9

The Court's reasoning in Tumey has been applied in other criminal cases...
as well as in the administrative context,521 and it should be extended to the
ADR context as well, in hearings conducted under the color of state action.
In the arbitration context, two factors inform the assessment of an arbitrator's impartiality: the background of the neutral and the degree of disclosure of potential conflicts. That is, it may be assumed that there will
be aspects of any given arbitrator's background, broadly defined, that may
give rise to a possible conflict of interest in the eyes of one or more of the
'
parties. Proper and adequate disclosure, however, can cure such a defect."
(a)

The Background of the Arbitrator

This factor speaks to the issue of bias and is complicated by the unique
character of arbitration, or more accurately, arbitrators, especially as compared to public judges. 23
The nature of an arbitrator's background can and should be an important consideration in the selection of an arbitrator. Unlike their judicial
counterparts, who almost invariably come from legal backgrounds, the back24
grounds of arbitrators vary widely and need not be legal at all." This
is particularly salient given that arbitrators, again unlike their judicial counterparts, are both party-appointed and party-paid in contractual arbitration,
and sometimes in court-related arbitrations as well.
This is both a strength and a weakness of the arbitration process. It is
a strength in that it helps to fulfill what may be considered the central
Id. at 523.
519.
See, e.g., Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245, 250-51 (1977) (finding that a justice of the
520.
peace whose responsibilities include the signing of search warrants, who does not receive a salary,
and who is paid per warrant issued and not for warrants denied, has a sufficient pecuniary interest
in the decision to be deemed biased and to invalidate the search warrant); Ward v. Village of

Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 59 (1972) (finding that the mayor of a small town could not serve as a
traffic court judge given that fines collected were a "substantial" part of the city budget).
See, e.g., Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 578-79 (1973) (finding that a state agency
521.
regulating optometry that is composed of independent optometrists is biased in proceedings
against optometrists who work for corporations because they have a pecuniary interest in limiting

entry into the field and in excluding chain stores). For federal administrative law cases, see generally
2 DAVIS & PIERCE, supranote 437, § 9.8 and cases cited therein.
522. See infra Part IV.C.2.a.l.b.
Public judges of course can be accused of bias. For a study suggesting that various
523.

aspects of a judge's background can create a bias rising to the level of a due process violation for
lack of impartiality, see Peter David Blanck, What Empirical Research Tells Us: Studying Judges' and
Juries' Behavior, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 775, 788-99 (1991).
See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
524.
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value of arbitration: the availability of substantive expertise in adjudicatory
decision making."' That is, courts or parties may select an arbitrator because
he or she has a certain background that makes him or her particularly
capable of understanding the parties, issues, and context of the dispute. On
the other hand, it can be a rich source of potential bias, as conflicts of interest
can be both direct and indirect. By "direct" conflicts, I refer to the broad
class of conflicts that are readily familiar, such as prior financial relationships, pecuniary interest in the dispute, and so forth. By "indirect" conflicts, I
am referring to the impact on judgment and decision making of the effects
of such subtle heuristics as cultural and professional biases, which social
psychologists, behavioral economists, and decisional analysts (among other
social scientists) are now coming to understand. 26 Put in more concrete
terms, few would challenge the proposition that the facts of a securities
fraud claim can be framed and interpreted very differently by an arbitrator
who has spent a significant career on the brokerage side of the industry from
how they would by an arbitrator who has spent a career advancing class
actions against brokers and companies.'
Similarly, arbitrators do not share the isolation that accompanies the
judicial role in that they are often still engaged in the practice of their
trades or professions. Although lawyers who move into the judiciary are often
expected to leave their prior professional relationships behind because of the
potential for conflicts of interest, in fact or in appearance, quite the opposite
is true of arbitrators. The reason is largely historical. Before the onset of
the modem entrepreneurial ADR movement, arbitration was generally seen
as a public service by a profession's elder statesmen rather than as a primary
source of professional income.
Therefore, arbitrators have long been
expected to maintain their activity and contacts within their given profession.529 Indeed, this continued engagement can often be an additional
source of authority for an arbitrator. It can, obviously, also create serious
conflicts of interest arising from prior or ongoing arbitrations, representations, business dealings, personal investments, and the many other activities
525.
See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960).
526.
For what isprobably the most comprehensive compilation of research on the psychological,
economic, social, and other dimensions of conflict and negotiation, see BARRIERS TO CONFLICT
RESOLUTION (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds., 1995). See also SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING (1993); Barbara A. Mellers et al., Judgment and Decision
Making, 49 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 447 (1998); Itamar Simonson & Amos Tversky, Choice in Context:
Tradeoff Contrast and Extremeness Aversion, 29 J. MARKETING RES. 281 (1992).
527.
For a contrary argument, however, see Alan Scott Rau, Integrity in PrivateJudging, 38 S.
TEX. L. REV. 485, 514-21 (1997).
528.
See Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 150 (1968)
(White, J., concurring).

529.

See id.
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in the daily life of a modem professional. 30 This is particularly true in the
modem era of conglomerated professions and entrepreneurial ADR, in which
interrelationships are increasingly complex and dispute resolution providers
often compete for business, such as being the named provider in contractual
dispute resolution clauses. "1
i.

Commonwealth Coatings

These tensions with traditional notions of adjudicatory neutrality can
be seen in the Supreme Court's only ruling to date on arbitral bias, Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. ContinentalCasualty Co.,32 in which the Court, in
a plurality opinion, held that arbitrators must be held to the same standards
"
of neutrality and impartiality as Article III judges. '
See School Dist. v. Northwest United Educators, 401 N.W.2d 578, 581 (Wis. 1987)
530.
(involving the discharge of a teacher, and an arbitrator who did not disclose that he had once
been employed by the Wisconsin Education Association Council, which represented the teachers'
union at the hearing); cf. Schmitz v. Zilveti, 20 F.3d 1043, 1048 (9th Cir. 1994) (vacating the
award for "evident partiality" because "an arbitrator may not know facts of which he may have
been suspicious or of which he was on notice which, if true, would create a reasonable impression
of partiality if not investigated and disclosed"); Drinane v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 606
N.E.2d 1181, 1185 (I11.1992) (holding that a "presumption of bias" arose from the arbitrator's
failure to disclose that at the time of the arbitration he was pursuing, as a plaintiffs attorney, a claim
against the same insurance company that was a party to the arbitration, but that the presumption
was "overcome by the sworn statements of the individuals involved in the separate matters" that
the arbitrator had not discussed the arbitration with the insurer or with its attorneys).
See, e.g., MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Matrix Communications Corp., 135 F.3d 27, 32 (1st
531.
Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 953 (1998). In that case, an outside provider of marketing services
for MCI sought to void a trial court decision to compel arbitration, after the discovery of an allegedly
previously concealed contractual relationship between the provider of arbitration services
specified in the MCI-Matrix contract and MCI. Among other things, the contract called for the
provider to provide special administrative and other services to MCI, including quarterly reports
analyzing the provider's settlements and recommendations, specialized training of arbitrators who
would hear MCI cases, and financial incentives to the provider if it asserted jurisdiction over cases
brought to it by MCI. See Memorandum in Support of Motion of Matrix Communication Corporation Under Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 60(b) for Relief from Court's Order of October 10, 1996,
Compelling Arbitration at 14-17, MCI Telecomms. Corp. (Nos. 96-2246, 97-1570). The memorandum
also alleges that MCI has paid more than $200,000 to the provider for dispute resolution services. See id.
393 U.S. 145 (1968). The Court's holding in Commonwealth Coatings was later nar532.
rowed. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 826 n.3 (1986) (declining "to read Tumey
[v. Ohio] as constitutionalizing any rule that a decision rendered by a judge with 'the slightest
pecuniary interest' constitutes a violation of the Due Process Clause" (quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273
U.S. 510, 524 (1927))).
While the arbitration at issue was conducted under the authority of the FAA and the
533.
was a direct construction of that act, surely court-related arbitration would require
opinion
Court's
no less in terms of impartiality for purposes of our inquiry. See Susan Keilitz, Court-Connected
ADR: New Qualifications Guidelines Say Quality Buck Stops at the Court, DISP. RESOL. MAG.,
Spring 1997, at 7. See generally SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONALS IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION, QUALIFYING DISPUTE RESOLUTION PRACTITIONER'S: GUIDELINES FOR COURT-CONNECTED PROGRAMS

(1998).
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The case arose from a contracting dispute in which Commonwealth
Coatings, a subcontractor, sued the sureties on the prime contractor's performance bond for money alleged to be owed for a paint job. 34 The painting
contract included an arbitration clause calling for a tripartite arbitration in
which both Commonwealth Coatings and the sureties would select one
arbitrator, and those two arbitrators would select the third. This arbitrator,
the "neutral" arbitrator, had a large engineering consulting business in Puerto
Rico and worked regularly with the prime contractor who was the target of
Commonwealth Coatings's lawsuit. While they had not done business
together in about a year, they had done substantial business intermittently
over the preceding five years in a relationship that even included work on
the project giving rise to the Commonwealth Coatings lawsuit. This relationship was not disclosed to Commonwealth Coatings or to anyone else
involved in the arbitration until after the arbitration award had been
rendered. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit ruled against
Commonwealth Coatings in its bid to have the award set aside on grounds
of arbitral misconduct. The decision was reversed by a divided Supreme
Court. 3 '
Justice Black wrote the Court's lead opinion and was joined by Chief
Justice Earl Warren and Justices William J.Brennan, and William 0. Douglas
in holding arbitrators to the same standard of impartiality as Article III judges
and rejecting the argument that as "men of affairs," '36 arbitrators should not
be held to the same standards of neutrality as traditional judges. For Black,
the fact that arbitrators are "men of affairs" was all the more reason for higher
standards of neutrality and disclosure:
It is true that arbitrators cannot sever all their ties with the business
world, since they are not expected to get all their income from their

work deciding cases, but we should, if anything, be even more scrupulous
to safeguard the impartiality of arbitrators than judges, since the former
have completely free rein to decide the law as well as the facts and are not
subject to appellate review. We can perceive no way in which the effectiveness of the arbitration process will be hampered by the simple
requirement that arbitrators disclose to the537parties any dealings that
might create an impression of possible bias.

534.
The facts recited hereafter are drawn from the Court's opinion in Commonwealth
Coatings, 393 U.S. 145 (1968). Neither the opinion of the Court nor the First Circuit opinion it
reversed included information on the nature of the arbitration award.

535.

For the lower court's opinion, see Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty

Co., 382 F.2d 1010 (1st Cir. 1967).
536.
Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 150 (White, J., concurring) (gender-specific reference in original).
537.
Id. at 148-19 (emphasis added).
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Black went on to frame the rule of law, with reference to the thenexisting, but not immediately applicable, professional standards for arbitrators
and judges (the AAA disqualification rule and the Thirty-Third Canon of
Judicial Ethics), stating: "This rule of arbitration and this canon of judicial

ethics rest on the premise that any tribunal permitted by law to try cases
and controversies not only must be unbiased but also must avoid even the
'
appearance of bias."538
Justice White, joined by Justice Thurgood Marshall, concurred in the
result but refused to hold arbitrators to judicial standards of neutrality,
because arbitrators are "men of affairs" whose conflicts are inevitable:
It is often because [arbitrators] are men of affairs, not apart from but
of the marketplace, that they are effective in their adjudicatory function. This does not mean the judiciary must overlook outright chicanery in giving effect to their awards; that would be an abdication
of our responsibility. But it does mean that arbitrators are not automatically disqualified by a business relationship with the parties before
them if both parties are informed of the relationship in advance, or if
they are unaware of the facts but the relationship is trivial. I see no
the best informed and most capable
reason automatically 5to
39 disqualify
arbitrators.
potential
White went on to frame his rule of law by stating:
is enough.., to hold... that where the arbitrator has a substan[Ilt
tial interest in a firm which has done more than trivial business with
a party, that fact must be disclosed. If arbitrators err on the side of
disclosure, as they should, it will not be difficult for courts to identify
which are too insubstantial to warrant
those undisclosed relationships
vacating an award.5
ii.

Active, Passive, and Structural Bias

Surprisingly, perhaps, the Supreme Court has not returned to the question of arbitral bias since Commonwealth Coatings. Its lack of substantial reasoning in the case, and of a clear majority opinion, has left the lower federal
and state courts to struggle with the applicable standards of conduct for arbitrators. 41 Many at least seem to bow to Black's lead opinion while at the
same time applying a rule of reasonableness that would appear to be more
538.
539.
540.
541.

Id. at 150 (White, J., concurring).
Id. (White, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
concurring).
Id.at 151-52 (White, J.,

For a criticism of Commonwealth Coatings and a call for reform under California state

law, see Matthew David Disco, Note, The Impression of Possible Bias: What a Neutral Arbitrator

Must Disclose in California,45 HASTINGS L.J. 113, 122-38 (1993).

HeinOnline -- 47 UCLA L. Rev. 1061 1999-2000

1062

47 UCLA LAW REVIEW 949 (2000)

consistent with White's concurring opinion.542 In this regard, a useful distinction is sometimes drawn from the FAA... between active (or "actual") and
passive (or "evident") bias."' Active bias typically refers to the actual bias
of an arbitrator in a particular case, which may be demonstrated by an arbitrator's comments favoring one side during the hearing, for example, and is
frequently joined with claims of arbitral misconduct. 45 Establishing such bias
is both rare and difficult."4 6 Passive bias, on the other hand, arises from past
relationships with one of the parties that can give rise to an appearance of partiality.547 Some scholars have also suggested that structural bias may exist in
an arbitration if the operation of the arbitration agreement or the rules under
which the arbitration is conducted are tilted in favor of one of the parties.54
While active and passive bias plainly raise constitutional issues, it is possible, perhaps even likely, that a court would not reach those issues because
of the availability of a statutory remedy under the FAA that expressly provides
for "evident partiality" of the arbitrator to be a basis for vacating an arbitration award.549 Structural bias, however, raises more serious constitutional
questions.
542.
See, e.g., Apperson v. Fleet Carrier Corp., 879 F.2d 1344, 1358 (6th Cir. 1989) (finding the standard for determining whether an arbitration panel in a labor relations case was biased
is whether a reasonable person would have to conclude the panel was partial to the other party to
the arbitration); Pitta v. Hotel Ass'n of New York City, Inc., 806 F.2d 419, 423 (2d Cir. 1986);
Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n Local Union No. 420 v. Kinney Air Conditioning Co., 756 F.2d
742, 745-46 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that the appearance of impropriety is insufficient, but that
"a reasonable impression of partiality" is required); Morelite Constr. Corp.
v. New York City Dist.
Council Carpenters Benefit Funds, 748 F.2d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 1984) (ruling that evident partiality
"will be found where a reasonable person would have to conclude that an arbitrator
was partial to
one party to the arbitration"); Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673, 681 (7th Cir.
1983) (noting that "circumstances must be powerfully suggestive of bias"); United Farm Workers
v. Arizona Agric. Employment Relations Bd., 696 F.2d 1216, 1224 (9th Cir. 1983); Andros Compania Maritima v. Marc Rich & Co., 579 F.2d 691, 699 (2d Cir. 1978).
543.
9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2) (1994).
544.
See 3 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 134, § 28.1.3; Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat Players,
Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of Statistics in Judicial Review of Employment Arbitration Awards, 29
MCGEORGE L. REV. 223, 244-52 (1998).
545.
See 2 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 134, § 28.2.1.
546.
See id. § 28.1.3.2; see, e.g., Health Servs. Management Corp. v. Hughes, 975 F.2d 1253,
1257 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding an arbitrator's statement at a hearing of his personal views of the
merits of the case to be neither misconduct nor evidence of bias); Sheet Metal Workers Int'l
Ass'n, Local No. 162 v. Jason Mfg., Inc., 900 F.2d 1392, 1398 (9th Cit. 1990) (finding multiple
procedural decisions in one party's favor not evidence of bias); Bell Aerospace Co. v. Local 516,
UAW, 500 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1974) (finding various evidentiary and interim rulings in favor of one
party not evidence of bias); Cook Chocolate Co. v. Salomon Inc., 748 F. Supp. 122, 128-29
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (finding disagreements between one party's counsel and the arbitrators not evidence of bias), affd, 932 F.2d 955 (2d Cir. 1991).
547.
See 2 MAcNEIL ET AL., supra note 134, § 28.2.1.
548.
See Bingham, supra note 544, at 244.
549.
See 9 U.S.C. § 10(b) (1994).
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As noted above, the first issue is that the Supreme Court has made
it clear that a personal stake in a dispute constitutes intolerable bias as a matter of due process."' 0 Similarly, it has also recognized that economic bias,
when established in a particular case, can rise to the level of a due process
violation.55' Both of these principles bear direct relevance to arbitrations
conducted under the FAA and related state statutes. In those cases, the arbitrators receive compensation directly from one or both of the parties, thus
creating a direct financial stake in the immediate dispute that simply is not
found in the traditional trial system."' Such remunerations would seem to be
a glaring contradiction of due process prohibitions against direct party payments to adjudicators that have been a part of the Anglo-American legal
tradition for centuries."'
To be sure, one answer to such concerns is that the arbitrator's compensation is often allocated evenly among the parties, even in court-related
programs, and therefore there is not a financial incentive to rule in favor of
either of the parties, as there was in Tumey. Thus, the argument goes, the
nature of the arbitrator's financial interest in the dispute is4 having the
55
matter to adjudicate, rather than in the outcome of the dispute. It can also
be argued that the arbitrator's broader interest in the perception of profes555
sional integrity will outweigh any pecuniary interests and temptations.
However, these arguments provide little constitutional comfort upon
closer scrutiny. For one, while arbitrators generally may not award attorney
to
fees absent specific contractual authority, they do have the discretion
557
More
award other administrative expenses, including their own fees.
does
often
arbitrator
the
ADR,
significantly, in this era of entrepreneurial
case
the
of
have a subtle but substantial economic interest in the outcome
in that his or her ability to get future cases depends, at least in part, on
party satisfaction. As a result, the arbitrator has an economic incentive or
See supranotes 512-522 and accompanying text.
550.
See Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1979); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564,
551.
578-79 (1973). These contexts are admittedly somewhat removed from the economic concerns
at issue in arbitration and are cited only for the general proposition that economic interests can be
a basis for a finding of unconstitutional bias in adjudicatory decision making.
In the public trial system, the neutrals are compensated by the government, which at least
552.

theoretically is a neutral party as to conflicts between private parties.
See supra Part IV.C.2.a.
553.
See, e.g., Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245, 246 (1977) (involving a justice of the
554.
peace who was paid based on the number of search warrants he issued); Ward v. City of Monroeville,
409 U.S. 57, 59-60 (1972) (involving a town budget met only if the mayor, serving as a traffic
court judge, issued sufficient fines); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 531 (1927) (involving a lower
court judge who was paid only when he convicted criminal defendants).
See Rau, supra note 527, at 514-29.
555.
See WILNER, supra note 48, § 43.01.
556.

557.

See id. § 42.02.
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bias to issue rulings that are favorable to (or that at least do not offend) parties that are large institutional players, such as insurers or financial institutions, and other repeat players that are capable of bringing more cases to the
arbitrator. This can be seen in awards that are compromised ("splitting the
baby")558 or downright skewed in favor of the party capable of generating
repeat business.
iii.

The Repeat Player Problem

This so-called repeat player problem is structural in nature and has
serious implications for the promise of adjudicatory neutrality in arbitration
assured by the Constitution's Due Process Clause. 59 It is of special concern
in contractual arbitration, in which arbitration services are sold on a highly
competitive retail basis,5 and in which a repeat player relationship with an
arbitrator or arbitration service is often established by contract, 61 by informal
business or professional relationships, or sometimes even by statute.562 Such
relationships might not be disclosed, in such cases defeating the constitutional due process goals of impartiality and transparency of process. Repeat
player considerations can also be found in the court-related context, although
with an arguably more subtle cast.563
558. For a criticism of so-called compromise awards, see PAUL R. HAYS, LABOR ARBITRATION: A DISSENTING VIEW 66 (1966). See also Richard C. Reuben, Mandatory ArbitrationClauses
inInsurance Contracts Stir Controversy, 15 RISK MGMT. NEWSL. 1 (1994).
559. See Rau, supra note 527, at 524-25; Reuben, supra note 9, at 637-38; see also Bingham,
supra note 44. In one study, General Accounting Office (GAO) researchers found that one Chicago
Board Options Exchange arbitrator had decided 47 percent of the cases the GAO reviewed, deciding
in favor of the broker-dealer in 71 percent of those cases. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: How REGISTERED REPRESENTATIVES FARE INDISCRIMI.

NATION DISPUTES 2 (1994); see also David E. Robbins, Securities Arbitrationfrom the Arbitrators'
Perspective, 23 REV. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 171, 175 (1990) ("[Olne too often sees the same
faces week after week at certain arbitration forums. With all due respect, arbitration should not be
a supplement to social security."); Margaret A. Jacobs, Woman Claims Arbiters of Bias Are Biased,
Too, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 1994, at B1.
560. The ADR field has become so market driven that JAMS/Endispute, a leading ADR
brokerage firm, recently selected a former executive with SuperCuts (a national retail hairstyling
chain) as its chief executive officer, rather than someone with a dispute resolution background. See
Ex-General Foods Executive to Head Resolution Firm, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Nov. 12, 1998, at C2.
561. See supra note 531.
562. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 28-9-8 (1997) (disputes between alcoholic beverage wholesalers
and suppliers); CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 54452 (West 1999) (agricultural product distribution disputes); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 18-87(i) (West 1998) (state and local government disputes involving prison populations).
563. The repeat player problem can be diminished but certainly not eliminated in the courtrelated situations that provide for free arbitration or for the arbitrator's fees to be paid by the government. Many if not most court-related programs operate on the basis of a roster system, whether
it be a formal roster in larger communities or an informal roster in smaller ones. The concern, of
course, is with the arbitrator's shading decisions in a way that is calculated to ensure that they are
selected for arbitrations again, for personal or political if not financial reasons. Admittedly, the
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A quarter of a century ago, Professor Marc Galanter suggested that
repeat players enjoy significant advantages over nonrepeat, or "one shot"
players, including: the benefit of experience for purposes of changing how
to structure the next transaction, and the ability to develop expertise, take
advantage of economies of scale, pay for access to specialist advocates,
cultivate informal continuing relationships with institutional incumbents,
develop a reputation and credibility with the neutral, engage in long-term
strategies that facilitate risk taking in appropriate cases, influence rules
through lobbying and other uses of resources, play for precedent and favor64
able future rules, and absorb both actual and symbolic defeats.
Conversely, Galanter suggested that "one-shotters" operate at a considerable disadvantage when compared to repeat players, including: having
more at stake in a given dispute, being more interested in immediate rather
than long-term gain, being more risk averse, having less interest in precedents and favorable rules, being unable to form continuing relationships
with courts or institutional representatives, being unable to use experience
to structure similar transactions, and having less reliable access to specialist
advocates.56
While such problems have long been suspected and discussed in the
abstract, 5'6 empirical researchers more recently have begun to document the
repeat player phenomenon statistically in the arbitration context, discovering
evidence of homogeneity in arbitration pools, substantial asymmetries of
information about the arbitrators between the repeat and nonrepeat players
about the arbitrators, and actual disparities in the magnitude of successful
outcomes between repeat and nonrepeat players.
For example, a widely cited 1994 General Accounting Office study
found extreme homogenization among securities arbitrators: Fully 89 percent

of all arbitrators who hear securities-related complaints, ranging from fraud
problem is arguably speculative in that there has been little, if any, empirical work done on this issue
to date.
See Galanter, supra note 44, at 98-103.
564.
See id.
565.
See, e.g., James A. Gross & Patricia A. Greenfield, Arbitral Value Judgments in Health
566.
and Safety Disputes: Management Rights Over Workers' Rights, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 645, 646 (1985);
Francis O'Connell Jr., The Labor Arbitrator: Judge or Legislator, 18 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. ARB. 102,
107-08 (1965); William M. Saxon, A Management Advocate's View in the Discipline and Discharge
Case: Two Devils' Advocates on What Arbitrators Are Doing Wrong, 32 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. ARB. 63
(1980). For a rich debate, compare John R. Phillips, Their Own Brand of IndustrialJustice: Arbitrators'
Excesses in Discharge Cases, 10 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 48 (1984), with Robert Coulson, The
Arbitrator'sRole in Discharge Cases: Another Viewpoint, 10 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 61 (1984). See also
Richard Mittenthal, Self-Interest: Arbitration's "Unmentionable" Consideration?, 49 DISP. RESOL. J.,
Mar. 1994, at 70, 90; Meyer S. Ryder, The Impact of Acceptability on the Arbitrator, PROC. 21ST
ANN. MEETING, NAT'L ACAD. ARB. 94, 95 (1968).
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allegations to sexual harassment, are white males with an average age of
sixty, many of whom spent their professional careers in the brokerage industry." 7 Reports also show the phenomenon of industry dominance in health
care arbitration. 68 One may reasonably suspect that more empirical research
may turn up similar findings in other contexts as well.
Perhaps not surprisingly, empiricists are detecting similarly disturbing
findings regarding the outcome of repeat player arbitrations. Professor Lisa
B. Bingham, for example, has studied the outcomes of nonunion employment cases heard by AAA arbitrators under the AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules, and she found indications of a substantial bias in favor of repeat
players.569 Generally speaking, Bingham found that the odds are 5-to-i
against the employee in a repeat player case, while the odds are 2.4-to-1 in
favor of the employee in other cases.57 She also found that arbitrators award
employees damages less often when the employer is a repeat player; in fact,
employees arbitrating against one-shot employers win more than 70 percent
of the time, while employees arbitrating against repeat player employers
prevail only about 16 percent of the time. Similarly, Bingham found that the
awards for employees are much lower when matched against repeat player
employers-with employees recovering only about 11 percent of what they
demand-than when matched against nonrepeat players, where recoveries
averaged 48 percent. 7'
Far more research is necessary to determine if these findings can be
confirmed and to see if they are replicated in other areas of arbitration.
567.

See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 559, at 2.
568.
See, e.g., S. Gale Dick, Arbitration: An Industry Faces Its Critics, 13 ALTERNATIVES TO
HIGH COST LITIG. 29, 35 (1995) (quoting the director of a nonprofit advocacy group for malpractice plaintiffs to the effect that in malpractice cases "there is a limited book of business for
arbitrators," and that "[i]f you don't work for Kaiser or another big HMO, you often don't work
at all"); Michael A. Hiltzik & David R. Olmos, 'Kaiser Justice' System's Fairness Is Questioned, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 30, 1995, at Al (suggesting that Kaiser "opens 700 arbitration cases a year in California" and that "Kaiser arbitrations can account for as much as half the annual income of an active
arbitrator").
569.
There is no reason to believe that AAA arbitrators are any worse in this regard than
those arbitrators that work through other programs. To the contrary, it would probably be more
accurate to draw an inference that the numbers are likely to be worse at most other brokerages of
arbitration services because the AAA is the oldest and largest of the brokerage services and, in
fact, has become increasingly selective in recent years, partly in response to questions raised about
arbitrator quality. Moreover, many arbitrators are listed on multiple arbitration panels. It should
also be noted, too, that the study analyzed cases before the AAA adopted the Due Process Protocol
for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising out of the Employment Relationship,
which provides for greater procedural protections than the Commercial Arbitration Rules. See generally Bingham, supranote 544.
570.
See Reuben, supra note 73, at 61 (reporting on the study, which included this separate
calculation by the study's author based on the study data).
571.
See Bingham, supra note 544, at 233-34.
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Still more research is needed to determine the reasons for such findings,
although the reasons may well come to approximate the advantages
suggested by Galanter a quarter of a century ago. Less noble, more selfserving motives, such as greed, can easily be hypothesized as well.
Assuming further documentation confirming the existence of a repeat
player phenomenon, the problem raises serious constitutional due process
worries because of its potential to eviscerate the due process guarantee of an
impartial neutral in binding cases."' Bluntly stated, an arbitrator who has
an economic incentive to rule in favor of one party or against the other
cannot be called "neutral" in a constitutional sense.
(b)

The Degree of Disclosure

Disclosure is typically the cure for conflicts-related problems, the theory
73
being one of waiver or informed consent to the bias or conflict of interests.
In the traditional public sphere, judges are subject to statutory rules regarding
74
disclosure of prior relationships, as well as to professional ethical standards.
In arbitration, disclosure is required in the commercial and securities
arbitration contexts by the FAA575 and is called for in the collective
bargaining context under the Code of Ethics and Procedural Standards for
Arbitrators of Labor-Management Disputes.576 The nature and scope of disclosure is, for the most part, however, left to professional standards. The
most significant of these are the Code of Ethics for Commercial Disputes,
7
which has been adopted by the AAA and the American Bar Association,
and the National Arbitration Association Code of Ethics and Interpretations
for Arbitrators of Labor-Management Disputes, which has been adopted by
the National Academy of Arbitrators (NAA), the AAA, and the Federal
Mediation and Conciliation Service. 78
572.
573.
574.

See supra notes 512-522 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct 1.7 (1989); infra notes 574, 576-578.
See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E (1998). See generally ViVI DILWEG

ET AL., MODERN JUDICIAL ETHICS (1990) (basing suggestions on the MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL

CONDUCT).
See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2) (1994); Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Cas.
575.
Co., 393 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
See NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS ET AL., CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPON576.

SIBILITY FOR ARBITRATORS OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT DISPUTES § 2B(5) (1985) ("The burden of

disclosure rests on the arbitrator.").
577.

See CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES Canon 2 (1977)

("An Arbitrator Should Disclose Any Interest or Relationship Likely to Affect Impartiality or Which
Might Create an Appearance of Partiality or Bias.").
The code states:
578.
Before accepting an appointment, an arbitrator must disclose directly or through the administrative agency involved, any current or past managerial, representational, or consultative relationship with any company or union involved in a proceeding in which he or she
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While these standards are arguably strong, they are also more prescriptive than descriptive, perhaps necessarily, and individual disclosure practices
of arbitrators vary in terms of scope, specificity, and proximity, among other
dimensions. This is a problem that is perhaps uniquely exacerbated by the
entrepreneurial nature of modem ADR. Case load is largely a passive function for public judges and administrative hearing officers, who have cases
assigned to them. As noted above, in the premodern era of ADR, arbitration
was perceived to be a source of professional duty, not a source of professional income. Just the opposite is true in the modern era, in which
arbitrators frequently abandon their professional practices in order to become
full-time arbitrators and, in the contractual context, often are able to charge
hourly rates per party that exceed their potential hourly rates within their
professions. In law, this migration is seen both from the bench579 and from
the bar."s Moreover, case generation is an active process, in which the market for private dispute resolution services is intensely competitive, and marketing efforts can be equally fierce.58'
Like questions of bias in other contexts, the duty to disclose in arbitration should depend upon the unique facts and circumstances of individual
cases."' The degree to which an arbitrator has made and communicated
such disclosures, and the texture of those disclosures, necessarily bear on the
question of whether there was, in fact, adequate consent to, or waiver of,
the alleged bias or conflict of interest that is in issue. While compliance with
professional standards is a consideration in this analysis, it cannot be seen
as dispositive, as particular facts and circumstances may justify more or less
disclosure than is called for by professional standards. In this regard, the
sophistication and relationship of the parties may also bear relevance to the
is being considered for appointment or has been tentatively designated to serve.
Disclosure must also be made of any pertinent pecuniary interest.
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS, supra note 576, § 2B(1).
579.
Some of the more prominent judges who have retired from judicial service to become
arbitrators or mediators include Abner J.Mikva of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit,
Arlin M. Adams of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, and Malcolm Lucas of the
California Supreme Court. See generally Margaret Jacobs, RentingJustice: Reired Judges Seize Rising
Role in Settling Disputes in California, WALL ST. J., July 26, 1996, at Al; Benjamin Howell & Jenna
Steel, Going Private, 20 CAL. LAW. (forthcoming May 2000).
580.
An excellent example, but certainly not the only illustration, is Richard M. Chernick
of Los Angeles. A prominent commercial litigator with Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, one of the
nation's most elite large law firms, Chernick rose to become president of the Los Angeles County
Bar Association before resigning his partnership and abandoning his law practice to become a fulltime arbitrator and mediator. See Richard Chernick, Richard Chernick, in ADR PERSONALITIES
AND PRACTICE TIPS 43 (James J. Alfini & Eric R. Galton eds., 1998).
581.
See, e.g., Anthony M. Aarons, PackagingADR: The Industry Is Still Searching for a Way
to Make Money, CAL. LAW., Feb. 1998, at 26 (detailing competition in the ADR industry).
582.
See supra note 551 and accompanying text.
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nature of disclosure that may be appropriate in a given case. A final consideration here is the quality of the disclosure. For example, it may not be
enough to disclose merely that an arbitrator has arbitrated many cases before
a party without also disclosing the character of the outcomes, if those outcomes might reasonably call into question the impartiality of the arbitrator.
The failure of an arbitrator to disclose potentially biasing economic
relationships or prior experiences could also leave the award open to later
attack on constitutional grounds for reason of defective waiver.58 For example, if there is an arbitration between two commercial entities, and the losing
party subsequently learns that the arbitrator has a contractual arrangement
with the prevailing party for future arbitration services that was not disclosed,
in my view, the losing party may reasonably go to court to set aside the arbitration award on the constitutional ground that there was not a knowing and
voluntary waiver of the right to an impartial tribunal because the most critical information had been withheld.5
Without question, this possibility opens the door for collateral challenges to arbitration awards, based on post hoc discovery of future relationships between arbitrators and parties, and therefore threatens to intrude on the
finality of arbitration awards. But the calamity of this concern is more red
herring than red flag. If the future relationship or potential relationship is
properly disclosed, the claim will always fail-and indeed, it may even be
sanctionable under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure585 and
related state law provisions for frivolous or bad faith litigation. The waiver
of the bias or conflict would have been knowing and voluntary because of
the disclosure. On the other hand, if a party's post hoc inquiry or discovery
reveals a bias in the form of a present or future professional relationship
establishing a conflict, and it is proven in a court of law, then the vacatur of
the arbitration award is justified because the waiver of the conflict of interest
The concept of defective waiver is seen in other relevant contexts. For example, waivers
583.
of the right to bring age discrimination claims have been found to render the release void or voidable. See, e.g., Raczak v. Ameritech Corp., 103 F.3d 1257, 1270-71 (6th Cit. 1997) (finding releases
of liability that fail to conform to the OWBPA are void and cannot be enforced), cert. denied, 522
U.S. 1108 (1998); Blistein v. St. John's College, 74 F.3d 1459, 1465-66 (4th Cit. 1996) (holding
that defective waivers are voidable and subject to ratification by an employee's retention of severance benefits); Oberg v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 11 F.3d 679, 683 (7th Cit. 1993) (finding that
releases of liability that fail to conform to the OWBPA are void and cannot be enforced); Wamsley

v. Champlin Ref. & Chems., Inc., 11 F.3d 534 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that defective waivers are
voidable and subject to ratification by an employee's retention of severance benefits).
Similarly, a defective waiver of counsel can require reversal if the defect goes to the knowingness and intelligence of the waiver. See, e.g., State v. Christensen, 698 P.2d 1069, 1072-74 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1985).
For a concrete example, see supra note 531.
584.
FED. R. CiV. P. 11.
585.

HeinOnline -- 47 UCLA L. Rev. 1069 1999-2000

1070

47 UCLA LAW REVIEW 949 (2000)

was defective, if not fraudulently induced, and vacatur would be necessary
to vindicate the constitutional promise of arbitral impartiality.

(2)

The Neutrality of the Venue

Forum neutrality may also be assessed according to the neutrality of the
venue for purposes of due process. Here the inquiry focuses on the equality
of the remedy.
The dramatic reversal in judicial attitudes toward arbitration, as represented by the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in the field, has already been
discussed and need not be repeated here.586 One of the assumptions that has
given the Court comfort as it has taken this relatively extraordinary step is its
presumption that arbitration represents only a change in forum, not a change
in the substantive rights of the parties. Thus, in Gilmer, the Court upheld
the mandatory arbitration of ADEA claims in the securities industry, insisting that "[bly agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo
the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolu'
tion in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum."587
The assumption behind the change-of-forum doctrine is highly debatable, and I leave its more exhaustive deconstruction to others."' The very
suggestion, however, that a forum that guarantees such procedural safeguards
as the right to the application of public law, the right to a neutral tribunal,
and the rights to present evidence and receive appellate review is the functional equivalent of a procedure that permits but does not assure any such
safeguards seems astonishing on its face.589 Indeed, while many courts have
followed Gilmer,59 several others have given indications of either backing
away from the assumption"' or holding Gilmer to its logical consequences.
586.
For a concise discussion, see Reuben, supra note 9, at 598-608; see also William M.
Howard, The Evolution of Contractually Mandated Arbitration,ARB. J.,
Sept. 1993, at 27, 27-28.
587.
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (quoting Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
588.
See, e.g., Carrington & Haagen, supra note 42, at 333-39.
589.
Carrington and Haagen call this "simply false doctrine," stating that "[wihatever its
strength as a means of resolving disputes, traditional arbitration is inferior to adjudication as a
method of enforcing the law, as Congress and the state legislatures have consistently understood."
Id. at 349 (footnote omitted); see also Alleyne, supra note 131, at 384-85.
590.
See Samuel Estreicher, Predispute Agreements to Arbitrate Statutory Employment Claims,
72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1344, 1345 n.5 (1997) (suggesting that the D.C., Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth,
Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have supported Gilmer one way or another).
591.
See Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1195-97 (9th Cit. 1998)
(holding that statutory employment claims cannot be subject to mandatory arbitration because legislative history revealed an intent to preserve the right to a jury trial in statutory cases); see also
Paladino v. Avnet Computer Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 1054, 1060 (11th Cit. 1998) (holding that
arbitration of Title VII claim could not be compelled because the agreement at issue contained
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Most notably, in Cole v. Burns InternationalSecurity Services,592 the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the change-offorum doctrine compels an understanding that contractually compelled arbitration requires substantive review for arbitrator errors that are in "manifest
disregard" of the law, just as in courts;... otherwise, mandatory arbitration provisions in contracts between parties of unequal bargaining power would have
to be stricken as unconscionable and therefore unenforceable because of the
disparity of bargaining power between the parties. Remarkably, the court
also extended this reasoning to hold that mandatory employment arbitration
plaintiffs cannot be forced to pay arbitration fees when vindicating statutory
and other rights because they would not be charged such fees in a public
court.5 94

While the change-in-forum doctrine calls for the equal availability of
remedies, contractual arbitration provisions all too frequently impose limits
on remedies that are not found in the judicial forum. For example, Hooters
of America, Inc., a popular restaurant-and-nightspot chain, in 1994 initiated
a mandatory and binding arbitration policy, the assent of which was required
of all employees as a condition of their continued or prospective employment. It provided, inter alia, that: (1) Employees must submit to arbitration
before a panel selected exclusively by Hooters; (2) employees were not eligible for punitive damages; (3) employees were not eligible for compensatory
damages; (4) employees were not eligible to seek changes in discriminatory
practices; (5) employees were required to pay Hooters' attorney fees; (6)
employees were barred from seeking remedies before the appropriate state
and federal agencies; (7) employees were subject to restricted discovery;
language that was "fundamentally at odds with the purposes of Title VII because it completely
proscribes an arbitral award of Title VII damages"); Graham Oil Co. v. Arco Prods. Co., 43 F.3d
1244, 1247-48 (9th Cit. 1995) (finding that the arbitration clause in a franchise distribution
agreement violated the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act "by compelling franchisee to surrender
important statutorily mandated rights under the act, such as exemplary damages, attorney's fees,
and a one-year statute of limitations"); Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
995 F. Supp. 190, 212 (D. Mass. 1998) (finding that brokers' "structural dominance of the NYSE
arbitration makes it an inadequate forum for the vindication of civil rights claims"), affd, 170 F.3d
1 (1st Cir. 1999); Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 39 F. Supp. 2d 582, 621-23 (D.S.C. 1998)
(refusing to compel arbitration of a Title VII claim because of inadequacy of the forum), affd, 173
F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999).
592.
105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997); see also Shankle v. B-G Maintenance Management
Inc., 163 F.3d 1230, 1234-35 (10th Cir. 1999) (finding that an arbitration agreement requiring
the employee-plaintiff to pay one half of the arbitrator's fees, which the plaintiff was unable to do,
did not provide the employee with a forum in which statutory rights can be effectively vindicated,
as well as following Cole).
593.
Cole, 105 F.3d at 1486 (quoting First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938,
942 (1995)).
594.
See id. at 1479-85.
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(8) employees' witnesses were required to be sequestered while Hooters' witnesses were not; (9) only Hooters would have the opportunity to make a transcript of the proceeding; (10) the employees' remedy would be limited to the
lesser of what Hooters or the law provides; (11) Hooters could change the
rules at any time.' 9'
In Hooters of America Inc. v. Phillips, a sexual harassment class action
brought by waitresses of the chain, often called "Hooter girls," the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina refused to enforce the clause,
finding that the arbitral forum it created was inadequate to protect the
statutory rights conferred by Title VII, a decision affirmed by the Fourth
Circuit.596 While the enormity and comprehensiveness of the imbalance
reflected in this particular provision is extreme, its various component parts
are certainly not unique-particularly with regard to its limitations on discovery17 and punitive damages59S-and the case provides a good flavor of the
potential for abuse that is available in contractual arbitration to render an
arbitration conducted even by an unquestionably impartial neutral, in a neutral location, structurally biased against one of the parties in a way that would
deprive that party of their due process right to a neutral forum. 99
Contractual arbitration provisions like the clause involved in the Hooters
case, and the proposed limits on punitive damages in securities arbitration,
suggest that the Supreme Court's reconsideration of this change-of-forum
assumption may be inevitable. Until then, however, the equality of the
remedies presumed by the assumption should be considered an element of
due process,' the violation of which may be used to challenge the validity
of a particular provision or to vacate an arbitration award entered under it.

595.
See Hooters, 39 F. Supp. 2d at 590 n.4; see also Hooters, 173 F.3d at 936, 938-39.
596.
See Hooters, 173 F.3d at 935.
597.
See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31 (1991) (refusing to
void an arbitration agreement that allowed for more limited discovery than would be allowed in
federal court); Arnold v. Arnold Corp., 920 F.2d 1269, 1278-79 (6th Cir. 1990) (finding the mere
allegation that discovery will be inadequate insufficient to void the agreement, given that arbitrators
have authority to subpoena witnesses and documents). See generally Richard A. Bales, Compulsory

Arbitration of Employment Claims: A Practical Guide to Designing and Implementing Enforceable
Agreements, 47 BAYLoR L. REv. 591, 608-09 (1995) (discussing employees' critical need for discovery
in suits against employers).
See, e.g., Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 58 (1995) (find598.
ing that parties to an arbitration agreement may choose, if they wish, to provide arbitrators with
power to award punitive damages); DeGaetano v. Smith Barney, Inc., No. 95 CiV.1613 (DLC),
1996 WL 44226, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 1996) (upholding an arbitration agreement of Title VII sex
discrimination claims even though it barred punitive damages, attorney fees, and injunctive relief).
599.
Even then, the waitresses at Hooters were fortunate to have found a court that was
receptive to their challenge to the clause, as others may not have been willing to be so charitable.

600.

See Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1482 (D.C. Cit. 1997).
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A Meaningful Opportunity to Present and Confront Evidence
An Opportunity to Present One's Case

In the full-blown adjudication that is a public trial, the presentation of
evidence is strictly ordered to further the general goals of accuracy, truth
seeking, and fairness."I Thus, there are sophisticated rules regarding burdens
of proof, relevance, the foundation for certain types of evidence (e.g., scientific
evidence), the use of hearsay and character evidence, cross-examination, and
even the form in which questions must be asked. 2 Indeed, with motion
practice, sidebars, and so forth, the technical wrangling over evidence can
constitute a significant portion of the actual time spent in trial. Similarly,
trial court rulings on such evidentiary matters also constitute a significant
portion of the time spent by appellate courts reviewing the veracity of trial
court decisions.
All of these steps are taken to maximize constitutional due process rights
in a public trial, in which constitutional force has its greatest gravitational
pull in our unitary solar system model. As an informal process, however, arbitration would be subject to less constitutional force under a unitary theory of
public civil dispute resolution, an application that is fundamentally consistent
with general arbitration practices. 6° ' While arbitrators may apply formal legal
rules and sometimes do,' they are not bound to apply the traditional statutory and common law rules of evidence unless the delegation of authority
to them by the government (in court-related arbitration) or the parties (in
contractual arbitration) specifically includes this limitation on their arbitral
discretion. 5 The guiding principle is to permit the parties to present whatever
evidence they would like to present,' including hearsay evidence, 7 which
The
will then be considered by the arbitrator "for what it is worth."'

601.

See supra Part I.A.1.

602.
603.

See id.

See ARNOLD M. ZACK & RICHARD I. BLOCH, LABOR AGREEMENT IN NEGOTIATION
AND ARBITRATION 13 (1983).
See, e.g., Ambassador Convalescent Ctr., Inc., 83 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 44 (1984)
604.
(Lipson, Arb.) (looking to federal law regarding the admissibility of hearsay testimony).
605. See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 49, at 296-98.
606. See id. at 300-02. This is also true as a matter of professional ethics. See NATIONAL
ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS ET AL., supra note 576, § 5A ("An arbitrator must provide a fair and
adequate hearing which assures that both parties have sufficient opportunity to present their respective evidence and argument.").
See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supranote 49, at 325-27.
607.
Id. at 725.
608.
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arbitrator's discretion on evidentiary matters is normally not a basis for substantive judicial review. 6"9
The relative burdens of proof, strictly regimented in the trial system,
also reflect the more relaxed approach of arbitration. While particular formulations may vary,"' the general rule seems to be that the moving party must
satisfy the burden of going forward-a minimal obligation-shifting to the
party against whom the evidence is offered the subsequent burden of producing evidence in rebuttal.61' This is similar in kind to the burden of production
in the trial context612 and is essentially consistent with the preponderance standard in administrative adjudications." However, because the ultimate burden in arbitration is wholly one of persuasion, as distinguished from
the establishment of entitlement under law, the burden of proof in arbitration may be more substantive in fact than it is in theory.
Discretion over evidentiary matters is an important part of the arbitration process. Little therefore would seem to be implicated by way of due
process concerns as a categorical matter. The context of particular cases
can, however, reveal the outer boundaries of arbitral discretion. The Supreme
Court has repeatedly recognized that "an elementary and fundamental
requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality
609.
See United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 40 (1987) (holding that
an arbitrator's refusal to consider evidence, even if erroneous, cannot be a basis for reversal unless
it was made in "bad faith or so gross as to amount to affirmative misconduct"). To demonstrate the
relationship between labor and nonlabor arbitration, it is worth noting that the court borrowed
this standard of review from the FAA, noting that it was not applicable but that its standards were
nonetheless useful. See id.
See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 49, at 324.
610.
See id. at 324-25. For an argument that the burden of proof does not exist, see
611.
Benjamin Aaron, Some ProceduralProblems in Arbitration, 10 VAND. L. REV. 733, 742 (1957) ("To
insist that the complaining party carries the burden of proof ...is manifestly absurd. Neither side
has a burden of proof or disproof, but both have an obligation to cooperate in an effort to give the
arbitrator as much guidance as possible.").
See MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 11(b) (1942) (stating that in a "Preliminary
612.
Hearing by [a] Judge," "subject to Rule 704 (rule governing effect of presumptions), the proponent
of the witness or evidence or the claimant of the privilege has both the burden of producing evidence and the burden of persuasion of the fulfillment of the condition").
See 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1994); Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 101-02 (1981) (holding
613.
that violations of securities laws must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence rather than
by clear and convincing evidence); Sea Island Broad. Corp. v. FCC, 627 F.2d 240, 243 (D.C. Cit.
1980) (finding that the "preponderance of evidence" standard is the traditional standard in civil
administrative proceedings and is the one contemplated by the APA).
614.
Under a Mathews analysis, the individual's right to greater process protections would be
outweighed by the government's interest in efficiency, and there is a low likelihood that additional procedures would increase the accuracy of the process-especially in light of the fact that
accuracy under law is not a goal of arbitration, and in light of professional and practice standards
favoring the admission of evidence rather than its exclusion, "for what it is worth." ZACK & BLOCH,
supra note 603, at 14.
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is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprize interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to
present their objections."" 5 Significantly, this fundamental principle of notice
and the opportunity to be heard has been repeatedly construed to include
"meaningful" participation in the hearing rather than mere technical compliance with formalities.616 A systematic failure of an arbitrator to hear
evidence from one party, while receiving it from another, could deny the
aggrieved party the opportunity to participate in the hearing in a meaningful way and could therefore violate due process in a manner sufficient to
justify vacating the award as a constitutional matter, just as it would call for
vacatur under the FAA.6" 7 Because vacatur of an arbitration award is so rare
on evidentiary grounds, the constitutional claim may prove more effective,
although proof problems can be significant, particularly in cases in which
the parties elected not to establish a formal record. The question of what
constitutes a systematic refusal to consider evidence is a question of fundamental fairness that can be answered only on a case-by-case basis.

Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (emphasis
615.
added); see also Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965) (finding that the failure of a
mother and her successor husband to notify the divorced father of the pendency of proceedings to
adopt their daughter deprived the father of due process of law so as to render the adoption decree
constitutionally invalid).
See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 235 (1990); Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 66
616.
(1979); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 541 (1971);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970); Armstrong, 380 U.S. at 552 ("A fundamental
requirement of due process is 'the opportunity to be heard.' It is an opportunity which must be
granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." (citation omitted)); Mullane, 339 U.S.
at 314.
See, e.g., Glennon v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 83 F.3d 132, 138-39 (6th Cit. 1996)
617.
(arguing that the manifest disregard standard for reviewing FAA claims would allow for vacatur
of punitive damages if no evidence supported the arbitration panel's award); Hoteles Condado
Beach, La Concha & Convention Ctr. v. Union De Tronquistas Local 901, 763 F.2d 34, 40 (1st
Cir. 1985) (finding that vacatur is appropriate under 9 U.S.C. § 10(c) (1982) when the exclusion
of relevant evidence so affects the rights of a party that it may be said that the party was deprived
of a fair hearing); Reichman v. Creative Real Estate Consultants, Inc., 476 F. Supp. 1276, 1285
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) ("In handling evidence an arbitrator need not follow all the niceties observed by
the federal courts. He need only grant the parties a fundamentally fair hearing."); Trident Tech.
College v. Lucas & Stubbs, Ltd., 333 S.E.2d 781, 788 (S.C. 1985) (arguing that the "touchstone
in considering claims of arbitrator misconduct is fairness"). But see Flexible Mfg. Sys. Party Ltd. v.
Super Prods. Corp., 86 F.3d 96, 100 (7th Cit. 1996) (finding that insufficiency of evidence is not
a ground for setting aside an arbitration award under FAA (citing Gingiss Int'l, Inc. v. Bormet, 58
F.3d 328, 333 (7th Cir. 1995))); Bell Aerospace Co. v. Local 516, Int'l Union United Auto.,
Aerospace and Agric. Implement Workers (UAW), 500 F.2d 921, 923 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding
that an arbitrator's consistent conclusions and reliance on evidence favorable to one of two unions
involved in a jurisdictional dispute did not establish evident partiality, in the absence of a showing that the arbitrator was biased or prejudiced, that he was predisposed to favor either party, or
that he acted out of any improper motives).
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An Opportunity to Confront Adverse Evidence

Corollary to the right to present evidence in arbitration is the right to
confront adverse evidence. The right to confront adverse witnesses issecured
in criminal cases by the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution,6"' and,
while it has been strongly protected in that context, it has not been viewed
as absolute." 9 Rather, the Supreme Court has looked at the totality of the
circumstances, noting that the clause's central purpose-to ensure the reliability of the evidence against a defendant by subjecting it to rigorous testing
in an adversarial proceeding before the trier of fact-is served by the combined effects of the elements of confrontation: physical presence, oath,
cross-examination, and observation of demeanor by the trier of fact.62
Similarly, in the civil context, despite language in Goldberg stating
that the failure to provide for confrontation or cross-examination would be
"fatal to the constitutional adequacy"62' of a given procedure, the Court has
taken a more flexible approach to what in the end is ultimately a right
of response. The Court has not extended the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation and related rights to the civil context, viewing the ability to counter adverse evidence during the course of an adversarial hearing as a matter
of due process instead.622 Even then, the Court has refused to find that
due process necessarily compels an opportunity for confrontation or crossexamination in a variety of contexts, looking instead to the nature of the
process to determine what is required to satisfy what is ultimately a right of
response. 623
618.
619.

See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 855 (1990) (holding that the Confrontation

Clause did not categorically prohibit a child witness in a child abuse case from testifying against the
defendant at trial, outside the defendant's physical presence, by one-way closed circuit television).

But see Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1019-20 (1988) (finding that the placement of a screen between

the defendant and child sexual assault victims during testimony against the defendant violated the
defendant's Confrontation Clause rights).

620.
621.
622.

See Craig,497 U.S. at 845-46.
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268 (1970).
See, e.g., Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc., 481 U.S. 252, 266 (1987) ("[Als a general

rule the employer's interest is adequately protected without the right of confrontation and cross-

examination, again so long as the employer is otherwise provided an opportunity to respond 'at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."' (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552
(1965))). Still, "minimum due process for the employer in this context requires notice of the
employee's allegations, notice of the substance of the relevant supporting evidence, an opportunity to
submit a written response, and an opportunity to meet with the investigator and present state-

ments from rebuttal witnesses." Id. at 264.
623.
See, e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980) (transfer of prisoners to mental institutions); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (commitment of children to mental institutions); Goss

v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (short-term suspensions from school); Wolff v. McDonell, 418 U.S.
539 (1974) (prison proceedings).
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In this regard, Goss v. Lopez'24 suggests a particularly useful example
of the flexibility of due process for purposes of the incorporation of a constitutional right of response into seemingly private arbitrations when appropriate. The case involved a challenge to an informal suspension procedure
in an Ohio public high school that permitted students to be suspended unilaterally, while reserving a right of appeal to the county board of education.
The Supreme Court affirmed a lower court's finding that the procedure
violated due process because it did not provide the students with a presuspension hearing at which they could tell their side of the story. Said the
Court:
Students facing temporary suspension have interests qualifying for pro-

tection of the Due Process Clause, and due process requires, in connec-

tion with a suspension of 10 days or less, that the student be given
oral or written notice of the charges against him and, if he denies
them, an explanation of the evidence the authorities have and an
opportunity to present his side of the story."'

Taking notice of the fact that such suspensions are common in public
schools, and that imposing additional due process requirements on them
could constitute a severe administrative and fiscal burden on school officials
and local governments under Mathews, the Court continued: "We stop short
of construing the Due Process Clause to require, countrywide, that hearings
in connection with short suspensions must afford the student the opportunity
to secure counsel, to confront and cross-examine witnesses supporting the
626
charges, or to call his own witnesses to verify his version of the incident.
In the language of a unitary theory of dispute resolution, the Court recognized that the short suspension procedure is an informal process, and that
the expectations of due process were simply less than they are in a more
formalized informal process, thus mitigating the need for the types of due process protections that would be available in such processes, such as crossexamination and confrontation rights in administrative adjudications. But
even here, due process requires that a party be provided a right to respond to
present her side of the story.
expectations is
Such a flexible approach for purposes of constitutional 627
Arbitrators
arbitration.
of
practices
and
also consistent with the traditions
419 U.S. 565 (1975). For an argument that the Court should eschew the intermittent
624.
balancing approach in favor of the Goss analysis, see 2 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 437, § 9.7.

625.
626.

Goss, 419 U.S. at 581-82.
Id.at 583.

For a case recognizing the possibility of a confrontation right in contractual arbitrations
627.
under the FAA but rejecting the claim on factual grounds, see Dexter v. PrudentialInsurance Co. of

America, No. CIV.A.96-2192 KHV, 1999 WL 156170, at *2 (D.Kan. Mar. 17, 1999).
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generally uphold the rights of confrontation and cross-examination, but not
as strongly as courts of law.628 Some arbitrators handle the problem preemptively, by refusing to accept evidence that is conditioned on nondisclosure to
the other party or that is not otherwise available to be subjected to the rigors
of scrutiny by an adverse party.629 Others choose to admit the evidence but
give it less weight. 630
Either approach would appear to be constitutionally sufficient on its face
under a unitary theory. As noted above, an arbitrator has-and needssubstantial discretion in the admission of evidence, and this is a value
of arbitration that should be protected. Once an arbitrator admits adverse
evidence, however, minimal but meaningful notions of due process in an
adjudicatory procedure like arbitration would require the arbitrator to permit
the affected party the opportunity to respond to that evidence in a meaningful way. 63' An arbitrator's failure to permit such a response can give rise
to a due process violation, albeit one that again may be difficult to prove,
particularly in the potential absence of a transcript or a written and reasoned
opinion accompanying the arbitration award.632 Materiality, however, is
also an important concept in this regard, for certainly an arbitrator's refusal
to permit a response on minor issues obviously cannot be the basis for vacating the award on the basis of a due process violation. Rather, it would need
to be established that the refused rebuttal was material to the arbitrator's
decision-making process and that it is reasonably possible that the arbitrator
would have reached a different conclusion if the evidence had been
permitted.6 3

628.
See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 49, at 316; COOPER & NOLAN, supra note 59, at
275-76.
629.
See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 49, at 316. See, e.g., Murray Corp. of Am., 8 Lab.
Arb. Rep. (BNA) 713 (Feb. 14, 1947) (Wolff, Arb.) (setting aside an employee disciplinary action
based on the employer's refusal to reveal the identity of informant). But see Los Angeles Transit
Lines, 25 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 740 (Nov. 21, 1955) (Hildebrand, Arb.) (upholding the anonymity of professional "spotters" who check on bus drivers).
630.
See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 49, at 318; see also Rich Mfg. Co., 46 Lab. Arb.
Rep. (BNA) 154 (Jan.7, 1966) (Block, Arb.) (holding that accusations of employee disrespect are
given less weight when customers, while named, did not testify at arbitration).
631.
See Hoteles Condado Beach, La Concha & Convention Ctr. v. Union de Tronquistas
Local 901, 763 F.2d 34 (1st Cir. 1985). "Vacatur is appropriate only when the exclusion of relevant evidence 'so affects the rights of a party that it may be said that he was deprived of a fair
hearing."' Id. at 40 (quoting Newark Stereotypers' Union No. 18 v. Newark Morning Ledger Co.,
397 F.2d 594, 599 (3d Cit. 1968)).
632.
See Hoteles, 763 F.2d at 34; see also infra Part IV.C.2.d.
633.
Such a formulation is similar to that used to determine if evidentiary error has caused
"miscarriage of justice," under California law. See People v. Watson, 46 Cal. 2d 818, 836 (1956)
(en
banc).
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A Qualified Right to Counsel

The right to counsel is secured in criminal cases by the Sixth Amendment
and applied to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.634 The right to counsel in civil cases is not expressed as an
independent constitutional provision. Rather, it has always been assumed
635 Indeed, in its related
to exist in civil cases as a matter of due process.
criminal opinions, the Supreme Court has implied that the right to counsel
due process, 6 3 6
in civil cases is implicit in the concept of Fifth Amendment
637
although not with the force seen in the criminal context.
With so little guidance directly on point, it is especially helpful to look
at how right-to-counsel issues have been treated in the administrative context. There we see a split among the cases, depending upon the nature of the
hearing. A right to counsel has been held to be a requirement of due process
when the hearing is of an adversarial nature, 66 but it has not been found to
639
be essential in hearings that are nonadversarial in nature. The student
and prisoner misconduct cases are exceptions to this general rule, but that
aberration may be explained on the ground that both students and prisoners
have lesser constitutional protections because of the need for substantial
the many different types
supervisory discretion and expedition in handling
64 °
of disciplinary challenges that they represent.
See, e.g., supra note 616; see also Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
634.
See Note, The Right to Counsel in Civil Litigation, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1322, 1327 (1966).
635.
For an historical explanation of the absence of a specific right to counsel in civil cases, see WILLIAM
M. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 8-9 (1955); Michael P. Malloy,
Economic Sanctions and Retention of Counsel, 9 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 515, 556 n.281 (1995).
See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932); Cooke v. United States, 267
636.
U.S. 517, 537 (1925). For lower court decisions, see American Airways Charters, Inc. v. Regan,
746 F.2d 865, 873-74 (D.C. Cit. 1984), and Potashnick v. Port City Construction Co., 609 F.2d
1101, 1117-18 (5th Cir. 1980).
See Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981) (finding no right to
637.
appointed counsel in civil cases).
See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270-271 (1970).
638.
See Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 333-34 (1985).
639.
See, e.g., Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485 (1995) (noting that "'[l]awful incarcera640.
tion brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction
justified by the considerations underlying our penal system" (quoting Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 125 (1977))); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565,582-83 (1975).
[Students subject to disciplinary processes are not entitled] to secure counsel, to confront
and cross-examine witnesses supporting the charge, or to call [their] own witnesses to
verify [their] version of the incident.... [Such] further formalizing [ofi the suspension
process and escalating [of] its formality and adversary nature may not only make it too
costly as a regular disciplinary tool but also destroy its effectiveness as part of the teaching process.
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Because arbitration is an adversarial process, it would seem that a qualified right to counsel-limited, that is,to a right to retain and be represented
by counsel if one so chooses, not a right to have counsel appointed'-must
be available as a constitutional matter in arbitration, just as it is at trials and
administrative hearings. In fact, the right to counsel is provided for by professional industry standards. 2 There are no reported cases that have decided
the question of a right to counsel squarely under the FAA. However, all of
the cases that have considered this issue in passing have assumed the presence of the right, albeit one that can be easily waived. 3 The Supreme
Court has recognized that in adversarial proceedings, lawyers can "help
delineate the issues, present the factual contentions in an orderly manner,
conduct cross examination, and generally safeguard the interests of the
recipient. '"" If these policy rationales are important in an adversarial context in which there are statutory rules to guide the proceedings, as well as
the availability of judicial review, they are even more important in the
arbitration context, in which the arbitrator is not bound by rules of law, and
which provides only the most limited basis for review-a point implicit in
Justice Black's discussion of bias in Commonwealth Coatings.6"
Moreover, the availability of counsel is essential to help the party in
arbitration assess the matter for purposes of comparing the likelihood for
success at a trial conducted under legal standards. This is true not only before
the arbitration, as part of the preparation for the arbitration, but during the
arbitration, when settlement still remains an option before the matter has
been submitted and the award has been issued. 6" Moreover, the standards
for review are limited primarily to arbitral misconduct, including a decision
641.
See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 22-23; see also Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 270.
"The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend
the right to be heard by counsel." ... We do not say that counsel must be provided at the
pre-termination hearing, but only that the recipient must be allowed to retain an attorney
if he so desires.
Id. (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932)).
642.
See supranotes 168-172 and accompanying text.
643.
See, e.g., Fallick v. Kehr, 369 F.2d 899, 901 (2d Cir. 1966) (implying the availability
of the right to counsel in arbitration); Araiza v. National Steel & Shipbuilding Co., 973 F. Supp.
963, 969 (S.D. Cal. 1997) (same); Valentino v. Smith, No. Civ-91-564-AR, 1992 WL 427881, at
*7 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 30, 1992) (implying a right to counsel, but holding that it had been waived
by the party's failure to assert it in a timely fashion); Nasta v. Paramount Pictures Corp., No. 87
Civ. 1599 (WK), 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12578, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 1991) (recognizing
a waivable right to counsel in arbitration); Rosengart v. Armstrong Daily, Inc., 169 N.Y.S.2d 837,
838 (Sup. Ct. 1957) (recognizing a waivable right to counsel in arbitration), affd, 179 N.Y.S.2d 659
(App. Div. 1958).
644.
See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 270-71.
645.
See Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 150 (1968).
646.
See 2 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 134.
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that would exceed the scope of the arbitral agreement." Few lay parties
can be expected to understand such a nuanced and technical issue, much
less be able to research the law and marshal the facts in such a manner as to
present a case that an award in fact was ultra vires. Similarly, how the arbitrator conducts the hearing may provide indirect evidence of bias that could
lead an experienced advocate to take a harder look at the background of the
arbitrator. 6 Again, such sophistication is too much to expect of most parties
who are not legally trained, at least as a general matter.
There is, of course, no constitutional requirement that parties retain
counsel. Indeed, because the environment is less formal, parties may reasonably choose to represent themselves or to be represented by a nonlawyer, such
as an accountant, a family member, or a friend. Such flexibility is among the
advantages of arbitration and should be respected under a unitary theory. The
more difficult cases are those in which one party chooses to be represented,
while the other chooses not to be represented. The specter of imbalance and
unfairness would seem to be quite visible. However, in such cases, it will
be important to recall that the decision to proceed to arbitration without
counsel represents a waiver of a constitutional right, in particular the right
to counsel, just as it does in trial and in administrative adjudications. Such
a decision should therefore be analyzed according to the same criteria discussed above for determining the validity of the waiver of a right to have
the claim heard in the trial forum: that the waiver be knowing and voluntary." 9 One would expect this threshold would be easily met in most cases,
as the decision on the question of whether to retain counsel, regardless of the
reason for the decision,6 ° may reasonably be believed to be one that is sufficiently deliberative to satisfy constitutional requirements, even if it may seem
objectively unwise in the context of a given case.
It should also be noted that a right to counsel would appear to satisfy
even the requirements of Mathews, as it is likely that the presence of an attorney will substantially enhance the accuracy (or, more precisely, the quality)
of a proceeding in which a lay party has an interest in life, liberty, or property
that is substantial enough to justify the cost of an arbitration. Moreover, the
administrative costs to the government or, in the case of arbitration, the
647.
(1997).

See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (1994); UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 12(a)(3), 7 U.L.A. 280

It is doubtful that by themselves, however, such comments could not be the basis for a
648.
finding of bias.
See supra Part III.C.
649.
See, e.g., Department of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715, 721-23 (1990) (upholding
650.
restrictions on attorney fees in the Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972); Walters v. National Ass'n of
Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 333-34 (1985) (sustaining a federal law limiting to $10 the fee
for lawyers representing veterans on claims stemming from service-related disabilities).
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government actor (or arbitrator) are minimal. While it is true that the
matter may take longer because of the presence of counsel, there is no
material direct cost to the arbitrator; to the contrary, there may actually be
a benefit in the form of additional fees that additional hearings would
generate.
Finally, because arbitrators often, if not generally, permit or even encourage representation by counsel, the constitutional requirement of a qualified
right to counsel would only serve to identify and to eliminate some of the
worst practices in the field, such as contractual arbitration clauses that prohibit a party from being represented at trial.65"' It would not require a dramatic change in the practices of most arbitrations. Indeed, many industry
guidelines explicitly provide for the right to representation.652 The recognition of such a qualified right as a constitutional matter would only underscore
what good policy and practice already require.
d.

A Comment on Written and Reasoned Opinions

I have so far demonstrated how the incorporation of minimal but meaningful constitutional protections into arbitration would help assure the
neutrality of the arbitrator and the forum, affirm the right of both parties to
a meaningful opportunity to present evidence and confront adverse evidence,
and ensure the qualified right to be represented by retained counsel. These
safeguards relate to the process of the arbitration hearing itself. What happens at the end of the process, when the time for decision has come, is also
important, and it raises the difficult question of whether written and reasoned
opinions accompanying arbitration awards are constitutionally compelled as
a matter of due process."'
The FAA and the state versions of the UAA do not require arbitrators
to make findings of fact or conclusions of law or otherwise to reveal the reasoning behind their awards in separate opinions that would accompany the

651.
See, e.g., DeGaetano v. Smith Barney, Inc., No. 95 CIV. 1613 (DG), 1996 WL 44226, at
*5-*6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 1996) (upholding an arbitration agreement of Title VII sex discrimination claims even though it barred punitive damages, attorney fees, and injunctive relief); see also
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 56-58 (1995) (holding that parties
to an arbitration agreement may choose, if they wish, to provide arbitrators with the power to award
punitive damages).
652.
See supra notes 167-170 and accompanying text.
653.
When an award is accompanied by an opinion or explanation, it is a matter of professional practice to note clearly where the award ends and the opinion begins. Cf. NATIONAL
ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS, supra note 576, § 6.
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arbitration award.6"4 Instead, the FAA and the UAA are silent on the subject and leave behind no legislative history that helps explain the silence.
As a result, arbitrations conducted under the FAA and related state laws are
are
something of an anomaly in the655broad field of arbitration, as opinions
.
.
656
customary in labor arbitration, international commercial arbitration,
7
and analogous agency adjudications under the APA." The notion of
written and reasoned opinions has also been embraced by the U.S. Supreme
Court in its construction of the APA, 65 and by most serious commentators
651
as one of the few basic elements of due process.
While the use of written and reasoned opinions in these contexts is
uncontroversial, their propriety inspires a more spirited debate in FAA and
related state laws. This division is reflected in the viewpoints taken by two
of the largest providers of arbitration services, the AAA and the CPR
Institute for Dispute Resolution. The AAA Rules for Commercial Arbitration, reflecting what may be viewed as the traditional approach, do not
require arbitrators to disclose their reasoning and, indeed, the organization
in the past has expressly discouraged the practice as a hedge against judicial
review. 6 ° As a result, in most AAA arbitrations the parties only receive the
bottom-line arbitration award or decision without an explanation. On the
other hand, CPR's rules, reflecting an arguably more modem approach, 661

See 3 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 134, § 37:10. For many lower court rulings that
654.
have applied this principle, see id. § 37.11 n.6 and cases cited therein. For an endorsement of
this concept in dicta, see Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956).
See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 49, at 133-134.
655.
See Rau, supra note 527, at 532.
656.
See 5 U.S.C. § 557(c)(3)(A) (1994).
657.
See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
658.
See generally MASHAW ET AL., supra note 464; SCHWARTZ, supra note 466; Friendly,
659.
supra note 23.
See AAA COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES R-44 (rev. 1999); see also AMERICAN
660.
ARBITRATION ASS'N, A GUIDE FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATORS 24 (1993).

Courts will not review arbitrators' decisions on the merits of the case, even where the
conclusions are different from those that a court might reach. But a carelessly expressed
thought in a written opinion could afford an opportunity to delay enforcement of the
award. The obligations to the parties are better fulfilled when the award leaves no room
for attack. In situations where [the arbitrator feels] it necessary to write such an opinion,
it should be contained in a separate document.
Id.
661.

Even the newer AAA Rules for Employment Disputes now call for a statement of reasons.

See NATIONAL RULES FOR THE RESOLUTION OF EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES § 34(C) (1999) ("The
award shall be in writing and shall be signed by a majority of the arbitrators and shall provide the
written reasons for the award unless the parties agree otherwise.").
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require that arbitrators "shall state the reasoning on which the award rests
'
unless the parties agree otherwise."662
Some scholars have suggested that constitutional due process compels
the requirement of written and reasoned opinions.663 However, the fact is
that the courts have never recognized a right to a written and reasoned
opinion at the trial level in civil cases,664 much less a right to appellate
review.665 While it is common in federal courts for magistrates and district
judges to draft opinions, they do so as a matter of statutory rather than constitutional obligation; under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, judges
who conduct bench trials are required to issue findings of fact and to state
conclusions of law that will support their opinions." Conversely, appellate
judges are under no such duty under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or
the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and certainly have not been compelled as a matter of due process to write reasoned opinions.
Because the Constitution has not been held to require written opinions of public judges, it is difficult to construct a constitutional argument for
treating arbitrators differently under a unitary theory of public civil dispute
resolution. As noted earlier, trial is the apex of constitutional due process.668
Even as a policy matter, the question is quite challenging, pitting the legiti662.
CPR NON-ADMINISTERED ARBITRATION RULES, Rule 13.2 (rev. 1993). Frequently, the
parties agree not to have a written opinion when they learn that they must pay for the arbitrator's
drafting time.
663.
For a strong argument that there is a constitutional right to reasoned opinions, see

Martha I. Morgan, The Constitutional Right to Know Why, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 297 (1982);
see also Sternlight, supra note 347, at 95-98.

664.

See Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 516-17 (1978) (rejecting a procedural due

process challenge to a state trial judge's failure to make an explicit finding of "manifest necessity"
or to articulate all the factors considered in ordering a mistrial). It has been argued that the hold-

ing in this case is limited, however, because the Court found that the basis for the mistrial order
was adequately disclosed by the record. See Morgan, supra note 663, at 353. For the rare exception

in which the Court has required reasons, see North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 726 (1978)
(finding that due process required an explanation when a more severe sentence was imposed after
a retrial following a successful appeal, and that under such circumstances, the reasons for the stiffer

sentence "must affirmatively appear" and "the factual data upon which the increased sentence is
based must be made a part of the record").
665.
See Pearce, 395 U.S. at 724 ("'This Court has never held that the States are required to
establish avenues of appellate review, but it is now fundamental that, once established, these avenues

must be kept free of unreasoned distinctions that can only impede open and equal access to the
courts."' (quoting Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 310-11 (1996))); see also McKane v. Durston,
153 U.S. 684 (1894).
666. See FED. R. Civ. P.52(a).
667. There has been discussion in recent years about the promulgation of a rule that would
require the appellate courts to write opinions for all cases, but the concept, while strongly favored
by the bar, has not been enthusiastically received by the bench. See Telephone Interview with
John Rabiej, Rules Counsel, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (Apr. 20, 1998).

668.

See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
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mate expectations of the arbitration process against the equally legitimate
expectations of the parties engaged in that process.
(1)

The Benefits of Written and Reasoned Opinions

For the parties, written and reasoned opinions accompanying the award
fulfill an important democracy-serving function, enhancing the integrity
and legitimacy of the arbitration process. In particular, written and reasoned
opinions, even brief ones not tethered to legal standards, provide rationality
and transparency to an otherwise arbitrary and potentially awesome process.
Parties know why the arbitrator ruled the way he or she did. The opinions
also serve persuasive and educational functions, contributing to both the parties' acceptance of the award and their ability to use it to adjust their future
relationships. For these reasons, there is some evidence that written and
reasoned arbitration opinions are preferable to both the arbitrators and the
parties."'
Written and reasoned awards also provide a degree of predictabilitythough not in the sense of precedential value, because even those areas
in which written and reasoned awards are customary do not allow their use
as controlling authority. Rather, they can be persuasive evidence at best in
individual cases and, more broadly, can coalesce into a collective arbitral
wisdom, known in the European commercial arbitration community as the
lex ercatoria,670 that may be drawn upon by both the parties and their
arbitrators. In this regard, to the extent that arbitration awards are published,
they serve a powerful informational function, providing information about
possible arbitrators and how such arbitrators might view their cases. (In this
way, too, the broadening of available information about arbitrators and arbitration can help alleviate the repeat player problem discussed above.671 )
See, e.g., Harold W. Davey, What's Right and What's Wrong with Grievance Arbitration:
669.
The PractitionersAir Their Views, 28 ARB. J. 209, 215 (1973). For a study with less decisive results
in the construction industry, see Thomas J. Stipanowich, Rethinking American Arbitration, 63 IND.

L.J. 425, 469 (1988). See also Thomas E. Carbonneau, Rendering Arbitral Awards with Reasons: The
Elaborationof a Common Law of InternationalTransactions,23 CoLUM. J.TRANSNAT'L L. 579 (1985).
670. For a general discussion of the lex mercatoria, see Dezalay & Garth, supra note 151, at
295-300.
671. See supra Part IV.C.2.a.l.a.iii. While acknowledging the usefulness of "track record"
evidence to guide parties in selecting arbitrators, Professor Bingham nonetheless cautions against
the use of such evidence of an arbitrator's past rulings as a basis for courts to assess active arbi-

trator bias, noting statistical problems of randomness.
It is not possible as a practical matter to determine whether a given arbitrator is ruling
statistically significantly more often for one side than the average arbitrator, given the

current state of confidentiality for awards, and the lack of public record-keeping. It is
also risky as a matter of fundamental fairness if no arbitrator's case load is random, since
one can not determine statistically whether that arbitrator's track record has departed
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The Burdens of Written and Reasoned Opinions

Despite such individual and systemic advantages, the use of written and
reasoned opinions does raise serious policy concerns regarding the privacy,
finality, and integrity of arbitration.
Privacy can be an important consideration in the decision to waive fullblown trial rights in favor of the arbitral forum. There are countless reasons
why both parties may wish to have a confidential but binding resolution of
their dispute, and this should be respected under a unitary theory. A requirement of written and reasoned opinions would seem to jeopardize this value
by making the dispute potentially public through the filing of an opinion
along with an arbitration award when it is confirmed by a public court.
While the privacy concern is real, it does not seem to dispose of the
policy question of whether arbitration awards should be written and reasoned.
For one, written and reasoned opinions accompanying awards are standard
practice in international commercial arbitrations, and there is no reason
to believe that the privacy interests are greater in domestic commercial arbitrations than they are in international commercial arbitrations. Moreover,
in most cases there is no reason to believe that the arbitrator's opinion will
be publicly disseminated through publication just because it has been rendered. In fact, in the labor context, in which written and reasoned opinions
have been customary for years, only an estimated 10 percent of the opinions
issued are actually published.672 Finally, at least in contractual arbitration,
given the fact that written and reasoned opinions obviously are not required
for judicial confirmation of arbitration awards, there is no reason why the
dissemination of the arbitrator's opinion has to go beyond the immediate
parties. Rather, the confidentiality of an arbitration proceeding in the end
is a matter of party choice, and the parties can simply assess and assume any
risk in publicizing their dispute when they file the motion to confirm the
award.673 While society may lose some value in the opinions if the parties
decide against making them public, it must be remembered that it is, after
all, the parties who "own" the dispute as an initial matter, not the public.674
from the mean because of arbitrator bias or because of some selection bias in the nature
of the cases referred to that arbitrator.
Bingham, supra note 544, at 247.
672.
See id. at 231.
673.
The same choice could be given to parties in court-related arbitration programs,
although judicial and legislative policymakers may discern a greater public interest in the fuller
disclosure that written opinions necessarily provide about their arbitration procedures, and about
their arbitrators, and may opt in favor of requiring that an award be accompanied by an opinion for
purposes of confirming the award.
674.
See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 145, at 501-02.
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A more fundamental worry, in my view, is the capacity for written and
reasoned opinions to lead to expanded judicial review that can undermine
the power of arbitration to bring substantive expertise to adjudicatory decision making, arguably one of the most vital values of arbitration as a process.
After all, there are many instances in which nonlawyers may make the best
675
arbitrators, and many cases in which the basis of arbitral decision making
can or should be without reference to legal standards. Yet the possibility of
expanded judicial review would seem to require holding nonlawyer arbitrators to legal standards and would further narrow the gap between litigation
and arbitration by transforming arbitration into a lesser form of litigationcall it "Litigation Lite." 76
Despite this potentially corrosive impact on the arbitration process,
there is clearly a significant trend emerging in favor of enhanced judicial
review of arbitration awards. This may be seen in the plethora of industry
standards and protocols specifically providing for such review. 677 The courts,
too, seem quite open to this development, as reflected in two emerging but
distinct lines of cases.
In one line of cases, judges apparently concerned about the loss of legal
rights in mandatory arbitration are taking a more expansive approach to the
"manifest disregard" doctrine, which, in jurisdictions in which it has been
adopted, permits courts to go beyond the statutory grounds for vacating arbitration awards specified in the FAA and related state laws and to vacate arbitration awards that are in "manifest disregard" of the law.678 Thus the Second
Circuit in Halliganv. PiperJaffray, Inc. 679 recently overturned an arbitration
award against an age discrimination plaintiff, finding that the arbitrator was
aware of the state of the law governing the case and, in the absence of a
written opinion explaining the award, could only have disregarded that law
or the evidence manifestly when ruling against the plaintiff in the face of
overwhelming factual evidence supporting the plaintiffs claim.6" While this
is an aggressive application of manifest disregard, it is still fairly conventional
in its structure. Chief Judge Harry T. Edwards of the District of Columbia
A favorite example is an episode of the popular television show L.A. Law, in which a
675.
dispute between two clowns about whether one stole the act of another was decided by a third
clown respected by both parties. L.A. Law: McKenzie, Brackman, Barnum & Bailey (NBC television broadcast, Feb. 10, 1994).
676.
For a fuller explication of this argument, see generally Sabatino, supra note 76, at 1289.
See also John P. Cleary, Filling Mastrobuono's Order: The NASD Arbitration Policy Task Force Ensures
the Enforceability of Punitive Damages Awards inSecurities Arbitration, Bus. LAW., Nov. 1996, at 199.
677.
See supra Part I.C.3.
For a comprehensive discussion of manifest disregard, see Hayford, supra note 509, at
678.
774-78.
148 F.3d 197 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1034 (1998).
679.
680.
See id. at 203-04.
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Circuit, however, took manifest disregard to a new level. In Cole v. Burns
InternationalSecurity Services,68' the court held in a Title VII case that such
review can only be meaningful if it "is sufficiently rigorous to ensure that
arbitrators have properly interpreted and applied statutory law." 82 If taken
at face value, the Cole standard would suggest that there is little difference
between arbitration and trial for purposes of judicial review, at least in statutory cases, given that the central duty of appellate courts in statutory cases
is to ensure that trial judges have properly interpreted and applied statutory
law.683 Such an approach, if taken seriously, could be fatal to the legitimate
goal of finality in arbitration.
The second line of cases is even more disturbing, in my view, as it finds
the courts increasingly permitting parties to define contractually the terms
and scope of the judicial review of arbitration awards, even beyond those
grounds expressly enumerated in the FAA and related state laws. In the lead
case, Lapine Technology Corp. v. Kyocera Corp.,684 the parties, two businesses,
entered into a contract that included an arbitration clause expressly
providing that "[t]he arbitrators shall issue a written award which shall state
the bases of the award and include detailed findings of fact and conclusions
of law."6 5 It also directed a court to vacate, modify, or correct an award "(i)
based upon any of the grounds referred to in the FAA, (ii) where the
arbitrators' findings of fact are not supported by substantial
evidence, or
' 86
(iii) where the arbitrators' conclusions of law are erroneous. ,6
In upholding the arbitration review provision, a splintered Ninth
Circuit panel noted that the parties had imposed on the arbitrators much
the same burdens faced by a federal trial court, which must "find the facts
specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon."8 " Because the
statutory purpose of the FAA is to enforce the validity of the terms of
contractual agreements to arbitrate, the majority concluded that the parties'
"contractual provision supplements the FAA's default standard of review
and allows
for de novo review of issues of law embodied in the arbitration
68
award."
681.
682.

105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
Id. at 1487.

683.

For a discussion and critique of Cole, see Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Growing Debate

Over 'Consumerized' Arbitration:Adding Cole to the Fire, DiSP. RESOL. MAG., Summer 1997, at 20, 22.
684.
130 F.3d 884 (9th Cit. 1997).
685.
Id. at 887.
686.
Id.
687.
FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
688.
Kyocera, 130 F.3d at 889. But see id. at 891 (Kozinski, J., concurring) ("I would call the
case differently if the agreement provided that the district judge would review the award by flipping a coin or studying the entrails of a dead fowl."); id. (Mayer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
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A majority of the courts that have considered the question of
contractual judicial review have agreed with the Kyocera approach. 9 Among
the federal appellate courts, only the Seventh Circuit has rejected this position, as of this writing." In Chicago Typographical Union v. Chicago SunTimes, Inc.,69 Chief Judge Richard Posner said: "If the parties want, they
can contract for an appellate arbitration panel to review the arbitrator's
award. But they cannot contract for judicial review of that award; federal
'
jurisdiction cannot be created by contract."692
As the Posner opinion suggests, the constitutional and other questions
raised by contractual standards of review are substantial and far-reaching.693
For example, what if the burden of proof defined by contract for the review
of an arbitration award were greater (or less) than would be required for a
similar case arising from a public court? Would the reviewing court be
obliged to apply the more (or less) stringent standard? Moreover, might
Kyocera be extended to permit more forum shopping than Carnival Cruise
Lines, Inc. v. Shute,694 and The Bremen v. Zapata Off.Shore Co.,69 ever contemplated by allowing, for example, parties to name a particular federal
judge to hear an appeal of an arbitration award? Suppose, too, that the parties named a federal judge who would not have jurisdiction over the matter
but for the contractual authorization. Enforceable? Similarly, would parties
be permitted to apply only some aspects of relevant substantive law, but not
FAA provides no authority "explicitly empowering litigants to dictate how an Article III court
must review an arbitration decision").
See Syncor Int'l Corp. v. McLeland, No. 96-2261, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 21248, at
689.
*14-*18 (4th Cit. Aug. 11, 1997) (per curiam), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1110 (1998); Gateway
Techs., Inc. v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 996-97 (5th Cir. 1995); New England Utils.
v. Hydro-Quebec, 10 F. Supp. 2d 53, 61-62 (D. Mass. 1998); Fils et Cables D'Acier de Lens
v. Midland Metals Corp., 584 F. Supp. 240 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase, 832
P.2d 899, 912-14 (Cal. 1992) (en banc); Marsch v. Williams, 23 Cal. App. 4th 238, 244-45 (Ct.
App. 1994); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. App. 4th 576, 590 (Ct. App.
1993); Primerica Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Wise, 456 S.E.2d 631, 634 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995); Tretina
Printing, Inc. v. Fitzpatrick & Assocs., 640 A.2d 788, 792-93 (N.J. 1994); Westinghouse Elec.
Corp. v. New York City Transit Auth., 623 N.E.2d 531, 535 (N.Y. 1993).
For lower court decisions, see Chicago Southshore & South Bend Railroadv. Northern Indi690.
App. Ct. 1997), and Konicki v.
ana Commuter TransportationDistrict, 682 N.E.2d 156, 159-60 (Ill.
Oak Brook Racquet Club, Inc., 441 N.E.2d 1333, 1338 (111. App. Ct. 1982).
691.
935 F.2d 1501 (7th Cit. 1991).
Id. at 1505.
692.
For a debate on the subject, see Stanley McDermott III, Contractingfor Judicial Review:
693.
Expanded Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards Isa Mixed Blessing that Raises Serious Questions, DISP.
RESOL. MAO., Fall 1998, at 18, and Carroll E. Neesemann, Contracting for JudicialReview: Party-Chosen
Arbitral Review Standards Can Inspire Confidence in the Process, and Is Good for Arbitration, DISP.
RESOL. MAO., Fall 1998, at 18.
499 U.S. 585 (1991); see supra note 392 and accompanying text.
694.
407 U.S. 1 (1972); see supra note 392 and accompanying text.
695.
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others (even specific cases)? The potential for abuse seems enormous, particularly in contracts of adhesion.
Such questions ultimately led the drafters of the RUAA to delete a
provision that would have permitted parties to include judicial review provisions in their agreements to arbitrate, after an intense debate on the floor
of the Uniform Law Commission.696 The Supreme Court may in the end be
compelled to decide the contractual review problem. Even if such contractual provisions are upheld, one must question their impact on the arbitration
process itself. Such "legalization" of arbitration clearly has the potential to
defeat arbitration's goals of simplicity and informality, to disrupt the experience and substantive expertise in decision making that compels the use
of arbitration as a dispute resolution process, and to heighten the judicial
role (and case load) in a process that many select as an alternative to judicial
processes.
One suspects that the rise in the call for increased judicial review from
so many quarters is a well-meaning response by judges, scholars, practitioners,
and other policymakers to very real concerns about perceived abuses in the
contractual arbitration context that arise from arbitral rulings that depart
from the expectations of public law.697 However, it does so by legalizing and
thereby distorting the irntegrity of the arbitration process. In my view, this
laudable goal may be accomplished within the current structure of arbitration
by simply adhering faithfully and powerfully to the principle that knowing
and voluntary agreements to arbitrate should be enforced if they are valid
under state contract law. If the submission to arbitration is truly knowing and
voluntary, and the process comports with minimal but meaningful notions
of due process, there seems to be little reason to disturb the finality of the
arbitrator's judgment, regardless of its consistency with legal standards. In
such a situation, the parties would know they were bargaining for a process
that did not necessarily assure the proper application of law or the right of
appeal, and the fairness of the process would be assured. The finality of the
process should be assured without the necessity of judicial intervention. In
sum, the parties, the process, and our larger democracy would likely be well
served by expanded use of written and reasoned opinions. However, the use
of such opinions to expand judicial review may well prove counterproductive

696.

See Christopher H. Hoving, NCCUSL Finishes First Reading of Revised Arbitration Act,

ADR REP., Aug. 4, 1999, at 2.
697.
There is a much stronger argument for judicial review in the court-related context
because the parties are often not in those processes voluntarily. Therefore, assumption-of-risk notions
that would compel finality in the contractual context are inoperable in the court-related context.

Some relief from arbitral error on matters of law may be appropriate.
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over time and isa step that should be taken with extreme caution if the integrity of the arbitration process is to be preserved.
Mediation

3.

Mediation is a fundamentally different method of dispute resolution
from arbitration and, as noted above, is only accountable to the Constitution
when it is court-related. 698 It isconsensual rather than adjudicatory in nature,
which means that the role of the government actor in mediation is to help
the parties reach their own resolution of the dispute, rather than to decide
who is right, how assets are to be distributed, and so forth. The implications
of this central distinction are felt throughout the process of incorporating
constitutional values into the mediation process, calling for a much lower
level of constitutional force than was seen in arbitration, even though some
of the concerns are the same, such as with mediator impartiality.
In the discussion that follows, I suggest that due process compels a
right to a neutral forum and a qualified right to counsel. A breach of either
of these rights, by practice or by statute,6' may lead to a violation of constitutional due process sufficient to warrant the vacation of a confirmed
mediation agreement arising from a mediation conducted under the aegis of
state action.
a.

The Right to a Neutral Forum

As we saw in arbitration, the right to a neutral forum is an essential
element of due process in mediation, although to a lesser degree because the
forum need not provide for an equality of the remedies.
(1)

Impartiality of the Mediator

While qualifications are among the most controversial issues in mediation,' °° impartiality is one of the few qualities that is commonly agreed to be
indispensable in a mediator, just as it is in an arbitrator.'O It is this neutrality
698.

See supra notes 198-201 and accompanying text; Part II.B.2.c.

699.
700.

See infra note 715 and accompanying text.

See SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONALS IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION, ENSURING COMPETENCE
AND QUALITY IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION PRACTICE (1995); SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONALS IN
DISPUTE RESOLUTION, QUALIFYING NEUTRALS: THE BASIC PRINCIPLES (1989). See generally W.

Lee Dobbins, The Debate over Mediator Qualifications: Can They Satisfy the Growing Need to Measure
Competence Without Barring Entry into the Market?, 7 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 95 (1995).
701.
See Sara Cobb & Janet Rifkin, Practice and Paradox: Deconstructing Neutrality in Mediation, 16 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 35, 35-37 (1991) (arguing that neutrality is central to the theory and
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that enables the mediator to gain the confidence of the parties that is necessary to make the process work, regardless of whether the mediator's style is
facilitative or evaluative, or whether the mediation is conducted according
to caucus, noncaucus, or hybrid models.
The fact that a mediator is not a decision maker for the parties significantly diminishes concerns relating to a mediator's background for purposes
of possible due process violations. This is not to suggest that bias cannot be
a serious issue in mediation, or that concerns regarding repeat players have no
currency in the mediation context. Certainly a skillful but biased mediator
can have a substantial influence on the parties' settlement. This is particularly true in situations in which there is a substantial power imbalance
between the parties, given that one of a mediator's duties is to attempt to
minimize or to overcome the power imbalance as much as possible." In this
regard, it is easy to see how a biased mediator can exploit such an imbalance
to the detriment of the nonfavored party or parties through techniques that
silence, trivialize, or affirmatively reject their views and opinions. 3 Similarly, bias concerns may also be heightened in evaluative mediations, in which
the mediator is providing an opinion on the merits of the parties' relative
positions, precisely for the purpose of influencing the parties' settlements.
To the extent that there is a range of evaluative techniques-from the expression of an opinion that is tantamount to the role of a mutually agreed-upon
7
technical expert to that of a strong-arming settlement conference "-it
may
be said that the more evaluative and coercive the mediation, the greater the
concerns about the impact of possible bias. Finally, mediators are subject to
the same repeat player concerns that were seen in arbitration."
As in arbitration, however, the allegation of bias must be weighed
against the degree of disclosure of past, present, and potential future conflicts. ' The greater the disclosure, the less the likelihood of harm that would
be caused by the potentially biasing factors.

practice of mediation). See generally NANCY H. ROGERS & RICHARD A. SALEM, A STUDENT'S

GUIDE TO MEDIATION AND THE LAW 137-49 (1987).
702. For a discussion of the issue, see KOVACH, supra note 66, at 104-05.

703.

See generally Grillo, supra note 42.

704.

See generally JAY FOLBERG & ALLISON TAYLOR, MEDIATION: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE

TO RESOLVING CONFLICTS WITHOUT LITIGATION 130-46 (1984) (listing a total of 12 styles and
approaches to mediating conflict, including "muscle" mediation, in which the mediator acts as

"closet arbitrator," telling the party what is fair and appropriate, and arguing that this style should
be avoided); see also James J. Alfini, Trashing, Bashing, and Hashing It Out: Is This the End of "Good
Mediation"?, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 47, 66-73 (1991). "Bashers" focus primarily on criticizing

each side's position in a "'mad dash for the middle."' See id. at 70.
705. See supra Part IV.C.2.a.l.a.iii.
706.

See supra Part IV.C.2.a.l.b.
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That said, it clearly would be difficult for a plaintiff to prove that even
a biased mediator's conduct rose to the level of a due process violation
because of the nature of the role of the mediator in the mediation process,
the wide latitude that must be afforded to the pool of mediators, and the
availability of disclosure to trigger a valid waiver of any evident partiality.
After all, the decision on how to resolve the dispute ultimately is in the
hands of the parties, and the most significant structural procedural protection of mediation is any party's ability to terminate the mediation for any
reason by simply walking out of the room."'
One can imagine, however, at least two situations in which there
could be such a violation. The first is the situation in which the mediator
in fact decides the dispute. As noted in Part I, it is not uncommon to have a
dispute resolution process that calls for mediation and then, if that is unsuccessful, arbitration." 8 Many commentators consider it unethical for the same
person to serve as both the arbitrator and the mediator in such situationsand in all likelihood it is agreed uniformly that the decision to change processes from mediation to arbitration lies with the parties alone, absent structural
°
rules imposing time or other limits on the mediation process." Yet, particularly with unsophisticated parties, it is also possible for a mediator to
convert the mediation into an arbitration and to decide the dispute without
'
the parties even realizing what has happened." Such a situation could rise
to the level of a due process violation if proven to be intended to benefit
one of the parties, because the mediator's unilateral decision to change the
process from one that is consensual to one that is adjudicatory would by definition exceed the scope of the parties' delegation of authority to the mediator as a matter of process, and because it would also exceed the scope of the
waiver of trial rights that led to the mediation.
One may also contemplate a due process violation arising from a situation in which the power imbalance between the parties is great, the mediator
has an ongoing pecuniary relationship with the stronger party (especially for
future mediation services), there has been little or no substantive disclosure
707.
708.
709.

See ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note 66, § 1:01.
See supranote 81 and accompanying text.
See Lon L. Fuller, Collective Bargainingand the Arbitrator,in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

AND THE ARBITRATOR'S ROLE: PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTEENTH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL

ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 29-30 (Mark L. Kahn ed., 1962); Chris Manos & Carson Taylor,
Dispute Resolution Options Open Doors to Amicable Settlements, MONT. LAW., Jan. 1998, at 1, 3536 (discussing pros and cons of med/arb).
See, e.g., Reuben, supra note 5, at 53-54 (discussing an occurrence in which a mediator
710.
in a dispute between business partners converted the process into an arbitration and issued an
award substantially favoring a represented party, to the detriment of the unrepresented party,
based on issues beyond the scope of the initial mediation).
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of the conflict of interests, the weaker party is unrepresented and is either
physically or emotionally incapable of participating effectively in the mediation, and the mediator's style is heavily evaluative and coercive. Divorce and
child custody or visitation mediations might seem particularly susceptible to
such problems.7"'
In both situations, the burden on the proponent of a due process claim
is admittedly great, possibly unattainable in many if not most casesparticularly in light of the fact that mediation sessions are rarely recorded
and transcribed-but that is as it should be. Minimal but meaningful due
process violations in informal systems of dispute resolution, particularly consensual systems like mediation, should be reserved for the most egregious
of abuses, to allow for the flexibility necessary to permit those processes to
work. Due process is a shield, not a sword. That shield, however, is one that
should be available to allow the individual who believes her due process
rights to a fair and impartial neutral have been violated the opportunity to
prove her claim in a court of law.
(2)

Neutrality of the Venue

Parties in mediation are just as entitled to a neutral venue when state
action is present as are parties in trial or arbitration. Again, however, our
concerns here are substantially diminished by the consensual nature of the
process. It is possible for forum-based claims to arise from the situs to address
the same contextual concerns discussed in arbitration, '2 although the weakness of such claims must be acknowledged. Unlike arbitration, however, one
would not expect to see due process claims arising from any disparity in available remedies. The promise of mediation as a consensual process lies fundamentally in its ability to generate creative, integrative options for dispute
resolution that may include, but may also exclude or exceed, the distributive
capacity of many legal remedies. The availability of legal rights and remedies
can often serve as barriers to negotiated settlement in mediation, creating
impasse rather than resolution. For example, the availability of punitive
damages in trial is often a contentious issue, which the parties may in the
course of negotiations have to agree to take "off the table" of a possible settlement agreement (surely in exchange for other concessions) in order to continue the march toward settlement. To deprive the mediator and the parties
of such an opportunity would be inconsistent with the flexibility and crea-

711.
712.

See generally Grillo, supra note 42; Lerman, supra note 42.
See supra Part IV.C.2.a.l.a.ii.
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tivity in dispute resolution that is essential to the mediation process. Indeed,
in my view, it would pervert the mediation process beyond recognition."'
Finally, to the extent that there may be any question, it is doubtful
that a right to equal remedies would be available in mediation under a
Mathews analysis. Apart from the disclosure of potentially adverse information, there would be no harm to the party, because the party always has the
option to decline settlement and to terminate the mediation, assuming the
mediation takes place in a properly noncoercive environment."' Moreover,
while the administrative burden on the government actor (the mediator)
would be negligible if existent at all, the degree to which legal remedies are
available in mediation is an irrelevant consideration, because the goal of
the process is settlement according to the needs and interests of the parties,
rather than achieving a resolution of the dispute that is necessarily accurate
under law.
b.

A Qualified Right to Counsel

While the right to retain counsel is broadly available in traditional
public litigation, the presence of counsel is a controversial issue in mediation.715 In brief, the central question is the degree to which counsel should
be permitted into the mediation, if at all, given that the purpose of the mediation is to help the parties resolve their disputes themselves, with or without
reference to legal standards. For this reason, many mediators refuse to permit
parties to bring lawyers with them into the mediation, even though best practices would at least call for them encourage a party to consult with an
6
attorney after a mediation agreement has been reached." A few state
7 '
statutes also prohibit attorney attendance in court-related mediations, "
although the clear majority of state statutes that address the issue act to

713.

See ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note 66, § 2:02.

See infra notes 725-730 and accompanying text.
714.
See, e.g., KOVACH, supra note 66, at 112-14; Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Legal Representa715.
tion and the Next Steps Toward Client Control: Attorney Malpractice for the Failure to Allow the Client to
Control Negotiation and Pursue Alternatives to Litigation, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 819 (1990); Shelby
R. Grubbs, Preparing for Mediation: An Advocate's Checklist, TENN. B.J., Mar./Apr. 1996, at 14; John
Lande, How Will Lawyering and Mediation Practices Transform Each Other?, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
839 (1997); David Plimpton, Mediation of Disputes: The Role of the Lawyer and How Best To Serve
the Client's Interest, 8 ME. B.J. 38 (1993); Leonard L. Riskin, A Quick Course in Mediation Advocacy,
A.B.A. J., Aug. 1996, at 56.
See Friedman & Himmelstein, supra note 153, at 7-8.
716.
See MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-302(3) (1999) (divorce); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-4-59
717.
(Michie 1999) (same).
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permit parties to bring counsel to mediations if they so choose." 8 Statutes
that preclude the availability of counsel would be unconstitutional in courtrelated mediations because, as discussed above, they operate under the aegis
719
of state action.
Even assuming attorneys are permitted into the room, there are substan-

tial questions over the role that the attorney should play. Some attorneys
treat mediation like a settlement conference and do all the talking on behalf
of their clients. Others simply sit back and wait for their clients to ask
questions. Naturally, there is quite a range of activity between these ends of
the spectrum, and compelling arguments can be made for and against the use
of counsel, and the nature of the role of counsel, in the context of particular
cases.

Our recognition that court-related mediation can constitute state action
certainly informs this professional debate, compelling the honoring of a qualified right to counsel in mediation sessions if one so chooses-that is, as with
arbitration, limited to the right to be represented by retained counsel if one
so chooses, not a right to appointed counsel.
As our discussion of the right to counsel in arbitration observed, the
Supreme Court has typically distinguished between adversarial and nonadversarial processes in the administrative context for purposes of deciding
the availability of a constitutional right to counsel.7 The Court has found
that the right to counsel attaches in the former but not in the latter."' In
Gagnon v. Scarpelli,"2 the policy reasons for refusing to find a right of
appointed counsel in nonadversarial hearings were articulated by the Court
in the context of such a claim in an informal parole and probation revocation
proceeding:
The introduction of counsel into a revocation proceeding will
alter significantly the nature of the proceeding. If counsel is provided
for the probationer or parolee, the State in turn will normally

provide its own counsel; lawyers, by training and disposition, are
advocates and bound by professional duty to present all available

718.
See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-810 (1998) (counsel may attend mediation); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-09.1-05 (1997) (mediator may not exclude counsel); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1824(5)
(1998) (conciliation court); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.600(1) (1997) (marriage dissolution, attorney
may not be excluded); id. § 107.785 (same); WIS. STAT. § 655.58 (1998) (authorizing counsel to
attend mediation).

719.
720.

See supra Part II.B.2.
See supra Part IV.C.2.c.

721.
722.

See supra Part IV.C.2.c.
411 U.S. 778 (1973).
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evidence and arguments in support of their clients' positions and to

and views.723
contest with vigor all adverse evidence
Moreover, in another case, the Court has suggested that "[the insertion of
counsel into the disciplinary process would inevitably give the proceedings
a more adversary cast and tend to reduce their utility as a means to further
correctional goals. There would also be delay ....,,724

While mediation is an informal process, there are strong arguments
to distinguish the administrative law cases and to support a qualified right
of counsel in mediation. As a preliminary matter, it is worth underscoring
the fact that the Supreme Court has never rejected a right to retained counsel in civil cases. Rather, the cases in which the Court has articulated the
adversarial-nonadversarial distinction within the right to counsel have come
725
in the context of constitutional claims for the appointment of counsel.
This is a significant distinction by itself, because the impact of the recognition of the claimed right to counsel on the government fisc is substantial
in appointed cases-indeed, under a Mathews analysis, it could be dispositivewhile such an impact is negligible, if it exists at all, when applied in the
context of the right to retained counsel in mediation.
Moreover, the administrative context is one in which the need for the
efficient handling of mass or minor claims is at its greatest. Significantly,
most of these claims are governed under the APA, which provides a fairly specific set of procedural protections, including the right to a written statement
of reasons and appellate review.726 Neither of these profoundly important
procedural protections, or any other for that matter, is provided in mediation.
Rather, as noted above, the most significant procedural protection that the
mediation process provides is the ability of either party to terminate the
7 Beyond that, mediation is a fluid
mediation at any time for any reason.
process in which the absence of other procedural protections, the inherent
problem of power imbalances, and the possibility that information disclosed

Id. at 787 (cited with approval in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 569-70 (1974)).
723.
Wolff, 418 U.S. at 570. For an argument that such concerns prove a myth under the
724.
weight of empirical research, see Craig A. McEwen et al., Bring In the Lawyers: Challenging the

Dominant Approaches to Ensuring Fairness inDivorce Mediation, 79 MINN. L. REV. 1317 (1995).
725.

See, e.g., Wolff, 418 U.S. 539.

726.

See 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (1994).

While the good faith of the parties is assumed, at least one prominent mediation
727.
scholar has argued that it should be a statutory requirement. See Kimberlee K. Kovach, Good Faith

inMediation-Requested, Recommended, or Required? A New Ethic, 38 S.TEX. L. REV. 575 (1997).

For a contrary view, see Edward F. Sherman, 'Good Faith' Participation in Mediation: Aspirational,
Not Mandatory, DisP. RESOL. MAG., Winter 1997, at 14.
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can be used to a party's detriment outside the mediation all compel the recognition of a right to retained counsel. Each of these issues bears further
discussion.
(1)

Absence of Procedural Protections

While the unfettered exit option may seem to be the ultimate procedural protection, in practice it may be inadequate in many cases without an
attendant right to counsel because of the unique vulnerabilities of the parties
in mediation. For one, a weaker party may not have the personal fortitude
to simply walk out on a mediation. Moreover, it is difficult for a lay person
to know when to exercise the right to walk out of a mediation, just as it is difficult for the lay person to understand the full legal consequences of an ultimate mediation agreement or to appreciate fully the impact of the dynamics
of the mediation on their ultimate judgment about the acceptability of a
mediation agreement, such as the effect of a power imbalance. By definition,
nonlawyers reasonably may be presumed not to have an understanding of the
law that is sophisticated enough to permit them to be able to weigh the
merits of a proposed mediation agreement against the remedies that might
be available at trial. Also, decision making in mediation often comes at the
end of a process that can be emotionally and physically taxing, when the
sobriety of judgment is most vulnerable to the influences of passion or fatigue.
As a result, a party in mediation is particularly susceptible to accepting a settlement that might seem right in the heat of the moment but might be less
attractive upon closer scrutiny. Counsel may not, of course, be able to dissuade an insistent party in mediation from accepting an agreement that may
seem unwise or ill-advised. However, at least such a decision will be made
with the benefit of counsel that is presumably more emotionally detached.
In this way, in the absence of other structural procedural protections, the
availability of counsel is a minimal but meaningful constitutional safeguard
that will, among other things, give content to the exit option.
(2)

Power Imbalances

The absence of other procedural safeguards in mediation is particularly
troubling in light of the difficulty the mediation process has in dealing with
the power imbalances that are so often a part of, if not a cause of, conflicts
that come to mediation. 28 Rather than balancing the playing field structurally through rules or procedures seen in adjudicatory proceedings, mediation's
728.

See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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informality can have just the opposite effect and can actually exacerbate
existing power imbalances." 9 As a result, a weaker party might be subtly, even
730
inadvertently, discouraged from participating effectively in the mediation.
Similarly, a party in such a situation might readily accept a settlement that on
its face seems to accomplish her goals but that may raise questions about
substantive fairness. For example, a woman in a divorce mediation might
give up substantial property and pecuniary rights to which she would be
entitled at law in order to get the thing she values most, primary custody of
her children."'
Again, it is not the place of the law to determine the wisdom of such a
trade-off. Personal preferences and the nuances of particular situations can
vary widely. However, counsel should be available to assure the ability of
parties to participate effectively in the mediation, despite disparities of power
and bargaining strength, and to test the proposed settlement against a party's
long-term goals and needs."'
The Permeability of Confidentiality

(3)

Confidentiality, like mediator impartiality, is one of the cornerstones of
the mediation process. It fosters a climate that promotes the frank exchange
of feelings, facts, and ideas by creating a zone of safety wherein intimate
thoughts and concerns will be heard, respected, and kept private. This promise is typically one of the first matters addressed by the mediator in the first
minutes of the first mediation session, to help set a tone of candor for the
overall mediation effort."'
Despite such assurances, however, confidentiality in mediation is not
nearly so absolute in practice as it might seem, and the presence of counsel
may at times be most advisable to prevent a party from disclosing inside the
mediation information that may be used to the client's detriment outside of
the mediation.
For example, while several states have privilege statutes protecting confidentiality in mediation, the majority of those statutes are also subject to
significant exceptions."' One particularly salient and common exception
effectively requires mediators to comply with legal duties to report certain
729.
730.
731.
732.

See AUERBACH, supra note 42, at 136.
See Grillo, supra note 42, at 1585-86; Lerman, supra note 42, at 72.
See Grillo, supra note 42, at 1594-95; Lerman, supra note 42, at 72.
See ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note 66, § 1:02, at 1-13; id. §§ 4:01-:13, at 4-1 to 4-47.

See KOVACH, supra note 66, at 82-87.
See ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note 66, § 9:04; see also UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 8
(Draft Mar. 2000).
733.

734.
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35
activities that could have criminal consequences, such as child abuse.1
This evidence could easily be elicited (even if untrue) during the course of
a divorce or child custody mediation. Similarly, several states also have
mediation confidentiality statutes that simply do not apply in subsequent
criminal proceedings, meaning that testimony about anything said during
the course of a mediation could be compelled and used as evidence to convict
a party to the mediation, to the extent that it is relevant to the prosecution
of a later criminal case.13 ' Finally, not all mediations are successful, and,
upon termination, may give way to subsequent civil trials. While confidentiality statutes may bar the disclosure of statements made during the course
of the mediation, the reality is that the sensitive information that is the mortar of mediation has already been disclosed to one's opposition, as have the
strengths and weaknesses of one's case. Creative lawyering, of course, can
often effectively defeat the privilege of confidentiality once the information
has been disclosed. This is one reason that many a lawyer has decried mandatory mediation in court-related programs as being more of a discovery tool
than a settlement device.
As can be seen, even when the parties are balanced, the mediation can
present a substantial legal risk to the unsuspecting participant that the availability of a right to counsel can significantly and reasonably cure.

(4)

Advisory Processes

In most situations, evaluative processes and fact-finding likely will not
be subject to constitutional constraints because they will not be governmentally compelled. Yet even in those situations in which evaluators or
fact finders are state actors, any constitutional concerns are substantially
diminished by the nature of the role being played by the state actor.
In particular, these processes are neither adjudicatory nor consensual.
Rather, they are collateral processes intended to aid or facilitate the decision
making of a third party or parties by providing additional information. This
third-party decision maker can be either one or all of the parties themselves
(in the case of a neutral evaluator, for example), or an adjudicator (arbitrator,
judge, or administrative officer). Therefore, minimal but meaningful consti-

735. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-53(c) (1999) (domestic violence); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 26.09.015(3) (West 1997) (marriage dissolution). See generally UNIF. MEDIATION
ACT § 8(a)(5) (Draft Mar. 2000).
736.
See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 216.15B(2) (1997); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 150, § 10A (1998);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.023(C)(3) (Anderson 1997).
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tutional safeguards in this context should be confined to the qualified right
to counsel during the government-compelled fact-finding or evaluative
session. Much of the previous discussion of the right to counsel in arbitration
and mediation informs this analysis. As in those processes, one has a right
to an impartial fact finder or evaluator if that fact finder or evaluator is established to be a state actor. This would likely be in those limited situations
in which the fact finder or evaluator is directly appointed from a governmentapproved roster by a court, legislature, or government agency.
As such, bias remains our central constitutional concern in these contexts. While it is certainly possible that a fact finder can be biased, the effect
of that bias can be readily neutralized by the presence of counsel to make sure
that the fact finder is in compliance with any substantive or procedural limitations on their fact-finding authority, and that the party being investigated
does not disclose any detrimental information that would be privileged or
beyond the scope of the fact-finding mandate. Moreover, an attorney may
be expected to be sensitive to the possibility of bias or other mischief during
the investigation and to take appropriate steps to remedy it, such as moving
to disqualify the fact finder, highlighting information that is relevant but
being overlooked or trivialized, and refusing to permit inquiry into areas that
are privileged or beyond the scope of the fact-finding mandate including, if
necessary, the seeking of an injunction. Similarly, an evaluator may also be
biased, but counsel can readily remedy such bias by putting an evaluator's
assessments and judgments into perspective, or by recommending that another
evaluator be brought in for a second opinion. The right to counsel if one so
chooses is the essential minimal but meaningful due process safeguard in
these more remote ADR processes.
CONCLUSION
In describing the current state of the ADR movement in Part I, I noted
the puzzling inconsistencies in the empirical data on ADR, most notably
that institutional support tends to remain high while actual voluntary usage
of ADR tends to remain relatively low. I further submitted that at least part
of the reason for this puzzling inconsistency may be a legitimacy barrier
arising from the absence of enforceable constitutional standards in ADR, as
currently understood according to a bipolar paradigm. While hailing its
many virtues in providing for dispute resolution that may be more effective
and efficient than traditional litigation, I suggested that the proverbial glass
may be half full, rather than half empty, and questioned whether the glass
would continue to fill. After more than a quarter-century of growth, ADR
no longer enjoys the fresh bloom of its younger days, and, indeed, even its
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more zealous advocates are coming to acknowledge the legitimacy of the concems of ADR's critics.737
In my view, the recognition of the minimal but meaningful due process
standards described in this Article will help make it possible for the glass
to continue to fill. One ADR scholar has described the first decade
of modem ADR as being "one of experimentation, the second, one of
implementation[,] ... [and] the third, and current decade[,] ... one of regu73
lation.""
This may be seen not only in attempts to establish standards
by which the profession may operate and be regulated, such as the efforts to
draft a new Uniform Mediation Act and to revise the existing UAA, but
also in the new wave of ADR expansion now underway, particularly in the
judicial and administrative contexts.
While many of these efforts to regulate ADR have arisen from outside
the ADR community, it is notable that every major reform effort that has
arisen from within the industry has sounded in themes of due process, from
the various "due process protocols, 739 to ethical guidelines,74 to reform commissions."' These proposals are far more detailed in prescribing procedures
and standards than those minimal but meaningful constraints that may be
constitutionally required-the impartiality of the tribunal, the right to present and confront evidence, and the qualified right to counsel-depending
upon the process.
One's faith in the importance of recognizing such a limited constitutional dimension need not be limited to intuition, anecdotal evidence, and
scholarly prescience. New and important empirical research is beginning to
document not only the existence of structural weaknesses in ADR that raise

737. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Do the "Haves" Come Out Ahead inAlternative Judicial Systems? Repeat Players in ADR, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 19, 57 (1999).
738.
Kimberlee K. Kovach, Section Poised for an Important Year, DISP. RESOL. MAO., Fall
1997, at 3.
739.
See supra Part I.C.3.
740.
See, e.g., CPR-GEORGETOWN PROPOSED MODEL RULE OF CONDUCT FOR THE LAWYER
AS THIRD PARTY NEUTRAL (Draft Spring 1999); see also AAA/ABA/SPIDR MODEL STANDARDS
OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS (1994); Elizabeth Plapinger & Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ADR Ethics:
Model Rules Would Clarify Lawyer Conduct When Serving as Neutral, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Summer
1999, at 20.
741.
See generally SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONALS IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 533;
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN CIVIL CASES, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE
QUALITY OF JUSTICE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND THE JUDICIAL

SYSTEM (Aug. 1999) (final report of California statewide commission appointed by state Supreme
Court Chief Justice Ronald M. George to analyze and make recommendations with regard to problems with court-related ADR programs); THE CENTER FOR DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, INSTITUTE
OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, NATIONAL STANDARDS FOR COURT-CONNECTED MEDIATION

(1992).
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constitutional implications, but also the success that the imposition of due
process standards can have in enhancing the fairness, and the perception of
fairness, of such processes. 4 To be sure, there will still be the potential for
abuses under a unitary approach to public civil justice that recognizes the
constitutional character of harms caused by private actors that are fairly
attributable to the state. Such is the nature of the human condition. However, under a unitary approach, unlike the current bipolar understanding,
there would also be constitutional remedies that would be consistent with
the broader fabric of the law and with the reasonable and intuitive expectations of parties involved in those processes.
That said, one must be realistic and recognize that the unitary theory I
have suggested seems both implausible and inevitable at the same time. Its
implausibility may be inferred from the heavy weight of the current bipolar
understanding, according to which ADR and litigation exist in two separate
and exclusive spheres. Moreover, the incremental nature of the work of
courts mitigates against judicial adoption of a broader theory such as the unitary theory advanced here, because courts are asked to decide upon particular
questions of fact and law in the context of specific cases, rather than upon a
broad theory with highly integrated components.. Finally, there are always
generalized concerns about the uncontemplated issues that inevitably arise,
and understandably so.
The tempered nature of a unitary theory of dispute resolution can overcome at least some of these barriers by accommodating both the strong public
policy reasons supporting ADR and the demands of the state action doctrine.
The minimal but meaningful due process standards I have described incorporate into seemingly private ADR processes constitutional standards that
are sensitive both to the concerns that can arise in those processes and to
their unique needs.
There are, of course, constitutional issues other than due process that
may bear relevance to ADR once the constitutional border of ADR has been
recognized, as a couple of more salient examples illustrate. One is the degree
to which equal protection concerns may be implicated by ADR, such as
through statutory ADR schemes that permit one but not all parties to route
a case into ADR; some courts already have found such schemes constitutionally troublesome."' Similarly, the First Amendment right of the press
to have access to ADR hearings presents a serious clash between the rights
of the public to democratic participation (and government oversight) and
the needs of ADR processes for privacy that has only barely, and tepidly,
742.
743.

See supra notes 173-176 and accompanying text.
See generally Katz, supra note 98.
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been addressed by courts and commentators." Both are issues most worthy
of careful thought and intelligent discussion.
Finally, though not necessarily constitutional in nature, the recognition
of a constitutional dimension also has important implications for court
funding. That is, the recognition of state action in seemingly private ADR
processes, or the embrace of a unitary theory of dispute resolution, provides
additional support for the funding of such programs, if not an obligation.
Governmental processes for public dispute resolution other than trial seem
at least as worthy of adequate public funding as the single process for public
dispute resolution contemplated by the current bipolar model, namely, trial.
Indeed, once a means of measurement is established to quantify the relationship between the use of ADR processes and the number of conflicts that
escalate into more formalized disputes requiring trial, researchers may find
that public investment in funding ADR processes yields a greater return than
expanding funding for trial processes through the creation of more judgeships,
speciality courts, and other administrative devices that merely restructure
case management rather than reduce the flow of cases by preventing unnecessary conflict escalation. At a minimum, the expansion of public justice
through a more accurate understanding of ADR calls for renewed consideration of the funding question.
Despite the arguments against its adoption, there is an air of inevitability about the recognition of state action in some seemingly private ADR
processes, if not the embrace of a more fully developed unitary theory of
public civil dispute resolution. The more court-related ADR expands, the
more reasonable it is to expect questions to be raised in judicial forums over
due process, the First Amendment, equal protection, and possibly other constitutional issues. The more those constitutional questions are raised in the
court-related context, the greater the likelihood that courts will recognize
that those processes are driven by state action and therefore compel at least
rudimentary notions of due process as a constitutional imperative. In time,
the illogic of having different standards of fundamental fairness applicable in
the court-related and contractual contexts-especially given that the same
neutrals frequently serve in both spheres-may lead to the crumbling of that
wall in practice if not in theory. At that point, the wall between the public
and private dispute resolution systems will become imperceptibly thin, the
elements of a unitary system of dispute resolution will begin to align, and the
best promises of ADR will be well on their way to being finally fulfilled.

744.

See id.
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